Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant and his stepson were jointly charged with thirteen felonies. Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges stemming from two of the burglaries, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted on nine of the thirteen felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions; and (2) denying Defendant's motion to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder because the charges were properly joined and Defendant failed to show the denial of his motion to sever charges resulted in clear prejudice to his substantial rights.View "State v. Dowty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of fourteen "recreational park trailers" that were used as cabins for lodging in a campground Plaintiff operated. Pennington County assessed the cabins as real property for ad valorem taxation purposes. The County Board of Equalization affirmed the assessment. On appeal, the circuit court reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that the cabins were not taxable under S.D. Codified Laws 10-4-2. The County appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when considered together, the facts of this case established that Plaintiff's cabins were "improvements to land" within the meaning of section 10-4-2(2). View "Rushmore Shadows, LLC v. Pennington County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old K.V. threw a large rock that struck nine-year-old G.E. in the head. The incident took place near the intersection of three backyards, one of which belonged to the rental home of the Vitals, K.V.'s parents, the second of which belonged to the Englunds, G.E.'s parents, and the third of which belonged to Robert Smith, the Vitals' landlord. The Englunds filed an action against K.V., the Vitals, and Smith. The claims against Smith included negligence, negligent rental, and punitive damages. The trial court granted summary judgment for Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Smith did not owe a duty of care to G.E. based on his position as landlord and did not owe a duty to protect G.E. from the alleged intentional or criminal conduct of K.V.View "Englund v. Vital" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part II information alleged that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions within the last ten years, in 2003, 2004, and 2007. Defendant moved to strike the prior convictions, alleging that he pleaded guilty to the DUI charges without being adequately advised of his Boykin rights, rendering the prior convictions invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was a complete absence of any Boykin waiver advisement in the 2007 case, and thus, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to strike his 2007 conviction. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Bilben" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were married in 1997 and had five children together. Mother later filed for a divorce, and a decree of divorce was filed in 2010. The parties stipulated to joint legal custody with Mother having primary physical custody of the children. Following a domestic violence incident between Mother and Mother's new husband, Father sought permanent change of custody for the five children. The trial court granted temporary custody of the children to Father, after which Mother divorced her new husband. A permanent custody trial was later held, after which the trial court awarded joint legal custody and primary physical custody to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the best interests of the children that Father be awarded primary physical custody.View "Severson v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Steven Thomas & Sons (T&S), LLC did excavation and soil compaction work for an addition to a school building in the Kimball School District. The School District was later informed that problems in the building caused by settling issues were due to negligently performed work by T&S. The School District brought suit against T&S and other defendants. T&S’s commercial general liability insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) withdrew from contributing to T&S's defense, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for continuous or progressive property damage that occurred before the effective date of the policy, and the problems to the building were observed before the 2007 policy date. In 2005 and 2006, T&S was insured by AMCO Insurance Company. Ultimately, AMCO paid defense costs and indemnified T&S for its share of the arbitration award in favor of the School District. AMCO subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against EMC seeking a ruling that EMC had a joint duty to defend T&S and a declaration that EMC’s policy exclusion was void as against public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of EMC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that EMC’s exclusion did not violate public policy. View "AMCO Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellants entered into a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans that secured a promissory note in the amount of $165,750 and encumbered certain property. Plaintiffs later refinanced the loan by executing a promissory note in favor of Countrywide in the amount of $236,900 and executed a mortgage in the property in favor of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. In 2009, Appellants defaulted under the terms of the subject note and mortgage. In 2011, BAC filed an amended complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The circuit court granted BAC’s motion for summary judgment. The court also awarded attorney fees to BAC and reformed the mortgage by changing the legal description. The property was subsequently sold to BAC at a sheriff’s sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting BAC summary judgment to foreclose the mortgage; (2) the circuit court did not err in awarding BAC attorney fees and costs; and (3) the circuit court’s revision of the mortgage reflected the true intention of the parties and therefore, was not error. View "BAC Homes Loans Servicing, LP v. Trancynger" on Justia Law

In 1967, Severt Kvalheim conveyed certain real property to Gordon Holsti by warranty deed. Kvalheim reserved fifty percent of the mineral rights for himself. That same year, Kvalheim executed a will devising to each of his heirs a one-eighth interest in his estate. Kvalheim died in 1969. In 2007, Gordon Holsti conveyed the surface estate to his sons (the Holstis). Believing Kvalheim’s mineral interest had lapsed and been abandoned because of nonuse, the Holstis published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the official county newspaper. When no one filed a statement of claim asserting ownership of the mineral interest severed from the property, the Holstis brought a quiet title action. The circuit court ruled that the Holstis were the owners of the entire mineral interest, concluding (1) Kvalheim’s mineral interest had been abandoned under section S.D. Codified Laws 43-30A-2, -3; and (2) the Holstis gave proper notice of the lapse of the mineral interest even though they did not serve notice of the lapse on Kvalheim’s heirs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mineral interests were not abandoned under section 43-30A-2. Remanded. View "Holsti v. Kimber" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to grand theft by insufficient funds check. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to eight years in the penitentiary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed properly to advise him of all of his constitutional and statutory rights at his plea hearing and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea; and (2) Defendant’s contention that his eight-year penitentiary sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment was without merit. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law