Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Misty Jo Oliver asked the trial court to expunge her record of two misdemeanor convictions pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-26 through 23A-3-33 (collectively, the expungement statutes). The trial court granted her request. The State appealed on the grounds that under both the expungement statutes and the state Constitution the trial court was without jurisdiction to expunge records of Oliver's convictions. After analyzing the statutes and the legislative history, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the expungement statutes to apply to convictions, and therefore, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by expunging the records of Oliver's convictions. View "State v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Loren Pourier, the owner of a corporation that operated a gas station on reservation land, brought an action against the state Department of Revenue and Regulation to protest a state motor-fuel tax imposed on the corporation. The Supreme Court held that the fuel tax was illegal in Pourier I. Pourier then filed a motion for costs and attorneys' fees. The circuit court granted the motion. The Department appealed, contending that the position it took in Pourier I was "substantially justified" under S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-34. The Supreme Court reversed after undertaking a three-pronged analysis, holding that the circuit court erred in finding the position the Department took in the Pourier litigation was not substantially justified and thus ordering the Department to pay Pourier's costs and attorneys' fees. View "Pourier v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

Patrick Kendall suffered a work-related injury while working at John Morrell and Company, a self-insured employer. Morrell initially accepted Kendall's workers' compensation claim, but because Kendall later missed a number of physical therapy and doctor's appointments, Morrell later denied all further benefits relating to the injury. Almost three years later, Kendall filed a petition with the state Department of Labor requesting additional benefits for the injury. The Department granted summary judgment in favor of Morrell, concluding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all of Kendall's claims for benefits were procedurally barred by the statute of limitations in S.D. Codified Laws 62-7-35. View "Kendall v. John Morrell & Co." on Justia Law

Stacy Brant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. As part of his sentencing, the court ordered that Brant provide a full and honest debrief as to the incident. The state Board of Pardons and Paroles later determined that Brant had violated the terms of his sentence by failing to comply with the court order to honestly debrief the incident and issued an order that partially revoked his suspended sentence. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. Brant appealed, contending that he was not given a fair warning that a failure to honestly debrief would result in the loss of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brant received a prior fair warning that failing to give an honest debrief could result in a revocation of his suspended sentence; and (2) the circuit court and Board did not clearly err in finding that Brant had violated a condition of his suspended sentence. View "Brant v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

John Willey was arrested for three DUIs: in 2008, May 2010 and August 8, 2010. Willey pleaded guilty to charges for his May 2010 arrest on August 30, 2010 and was convicted on September 27, 2010. For Willey's August 8, 2010 arrest, the State filed a Part II information that alleged Willey had two prior DUI convictions. Willey argued that the conviction on September 27, 2010 was invalid for enhancement purposes. The circuit court denied the motion. After a stipulated court trial, Wiley was convicted of DUI based on the August 8, 2010 arrest. The next day, a jury convicted him on the Part II information, finding that he had two prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-5.2, (1) the Part II information in this case constituted an enhanced penalty, and (2) Willey could not receive an enhanced penalty for a third offense DUI because he had not been convicted or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to the second offense previous in time to committing the third subsequent offense. Remanded. View "State v. Willey" on Justia Law

Under the terms of a plea agreement entered into with the State, Chris Jones agreed to plead guilty to three counts of second-degree rape and one count of kidnapping. After sentencing, Jones filed a motion to reconsider the sentence based upon an alleged violation of the plea agreement by the State. The trial court granted the motion and held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Jones's oral motion for a different sentencing judge. Jones appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jones did not contemporaneously object to the state's violation of the plea agreement, he forfeited his claim; (2) Jones did not demonstrate that the violation of the plea agreement resulted in plain error; and (3) given Jones's conduct and the fact that the sentence was well within the statutory maximums for his crimes, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Robert Dahl was convicted for third-offense DUI. Dahl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl's vehicle did not stay as close as practicable to the right-hand curb when making the turn; and (2) even if Dahl did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. View "State v. Dahl" on Justia Law

A doctor and his wife filed suit against a hospital and several of its treating physicians (collectively, Defendants) alleging medical malpractice. The jury entered a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding alleged statements made by employees of Defendant under S.D. Codified Laws 19-12-14 as this issue was waived, and even if it was not waived, there was no offer of proof that provided factual context to demonstrate that the statements should not have been excluded under the statute; and (2) the circuit court did not err in precluding the impeachment of a defense expert witness after finding it was not relevant. View "Ronan v. Sanford Health" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a struggle between two factions in a Hutterite colony. One faction purported to excommunicate members of the other, and eventually the other faction sought court dissolution of the corporation. Denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court (1) concluded the corporation was not functioning as a communal organization in accord with its articles and bylaws, and (2) ordered the appointment of a receiver to collect all the assets and divide the proceeds among the colony members. In determining which members were entitled to distributed assets, the court was obliged to determine which members were eligible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying religious controversies over church leadership so pervaded the dissolution of the religious corporation that the dissolution required an unconstitutional entanglement in a religious dispute and was beyond a secular court's jurisdiction. Remanded for entry of an order of dismissal. View "Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc." on Justia Law

Lorraine Flaws died testate but was predeceased by her named beneficiaries. Because Flaws' will did not designate contingent beneficiaries, the administration of her estate was governed by the laws of intestate succession. Prior to a hearing to determine heirs, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed claiming that Lorraine's niece, who was born to Lorraine's brother out of wedlock, did not have standing under the pertinent statutes to assert that she was an heir of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the niece did not comply with S.D. Codified Laws 29A-2-114, which sets forth the methods and time limits an individual born out of wedlock must comply with in order to establish parentage for purposes of intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a question remained as to whether Yvette failed to comply with any of the methods and time limits in the statute for establishing paternity. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Flaws" on Justia Law