Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl
Defendant applied for homeowner's insurance with Insurer, and his application was approved. Several years later, after discovering a misrepresentation in Defendant's application, Insurer rescinded the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Defendant. Insurer then initiated this action against Defendant, alleging that it lawfully rescinded the insurance contract with Defendant. Insurer also sought recovery of all monies paid to Defendant under the insurance contract. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant made a misrepresentation on his homeowner's insurance application and that the misrepresentation was material. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no material question of fact existed regarding whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation on his application for homeowner's insurance, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Insurer. View "De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl" on Justia Law
Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y
Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Black Hills Federal Credit Union and CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for changing their credit disability insurance policy. The complaint alleged that Defendants wrongfully switched the credit disability insurance policies of 4,461 borrowers. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the adequacy requirement or the predominance and superiority requirements of the class certification statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its application of the class certification statutes to the facts in this case. Remanded for certification of the class. View "Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y" on Justia Law
Patitucci v. City of Hill City
Plaintiff was injured while walking on a sidewalk abutting a Granite Sports, a sporting goods store in Hill City. The sidewalk also abutted a state/federal highway. Plaintiff and her husband sued Granite Sports and the City for negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that neither owed a duty to Plaintiffs to keep the sidewalk reasonably safe. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the City, holding that the City had sufficient control of the sidewalk to charge it with the affirmative duty of keeping its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for public travel; and (2) affirmed the summary judgment granted in favor of Granite Sports, holding that the store did not have the general duty to keep the sidewalk reasonably safe in this case, and it thus did not have the lesser included duty to warn. Remanded. View "Patitucci v. City of Hill City" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, South Dakota Supreme Court
State v. Medicine Eagle
M.E.H. alleged she was kidnapped and raped by Defendant in 2000. The charges against Defendant were dismissed when DNA testing failed to implicate him. In 2008, the case was reopened, and the evidence obtained in 2000 was retested using a new method of DNA testing, which revealed the presence of Defendant's DNA. Defendant was again indicted, and a part II information was filed charging Defendant as a habitual offender. The jury found Defendant guilty of rape in the second and third degree and related charges. In a separate trial, the jury found Defendant was a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of an incident involving another alleged victim as other acts evidence; (2) did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by admitting testimony regarding the results of the DNA testing performed in 2008 and 2011, even though some steps of the testing were performed by nontestifying analysts; but (3) because the State's filing of an amended part II information effectively dismissed the original part II information, the State's dismissal of the amended part II information left the trial court without jurisdiction over the habitual offender proceedings. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Medicine Eagle" on Justia Law
State v. Wheeler
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant appealed, asserting that the jury had insufficient evidence to find that he possessed the marijuana found in the apartment he resided in. Defendant's girlfriend was listed as the apartment's only tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, as (1) Defendant had at least joint control over the dresser where the marijuana was found and thus joint control over the marijuana; and (2) Defendant's had a knowledge of the specific character and location of the marijuana. View "State v. Wheeler" on Justia Law
In re Nelson Living Trust
Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law
Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co.
This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded. View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law
State v. Clements
The State charged Defendant with bigamy in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 22-22A-1. Defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the State failed to state a public offense. Specifically, Defendant argued that because a bigamous marriage is void ab initio under S.D. Codified Laws 25-1-8, he was never legally married the second time, and thus, it was legally impossible to prosecute him for bigamy. The trial court accepted this argument and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in order to give meaning and effect to the enactment of section 22-22A-1, bigamy is committed when a person enters into a purported marriage contract or relationship at a time when the person already has a living spouse. Remanded. View "State v. Clements" on Justia Law
Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims.
View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Velocity Invs., LLC v. Dybvig Installations, Inc.
A corporation entered into an agreement with Wells Fargo for a business line of credit. The owners of the corporation signed the document as officers of the corporation. The corporation later defaulted on the line of credit. Velocity Investments, the alleged successor in interest to Wells Fargo, subsequently filed suit against the corporation and the owners as personal guarantors of the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment for Velocity after the owners, acting pro se, failed to respond to Velocity's statement of material facts and requests for admissions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in denying the owners' motion for leave to answer requests for admissions, as (i) allowing the owners to answer the requests for admissions would serve the presentation of the merits of this case, and (ii) Velocity failed to demonstrate that it would be prejudiced if the owners were allowed to answer; and (2) because the trial court granted summary judgment based solely upon the owners' failure to respond to the request for admissions, genuine issues of material fact still existed, and the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. View "Velocity Invs., LLC v. Dybvig Installations, Inc." on Justia Law