Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who was fifteen years old and a native Spanish speaker, was transported to the police department for questioning in connection with the death of Jasmine Guevara. During her questioning by police, Defendant confessed to the murder. Defendant moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her Miranda rights. The juvenile court denied the motion. The case was then transferred to adult court in the First Judicial Circuit. The trial court reopened the motion to suppress and granted the motion, concluding that Defendant made her statements voluntarily but did not knowingly and intelligently waive her rights. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in suppressing Defendant’s confession where the State met its burden to show more likely than not that Defendant’s waiver of her Miranda rights was “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Revenue and Regulation (Department) issued Appellant a jeopardy assessment alleging unpaid sales tax. On appeal, a hearing examiner found Appellant liable for a jeopardy assessment, and the Secretary of Revenue adopted the decision. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that Appellant's failure to pay the amounts affirmed by the Secretary or to file a bond before commencing its appeal resulted in the failure to preserve jurisdiction in the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's failure to post its bond within the statutory period was fatal to its appeal; (2) Appellant failed to substantially comply with the relevant statute; and (3) the time for Appellant to post its bond could not be equitably tolled.View "AEG Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc. v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, second-degree rape, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant subsequently filed an amended application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, a fair trial, and due process of law. The habeas court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Defendant's due process claim regarding cross-examination of the victim concerning her sexual activity before the rape and her post-rape drug charge were res judicata; and (3) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant's remaining due process argument lacked evidentiary support.View "Fast Horse v. Weber" on Justia Law

Amanda Pfuhl obtained a temporary protection order against her husband Jason. One month later, the circuit court continued the protection order for another month and appointed counsel, Tressa Kool, for the couple’s minor children. After the matter was heard again, the protection order was dismissed for failure to provide sufficient evidence. Kool subsequently sought costs related to her appointment. The circuit court ordered that Minnehaha County (“Minnehaha”) pay Kool $1094. Minnehaha appealed. On appeal, the circuit court argued that S.D. Codified Laws 26-8A-18 required the appointment counsel for the minor children and required ordering Minnehaha to pay appointed counsel’s costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked statutory authority in this case to order Minnehaha to pay appointed counsel’s costs because section 26-8A-18 applies to the particular subject of a child’s status or condition, and that was not the particular subject of the proceeding the circuit court presided over. View "Pfuhl v. Pfuhl" on Justia Law

After Earl Long died, Earl’s daughter, Brenda Chafin, challenged the validity of Earl’s estate plan, which included certain gifts and amendments to his trust. The circuit court concluded that Earl’s estate plan was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Earl had the requisite testamentary capacity to carry out his estate plan; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that Earl’s estate plan was not the product of undue influence; and (3) the circuit court did not err by not requiring the distributions to be equalized under a review of Earl’s entire estate plan. View "In re Estate of Long" on Justia Law

Defendant and his stepson were jointly charged with thirteen felonies. Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges stemming from two of the burglaries, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted on nine of the thirteen felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions; and (2) denying Defendant's motion to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder because the charges were properly joined and Defendant failed to show the denial of his motion to sever charges resulted in clear prejudice to his substantial rights.View "State v. Dowty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of fourteen "recreational park trailers" that were used as cabins for lodging in a campground Plaintiff operated. Pennington County assessed the cabins as real property for ad valorem taxation purposes. The County Board of Equalization affirmed the assessment. On appeal, the circuit court reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that the cabins were not taxable under S.D. Codified Laws 10-4-2. The County appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when considered together, the facts of this case established that Plaintiff's cabins were "improvements to land" within the meaning of section 10-4-2(2). View "Rushmore Shadows, LLC v. Pennington County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old K.V. threw a large rock that struck nine-year-old G.E. in the head. The incident took place near the intersection of three backyards, one of which belonged to the rental home of the Vitals, K.V.'s parents, the second of which belonged to the Englunds, G.E.'s parents, and the third of which belonged to Robert Smith, the Vitals' landlord. The Englunds filed an action against K.V., the Vitals, and Smith. The claims against Smith included negligence, negligent rental, and punitive damages. The trial court granted summary judgment for Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Smith did not owe a duty of care to G.E. based on his position as landlord and did not owe a duty to protect G.E. from the alleged intentional or criminal conduct of K.V.View "Englund v. Vital" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part II information alleged that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions within the last ten years, in 2003, 2004, and 2007. Defendant moved to strike the prior convictions, alleging that he pleaded guilty to the DUI charges without being adequately advised of his Boykin rights, rendering the prior convictions invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was a complete absence of any Boykin waiver advisement in the 2007 case, and thus, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to strike his 2007 conviction. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Bilben" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were married in 1997 and had five children together. Mother later filed for a divorce, and a decree of divorce was filed in 2010. The parties stipulated to joint legal custody with Mother having primary physical custody of the children. Following a domestic violence incident between Mother and Mother's new husband, Father sought permanent change of custody for the five children. The trial court granted temporary custody of the children to Father, after which Mother divorced her new husband. A permanent custody trial was later held, after which the trial court awarded joint legal custody and primary physical custody to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the best interests of the children that Father be awarded primary physical custody.View "Severson v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law