Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Davison County adopted a county-wide plan to reassess agricultural structures. The County reassessed agricultural structures in four of its twelve townships that year. Donald and Gene Stehly, who owned agricultural structures in the four reassessed townships, initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the plan to reassess four townships each year created an unconstitutional lack of uniform taxation within the county. The trial court concluded that the Stehlys' claim failed because they did not establish lack of uniformity within a single taxing district as required by the South Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) townships are taxing districts under the Constitution, and (2) a reassessment plan that creates a temporary lack of uniform taxation among townships within a county is constitutional. View "Stehly v. Davison County" on Justia Law

After self-insured Employer filed for bankruptcy, it continued to take payroll deductions from Employees for medical coverage but stopped paying the provider hospital for the covered charges. The hospital then directly billed Employees for services that should have been paid by Employer. Employees filed suit to stop the hospital's attempts to collect payment, seeking relief under the theories of declaratory judgment, injunction, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all of Employees' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employees had standing as third party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of the hospital agreement and payer agreement; and (2) Employees were not obligated to pay for covered medical services under the agreements. Remanded. View "Jennings v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Over a period of two years, the City of Sioux Falls issued Daniel Daily four citations for a concrete extension to his driveway. Daily appealed each of the citations, but a hearing was held only on the final two citations received. Daily then initiated a declaratory judgment action against the City. The trial court ultimately concluded that the City's administrative appeals process, both as written and as applied, and the City's enforcement of its zoning ordinances violated Daily's constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the hearing examiner in this case did not hold the City to its burden of proof, the City's administrative appeals process deprived Daily of a protected property interest without due process of law; and (2) the hearing examiner's application of the rules of evidence deprived Daily of a fair hearing. View "Dailey v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Tabitha Pourier was seriously injured in an automobile accident and suffered damages in excess of $250,000. After receiving $25,000 from the tortfeasor's liaility carrier and $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage from her primary insurer, Pourier sought an additional $100,000 in underinsured coverage from her excess carrier, De Smet Insurance Company. De Smet denied coverage, asserting that an exclusion in the policy precluded coverage. On cross motions for summary judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of De Smet, ruling that the policy exclusion was valid and enforceable. At issue on appeal was whether De Smet's owned-but-not-insured exclusion was void as against public policy because it prohibited Pourier, who was riding in a vehicle owned by her but insured by another company, from recovering for uncompensated damages by De Smet as the secondary insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy exclusion was not against public policy. View "De Smet Ins. Co. v. Pourier" on Justia Law

Kenneth Stark, a registered sex offender, was convicted of loitering in a community safety zone in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-24. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state statutes prohibiting sex offenders from loitering in community safety zones are constitutional; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend the information to include the correct location of Stark's prior felony conviction; (3) there was sufficient evidence to establish that Stark's primary purpose for remaining in the community safety zones was to observe or contact minors; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that an individual in a white mini-van registered to Stark was seen in a community safety zone the day before the charged conduct occurred. View "State v. Stark" on Justia Law

Matt Onnen was terminated from the position of registrar at Southeast Technical Institute (STI), an entity of the Sioux Falls School District, after STI officials found several degrees or diplomas had been approved and awarded by Onnen to students who had not earned them, and several students entitled to a degree or diploma had not received one. The Sioux Falls School Board affirmed the decision. Onnen appealed the District's and Board's decision to circuit court, which affirmed the District. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the District's decision was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) because Onnen was not a teacher at STI, he was not entitled to sixty days' notice before termination, and therefore Onnen was not denied procedural due process when he was terminated; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Onnen's motion for a new trial. View "Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Rose Pray fell and was injured when a rottweiler broke loose from its owner and dashed across the street toward her. Pray brought an action for damages against the dog owner and the City. As against the City, Pray asserted that it knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that, under Tipton v. Town of Tabor, the city owed Pray no special duty and, therefore, owed no duty to control the conduct of third persons. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Pray needed to prove each of the four Tipton elements to establish that a special duty existed, but (2) as a matter of law, Pray did not meet the legal requirements to show such a duty. View "Pray v. City of Flandreau " on Justia Law

The personal representative of an estate sold real property that had been specifically devised to several heirs. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous appeal that the personal representative lacked the authority to sell the property and remanded the case to allow the buyers of the real property to intervene to protect their interests. After remand, the buyers filed suit against the estate. The heirs who objected to the sale intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyers, finding that the buyers were good faith purchasers for value of specifically devised land and thus were protected by S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-714 as a matter of law. The intervening heirs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that based on lack of notice of the heirs' interest in the land or the law at issue, the buyers were good faith purchasers for value, and as such, were protected by the statute. View "Muhlbauer v. Estate of Olson" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Governor requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court regarding eligibility requirements for individuals seeking appointment to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The Governor asked (1) what actions or intent are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 and 6 that justices of the Supreme Court be voting residents within the district from which they are appointed, and (2) at what point in time must these actions be undertaken or intentions be formed? The Supreme Court accepted the request and answered (1) a person selected by the Governor to fill a vacant seat on the Supreme Court becomes a justice by qualifying for office by taking an oath or affirmation, (2) prior to taking that oath, that person must fulfill the eligibility requirement to hold that office including establishing voting residency in the district from which he or she is appointed pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 12-1-4, and (3) by doing so, that person becomes a justice after taking the oath and complies with the constitutional directives of being a voting resident of the district from which he or she was selected. View "In re Interpretation of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 & 6" on Justia Law

Pizza Hut hired Norman Williams, who was at the time on parole for a felony conviction involving a gang-related incident of mutual combat resulting in serious injury. While working at the restaurant, Williams allegedly attacked David Iverson. Iverson filed suit against Williams and Pizza Hut, asserting (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) negligent hiring, (3) breach of duty to control an employee, and (4) negligent supervision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Pizza Hut's favor on all four theories of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where (1) Pizza Hut's agency relationship was immaterial to Williams's tort, (2) because at the time Williams was hired he was only to have incidental contact with the public, Pizza Hut did not have a duty to inquire further into Williams's background, (3) because Iverson did not satisfy the foreseeability prong, he failed to show that Pizza Hut had a duty to control Williams, and (4) given the facts and circumstances, it was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on Pizza Hut to prevent Iverson from meeting with Williams at the restaurant. View "Iverson v. NPC Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law