Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In South Dakota, Kenneth Leroy Kurtz pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court determined there were aggravating circumstances that justified a departure from the presumptive probation sentence, and Kurtz was sentenced to five years in prison. Kurtz appealed the decision, arguing that he did not pose a significant risk to the public and therefore should have received probation. Alternatively, he claimed the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum prison sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court had wrongly applied the statute for presumptive probation. The court noted that while the circuit court had identified aggravating circumstances, it had also found that Kurtz did not pose a significant risk to the public. The Supreme Court pointed out that the law allows for a departure from presumptive probation only if aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk to the public are found.The court concluded that the circuit court's statement that punishment was warranted regardless of whether Kurtz posed a threat to society contradicted the mandate in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for the circuit court to issue a sentence of probation. View "State v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of South Dakota heard the case of Steven Foshay, who was deemed incompetent to stand trial on four criminal charges in 2017. He was committed to a state facility for competency restoration treatment, which remained unsuccessful over the years. In 2021, Foshay requested the dismissal of his charges, citing South Dakota Codified Law (SDCL) 23A-10A-14, which mandates the dismissal of a defendant’s criminal charges when there is no significant probability that the defendant will become competent to proceed in the foreseeable future. The circuit court denied his motion, and Foshay appealed.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the circuit court had erred by not dismissing Foshay's charges in accordance with the relevant statute, given the undisputed testimony that there was no substantial probability that Foshay would become competent in the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the entry of an order dismissing the criminal charges against Foshay. Any further determinations regarding Foshay's commitment would need to be addressed through a civil commitment proceeding. View "State V. Foshay" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, petitioners Tammy Bohn, Justin Bohn, and Brenda Vasknetz (collectively, the Citizens) sought a writ of mandamus against several city officials after the finance officer for the City of Sturgis declined to certify their petition to hold an election to remove the position of city manager from the City’s government. The circuit court denied the writ by granting summary judgment in favor of the City. The Citizens appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court concluded that the finance officer had a clear duty under administrative rules to certify the petition and present it to the city council, as long as the petition was in the correct form, contained the necessary number of valid signatures, and met the requirements in terms of header and verification. The Court held that neither the finance officer nor the city council had the authority to delay the scheduling of an election to vote on the submitted petition. Their attempts to do so were based on their mistaken belief that the law does not allow citizens to request an election on whether the City should no longer utilize a city manager.As a result, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter a writ of mandamus directing the city council to schedule and hold an election consistent with the relevant statute as presented in the petition. The Court also concluded that the Citizens were not entitled to attorney fees, but, as the prevailing party, they were entitled to costs. View "Bohn V. Bueno" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, Emily Bialota sought to gain title to a property previously owned by Lakota Lakes, LLC, which was sold at a tax sale due to unpaid property taxes. Bialota argued that she had properly served Lakota Lakes with a notice of intent to take tax deed, while Lakota Lakes claimed it had not been validly served, rendering the tax deed void. The circuit court granted Lakota Lakes' motion for summary judgment, determining that Bialota had not properly served the notice. Bialota appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It held that under Minnesota law, which Lakota Lakes operated under, the Minnesota Secretary of State was the valid agent for service of process as Lakota Lakes had been administratively terminated and failed to maintain a registered agent for service of process. The court further held that Bialota had personally served the notice on the Minnesota Secretary of State, which was deemed proper under South Dakota law. Therefore, the court concluded that Bialota had correctly served Lakota Lakes and was entitled to the tax deed to the property. View "Bialota V. Lakota Lakes" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, a Minnesota-based company, Ellingson Drainage, Inc., was charged a use tax by the South Dakota Department of Revenue (DOR) after an audit revealed Ellingson had not paid use tax on equipment used in South Dakota but purchased elsewhere. Ellingson challenged the constitutionality of the tax in an administrative appeal, which was dismissed. The company then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the imposition of the tax, holding it did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause. Ellingson appealed this decision and the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota also affirmed the imposition of the tax.The Court determined that the use tax, imposed under SDCL 10-46-3, met all four prongs of the Complete Auto test, which is used to determine if a tax violates the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court found that Ellingson had a sufficient connection to South Dakota, the tax was fairly related to benefits provided to the taxpayer, the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and the tax was fairly apportioned. Moreover, the Court concluded that the use tax did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as Ellingson had a sufficient connection to South Dakota and the statute was rationally related to South Dakota values.The Court rejected Ellingson's argument that the tax was unfairly disproportionate to the extent of the equipment’s usage in South Dakota, stating that "use is use" and that the provisions of SDCL 10-46-3 do not contemplate a formula by which to measure use. The Court concluded that such a change is not a judicial one, but rather one better suited to the formulation of public policy by the Legislature. View "Ellingson Drainage v. Dep’t Of Revenue" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of healthcare providers (Providers) sued the insurer Sanford Health Plan, Inc. (SHP) for excluding them from participating in some of its health benefit plans. The Providers argued that according to South Dakota’s “Any Willing Provider” law (SDCL 58-17J-2), they had the right to participate as panel providers in all of SHP's plans. The law stipulates that a health insurer cannot block patient choice by excluding a willing and qualified healthcare provider from its panel of providers if the provider is within the geographic coverage area of the health benefit plan. The circuit court determined that the law did not permit SHP to exclude a qualified and willing healthcare provider from participating in every health benefit plan it offered, granting summary judgment in favor of the Providers.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court's decision. It interpreted the law as plan-specific, meaning an insurer may not exclude any willing and fully qualified provider from any of its plans or from any tier within a plan. It also clarified that an insurer may still exclude providers from plans if they do not meet the statutory requirements for participation as a panel provider. The court concluded that, according to the law, SHP could not exclude the Providers from participating in its TRUE Plan or Tier 1 of the PLUS Plan, thus affirming the circuit court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Providers. View "Orthopedic Institute v. Sanford Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

