Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against several parties in the Catholic church for sexual abuse committed more than forty years earlier, averring that the abuse was perpetrated by a nun and a priest at a boarding school he attended. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the limitations period had expired on Plaintiff's claims because he failed to commence his action within three years of the abuse or within three years of the time he discovered or reasonably should have discovered his injury or condition was caused by the abuse in accordance with S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-25. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff never forgot the alleged abuse and was aware more than three years before commencing suit that his anger and hatred stemmed from this abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was on inquiry notice more than three years before he brought suit because circumstances, including Plaintiff's anger and hatred against the church from the time he was in eleventh grade and his leaving school because of the abuse, were sufficient to prompt a reasonably prudent person to seek out information regarding his injury or condition and its cause. View "Iron Wing v. Catholic Diocese" on Justia Law

When Rita Fix's son and daughter-in-law, Jeff and Marie, secured a loan from the First State Bank of Roscoe by obtaining a warranty deed for the property, the Bank assured Fix she could retain possession of the house. After Jeff and Marie conveyed the house and property to the Bank, the Bank sold the property and sought to remove Fix from the house. Fix sued the Bank for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Meanwhile, Fix, Jeff, and Marie were indicted on multiple criminal counts. The State attorney who brought the charges and who represented the Bank civilly offered to dismiss the criminal charges against Fix if she would deed the house back to the Bank. Fix then amended her complaint to include a claim of abuse of process against the Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment against Fix on her IIED claim. A jury then returned a verdict finding the Bank liable for abuse of process but awarded no damages to Fix. The Supreme Court reversed on the abuse of process claim, holding that the trial court provided the jury with the incorrect legal standard for the recovery of emotional damages. Remanded for a new trial. View "Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe" on Justia Law

When Husband and Wife divorced, Wife retained custody of their two children, and Husband paid child support. Wife later sought modification of Husband's obligation. Husband requested a deviation from the child support guidelines because of his financial condition caused by the medical expenses of his wife, who suffered from serious medical problems. Based on Husband's financial condition, the referee allowed a downward deviation from the scheduled support obligation pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 25-7-6.10(2). The circuit court adopted the referee's recommendation, finding that without the requested deviation, Husband could not meet his financial obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the referee and circuit court did not abuse their discretion in reducing Husband's child support based on his financial condition because S.D. Codified Laws 25-7-6.10(2) allowed for the deviation in this case. View "Linge v. Meyerink " on Justia Law

Rylan Walth was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute and one count of simple possession of a controlled drug. Prior to trial, Walth filed a motion to suppress a statement he made to a police officer on the grounds that his Miranda rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding (1) the statements Walth made to a detective prior to his arrest were not made while he was in custody because a reasonable person would have understood he or she was at liberty to terminate the interview and leave; and (2) therefore, there was no Miranda violation. View "State v. Walth" on Justia Law

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded. View "City of Rapid City v. Estes" on Justia Law

Two unions filed grievances against the Sioux Falls School District, alleging that that the District violated the parties' labor agreements when the District provided 2.5 percent wage increases for the 2008-2009 school year. The District and the Department of Labor denied both grievances as untimely. The circuit court judge concluded that the grievances were timely, and reversed and remanded the matter to the Department to determine the correct percentage wage increase. On remand, the Department concluded that the union members were entitled to a three percent wage increase. The circuit court affirmed. The District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the union's grievances were timely; and (2) the union members were entitled to a three percent salary increase, and the District violated the terms of the agreements by implementing a percentage wage increase other than the percentage change in the per student allocation referenced in S.D. Codified Laws 13-13-10.1(4). View "AFSCME Local 1025 v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Christopher Fisher was convicted of manslaughter following the death of a fifteen-month-old child. Fisher appealed, contending that the trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress incriminating statements Fisher made during an interview with law enforcement, (2) admitting a portion of a videotaped interrogation where Fisher was depicted shaking a doll with the image of the doll redacted; and (3) finding that one of the state's expert witnesses was qualified to testify about abusive head trauma. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Fisher's confession during his interrogation was voluntary, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the redacted video of Fisher shaking the doll as the evidence was insufficient to mislead the jury or unfairly prejudice Fisher; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert witness to testify because the evidence in the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the witness had sufficient knowledge, training or education to offer her opinion on the child's cause of death. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Lacy March sought a protection order against Roger Thursby, which the circuit court granted. The testimony elicited at trial concerned stalking. Thursby appealed, alleging, among other things, that the findings of fact were insufficient to support the order as signed. The Supreme Court reversed due to insufficiency of the findings of fact, holding the circuit court failed to insure that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly entered. Specifically, the Court found that although the circuit court indicated that it believed March's version of the events, the written finding did not correspond with the oral testimony of March, and the court did not indicate how the evidence met the statutory elements of stalking. View "March v. Thursby" on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Lucas Waugh was charged with attempted rape of a woman and the rape of a minor. The incidents occurred one after the other within walking distance of each other. The circuit court joined the cases for trial, and a jury found Waugh guilty of both offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in joining the charges for trial because (i) the two incidents in this case were closely related in time, location, and manner of execution, and (ii) there was no undue prejudice because the evidence of each incident could have been admitted in the trial of the other; and (2) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to have found Waugh guilty of both offenses. View "State v. Waugh" on Justia Law