Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Wife moved into a nursing home, Husband disinherited Wife in his will. Wife's attorney-in-fact, her son, disclaimed any inheritance Wife may have been entitled to receive from Husband's estate. One year later, while Wife was receiving Medicaid assistance for her nursing home care, Husband predeceased Wife. Wife's guardian ad litem petitioned for an elective share of Husband's estate and moved to set aside the disclaimer. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Wife had validly disclaimed her right to an elective share and that Wife received her fair share of Husband's estate when Husband used their joint resources to pay for her care. The Department of Social Services, which administers the Medicaid program, intervened and moved to reconsider. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for Wife to obtain her elective share, holding (1) Wife was entitled to an elective share; and (2) because no prejudice to interested parties was demonstrated, the circuit court erred by not granting the guardian ad litem's motion to revoke the disclaimer where the guardian was acting in Wife's best interests. View "In re Estate of Shipman" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with numerous crimes, including grand theft. Defendant entered into an agreement with the State in which the State agreed to defer prosecution of the grand theft charge if Defendant pleaded guilty to other charges and complied with additional conditions, one of which required Defendant to plead guilty to grand theft if he violated any of the other conditions of the agreement. Defendant later violated some of the conditions of the agreement, and consequently, the State re-filed the grand theft charge against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to exercise his right to a jury trial. The circuit court denied the motion based on the terms of the agreement. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to grand theft and was sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the portion of the agreement requiring Defendant to plead guilty to grand theft was unenforceable because it unconstitutionally deprived Defendant of his right to voluntarily enter his choice of plea on the grand theft charge; and (2) because that portion of the agreement was unenforceable, the circuit court erred in determining that Defendant was bound by that portion of the agreement and in subsequently denying Defendant's motion to exercise his right to a jury trial. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a teacher employed by the Beresford School District. In 2011, the Beresford Board of Education voted not to renew Plaintiff's teaching contract for the upcoming year as part of a reduction-in-force (RIF). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Board utilized the wrong RIF policy in not renewing her contract. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly found that the policy for reductions in force was governed by a 2010-2011 negotiated agreement and properly followed the staff reduction policy contained in that agreement in deciding to terminate Plaintiff's employment; (2) the Board correctly applied the 2010-2011 RIF policy; and (3) the Board's decision to eliminate Plaintiff's position was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Huth v. Beresford Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a contract with DJ Construction (DJ) to build a home on their property. Construction was halted two years later after Plaintiffs discovered significant water damage in the home. Plaintiffs sued DJ, seeking to recover for the damage to their home and DJ's failure to complete the house. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, DJ's insurer, denied DJ's requests for defense and indemnity against Plaintiffs' claims, determining coverage was not provided for under the terms of the policy. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a stipulated judgment and settlement agreement with DJ in which DJ confessed judgment and assigned its rights and claims against Owners to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then filed suit against Owners based on Owners' failure to defend and indemnify DJ. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Owners, determining there was no coverage under the policy because multiple policy exclusions applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Owners on Plaintiffs' breach of contract and bad faith claims based upon its determination that multiple policy exclusions applied. View "Swenson v. Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by Shane Erwin for making an illegal left turn. After engaging in routine traffic stop questioning, the officer became suspicious and walked his drug-sensing dog around Defendant's vehicle. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were later found in the vehicle. Shane and his father, Richard Erwin, who was traveling in the vehicle, were both arrested. The Erwins moved to suppress evidence, alleging an illegal stop. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer had probable cause to stop the Erwins because he witnessed a violation of S.D. Codified Laws 32-26-18, which requires that a left turning vehicle turn into the left most lawfully available lane. Remanded. View "State v. Erwin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arraignment was inadequate and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant had sufficient notice of the charge against him, pleaded not guilty, exercised his rights, and had an adequate opportunity to defend himself at trial, there was no error in the arraignment; and (2) Defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred in failing to enter a specific finding that the minor victim was a competent witness, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff stopped a pickup truck because he did not see the vehicle's temporary license permit on the rear window. Defendant, the driver, was subsequently arrested for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the deputy unconstitutionally extended the scope of the stop by initiating contact with the driver when the deputy could have first confirmed that the temporary license permit was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that the initial stop of Defendant's pickup was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was without a license; (2) when an officer stops a vehicle based on objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, and the officer's suspicion is dispelled, the officer may nonetheless approach the driver and explain the mistake; and (3) it was error for the circuit court to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the stop and to order dismissal of the case. View "State v. Amick" on Justia Law

An intoxicated driver (Driver) struck and injured several children. Driver later pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular battery. Driver's insurer (Insurer) brought a declaratory action seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver in any negligence suit brought on the children's behalf. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Insurer, ruling that coverage had expired twelve hours prior to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by failing to accept the offer from Insurer to renew her insurance policy, Driver's coverage expired the day before the accident under the express and unambiguous terms of the insurance contract. View "Alpha Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ihle" on Justia Law

At the start of each beekeeping season, Elllingson's Inc. placed its honey bees on the real property of others. After Ellingson's determined it would not longer own bees, it leased to other beekeepers the right to place bees on the property of some of the landowners with whom Ellingson's had been doing business. In 2011, Jim Ammann, a competing beekeeper, sought permission to place his bees on the property of landowners who had previously given Ellingson's permission to place bees. Several landowners subsequently revoked the permission they had given Ellingson's and granted Ammann permission to place his bees on their property. David Ellingson, a principal in Ellingson's, sued Ammann for interference with a business relationship and other causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ammann. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that David had no business interference claim he could assert in his individual capacity, and thus, summary judgment in favor of Ammann was proper. View "Ellingson v. Ammann" on Justia Law

Appellees John Apland and others (collectively, Apland) and the Butte County Director of Equalization (Director) were involved in a dispute over the method Director used to calculate the value of Apland's rangeland property for tax purposes. In Apland I, the Supreme Court held that Director failed to comply with the Constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity and remanded with direction to Director to re-determine the property values after giving appropriate consideration and value to appurtenant and nontransferable water rights. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Apland, concluding that Director failed to comply with the directives in Apland I. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Director properly executed the directives of Apland I but that the record did not allow the Court to determine whether Director's method of valuation of Apland's property resulted in an equal and uniform assessment. View "Apland v. Bd. of Equalization for Butte County" on Justia Law