In South Dakota, realtor Joshua Uhre, who owns Uhre Realty Corporation (URC) and Uhre Property Management Corporation (UPM), had a dispute with Benjamin and Leslie Tronnes over the sale of their property. The Tronneses had contracted with Uhre to sell their property and entered into a property management agreement that authorized Uhre to lease and manage the property if it did not sell. After the property was leased to a tenant, the Tronneses sold the property directly to the tenant after the listing agreement expired. Uhre claimed that his realty company was entitled to a sales commission and that his property management company was entitled to a management fee for the entire lease agreement, despite its early termination. Uhre sued the Tronneses for breach of the listing agreement, breach of the management agreement, and civil conspiracy. The Tronneses counterclaimed, alleging that Uhre and his companies had interfered with their business expectation with the tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that Uhre was not entitled to a sales commission because he did not procure a ready, willing, and able buyer during the term of the listing agreement. The court also rejected Uhre's argument that the lease agreement gave him an option to buy the property, finding that it did not contain the necessary terms for a valid option contract. Additionally, the court found that the Tronneses did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Regarding the management agreement, the court ruled in favor of the Tronneses, stating that Uhre was only entitled to 10% of the monthly rent that had accrued through June 3, 2021, which he had already received. Finally, the court reversed the lower court's determination that the Tronneses were entitled to attorney fees, finding that the listing agreement only authorized fees in the event of a breach of contract. View "Uhre Realty V. Tronnes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Charles Redlin and First Interstate Bank. The case arose out of a dispute involving the Helene M. Redlin Trust. The trust was established by Helene Redlin with the aim to provide for her children in case of financial difficulties. After her death, the trust assets were placed in a low-interest money market account. Kelly Redlin, one of the beneficiaries, sued Charles and First Interstate for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that their failure to properly invest the trust assets constituted bad faith and gross negligence. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Charles and First Interstate, holding that the terms of the trust waived the Prudent Investor Rule, and their decisions to invest the assets in a money market account didn't constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota agreed with the lower court's decision, stating that the trust's waiver of the Prudent Investor Rule allowed the trustees to make investment decisions irrespective of any risk or nonproductiveness. The court found no evidence that Charles or First Interstate acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent in their management of the trust assets. As such, the court concluded that the conservative investment approach adopted by the trustees did not constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty. View "Redlin Trust V. First Interstate Bank" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, Todd Stevens was convicted on six counts related to drug possession and distribution. The state's key witness was Ashley Burgers, Stevens' former roommate and fellow methamphetamine user, who testified in exchange for immunity. Stevens' trial counsel did not request, and the court did not provide, corroboration or cautionary instructions for the jury regarding Burgers' testimony. On appeal, Stevens asserted that the lack of these instructions was plain error and also argued ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for failing to propose such instructions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the absence of a corroboration instruction was plain error, but concluded that Stevens was not prejudiced by this error because the other evidence presented by the State thoroughly corroborated Burgers' testimony. The court also found that the failure of the circuit court to give a cautionary instruction sua sponte was not error, much less plain error. Lastly, the court held that Stevens' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unsuccessful because the lack of prejudice in the plain error review precluded a successful claim on this issue. View "State V. Stevens" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, the defendant, Robert Horse, appealed his conviction of third-degree rape. The defendant raised three main issues: the validity of a search warrant for location data from his phone, comments made during trial by the State about the victim’s motivation to testify, and opinion testimony given by the detective who investigated the case.On June 4, 2019, the 14-year-old victim, D.M., reported that she was assaulted by a man named "Robert." She had spent the day with Robert, during which they drove around Rapid City, smoked marijuana, and drank alcohol. D.M.'s memory of the events was spotty due to her intoxication. She later identified Robert Horse from a photo lineup. A rape kit showed DNA matching Horse.Detective Dupres, who led the investigation, obtained a search warrant for Horse's cell phone and separate warrants for his Google account to gather location data. The data, analyzed by FBI Agent Fennern, helped map out Horse's movements on the day of the alleged crime. Detective Dupres offered an opinion at trial that the assault occurred at Horse's residence.The court held that there was probable cause to authorize the search warrant for the Google location data, although the exact warrants for this data were not included in the record before the court. The court also decided that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Horse’s objection to the State’s question regarding D.M.’s motive for testifying and in denying Horse’s motion for a mistrial based on the State’s comment. Lastly, the court ruled that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Detective Dupres to opine about the location of the crime.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's conviction of Horse for third-degree rape. View "State V. Horse" on Justia Law