Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants owned three lots in the Eagle Crest subdivision adjacent to the Eagle Ridge Estates (Eagle Ridge) subdivision. Defendants' predecessor in title obtained a private access easement from the prior owners of Eagle Ridge, which allowed Defendants to access their property in Eagle Crest by way of roads running through Eagle Ridge. In exchange, the grantee of the easement agreed to pay an annual general road assessment for each lot. The Eagle Ridge Homeowners Association (Association) brought suit against Defendants for their failure to pay general assessments for three assessment years. Defendants argued that the Association only had authority to assess general road assessments against them and not general assessments. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the Association and awarded attorney fees, finding that the expenditures made by the Association were associated with roads. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues with the exception of the Association's request for certain attorney fees because of contradictory findings and conclusions by the trial court. Remanded. View "Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Plaintiff granted a drainage easement to Pennington County on land he owned. In 1996, silt began to accumulate near the bottom of the canyon on part of Plaintiff's land due to the County's repair of a section of road abutting Plaintiff's land. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against the County for nuisance, constructive taking, trespass, and unlawful taking. The trial court granted summary judgment for the County, determining that there was no continuing tort and that the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County, as the County's actions did not constitute a continuing tort, and thus, Plaintiff's action was untimely filed. View "Brandt v. County of Pennington" on Justia Law

AgFirst Farmers Cooperative (AgFirst) sued Diamond C Dairy (Diamond) for cattle feed allegedly purchased by Diamond. Diamond admitted it owed AgFirst for some of the feed but contended that some shipments could have been sent to a facility in Ft. Dodge, Iowa that was owned by another company. The trial court disallowed this defense by refusing to allow Diamond to withdraw its admissions admitting that the feed had been delivered to its facility. Diamond also contended it did not owe AgFirst for some shipments because Diamond's facility did not have sufficient storage capacity to accommodate those loads of feed. The circuit court rejected this second defense and awarded AgFirst a money judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of fact were adequate to support its determination that there was sufficient storage space at Diamond's facility to have accepted AgFirst's deliveries; (2) the record was inadequate to determine whether the award of attorney's fees and expenses to AgFirst was appropriate; and (3) the court applied the wrong test in denying Diamond's request to withdraw admissions relating to the Ft. Dodge defense. Remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "AgFirst Farmers Coop. v. Diamond C Dairy, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of a voting interest in Coldwell Banker Lewis-Kirkeby-Hall Real Estate, Inc. (CBLKH). Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract under which the parties agreed that Plaintiff would sell Defendant his shares of CBLKH voting stock. On the closing date of the contract, Defendant failed to attend the closing and did not pay the amount agreed upon for Plaintiff's shares. After negotiations between the parties failed, Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract against Defendant. Defendant raised the defense that his consent to enter into the contract was obtained by fraud. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant for $250,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the contract was clear and unambiguous as to Defendant's receipt of financial documents; but (2) the court erred in barring Defendant's fraudulent inducement evidence under the parole evidence rule. View "Poeppel v. Lester" on Justia Law

Appellant, a forty-eight-year-old who lived independently for two decades, had "borderline intellectual functioning," an expressive language disorder, and a learning disorder. Appellant applied for Home and Community Based Services (HCBS), a federal-state Medicaid Waiver program that provides assistance to individuals with developmental disabilities. The South Dakota Department of Human Services (the Department) denied Appellant's application, determining that Appellant was not eligible for HCBS. After a hearing, an ALJ affirmed the Department's denial. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not clearly err in finding that Appellant did not qualify for benefits, as the evidence indicated that Appellant was a generally independent client who was able to function with little supervision or in the absence of a continuous active treatment program. View "Nelson v. Dep't of Social Servs." on Justia Law

An Arizona couple was injured on their motorcycle by another biker. The accident occurred in South Dakota. Because the other motorcyclist left the scene, the couple sought uninsured motorist benefits from their insurer. The couple's policy was issued in Arizona for a motorcycle registered and principally garaged in Arizona. The insurer tendered the policy's full uninsured motorist benefits of $15,000 per person. However, the couple would have recovered $25,000 per person in South Dakota had they been able to obtain the other biker's liability insurance. The circuit court declared that the terms of the Arizona insurance policy, rather than South Dakota law, governed the applicable coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that altering the terms of the parties' contracts in these circumstances was not supported by law. View "Milinkovich v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Shirley Murphy (Mrs. Murphy), who was ninety years old at the time of this action, had four adult daughters, Dee, Shirley, Claudia, and Mary (collectively, Daughters). In May 2012, Claudia obtained an appointment as Mrs. Murphy's temporary guardian and conservator. Both Claudia and Shirley petitioned to serve as permanent guardian and conservator. After a trial, the circuit court appointed Claudia permanent guardian and conservator. On September 5, 2012, notice of entry of the order appointing Claudia was served on Daughters. On October 10, 2012, Shirley served notice of her appeal by mail on Mrs. Murphy and Daughters. Claudia moved to dismiss Shirley's appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Shirley failed to timely serve her notice of appeal on all the parties to the action, and her appeal must be dismissed. View "In re Guardianship of Murphy" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law

The City of Rapid City applied a deicer to the streets adjacent to property owned by the Ruperts. The Ruperts sued the City, claiming that the deicer ran onto their property and destroyed several pine trees. The trial court granted the Ruperts' motion for summary judgment on their inverse condemnation claim, and a jury awarded the Ruperts $126,530 to compensate them for the damage to their property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Ruperts on their inverse condemnation claim, but the measure of damages used at trial for purposes of calculating the just compensation award was erroneous; (2) the trial court properly denied the Ruperts' request for attorney fees; and (3) the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on the Ruperts' claims of negligence and trespass did not constitute reversible error. Remanded for a new trial on damages. View "Rupert v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

When Peggy Nelson was ninety-one years old, she executed a durable power of attorney giving John Rice numerous powers over her personal and financial affairs. When Peggy was ninety-four years old, her niece and nephew petitioned the circuit court to appoint a guardian and conservator for Peggy and her estate, alleging that Rice was plundering Peggy's estate by misuse of the power of attorney. The circuit court subsequently appointed a temporary emergency guardian and conservator for Peggy to protect her personal and financial interests. After the circuit court extended the appointment of the temporary emergency guardian and conservator, Rice requested the court to set aside its previous orders as void due to the court's failure to follow regular procedures in the proceeding. The court denied Rice's petition. Rice appealed, contending that the court's failure to follow the mandates of the South Dakota Guardianship and Conservatorship Act extinguished the court's jurisdiction to appoint the guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded the matter for the court to fulfill the requirements of the Act, including its continued administration of the guardianship and conservatorship. View "In re Guardianship of Nelson" on Justia Law