Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was injured while working for Employer, a railroad corporation, by falling on snow-covered ice. Employee filed a personal injury claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits suit against railroads for an employee's injury that results in whole or in part from the railroad's negligence. A jury returned a verdict in Employee's favor and awarded Employee $300,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of drainage problems and failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law on foreseeability; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting Employee to receive post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict until the entry of judgment; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Employer a set-off on the judgment. View "Jacobs v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp." on Justia Law

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence. View "Neugebauer v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law

In December 2007, Kjerstad Realty brought suit against Bootjack Ranch for breach of a realty contract. In October 2009, the case was remanded. After remand, the assigned judge retired and a temporary judge presided over the case for six months. In the interim, Kjerstad pursued discovery. Once a new judge was appointed, Kjerstad requested a trial date within the one-year statutory deadline, which the judge did not grant. In November 2010, Bootjack moved to dismiss for Kjerstad's failure to commence trial within one year from the date of remand pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-30-16. The trial court granted Bootjack's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Kjerstad's suit against Bootjack because good cause existed to extend the deadline under section 15-30-16. View "Kjerstad Realty, Inc. v. Bootjack Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Robin Branhan borrowed money from Appellee Great Western Bank. As collateral for the loan, the Branhans gave Great Western a security interest in their shares of Glacial Lakes stock. The Branhans later defaulted on their loan. Great Western subsequently brought a foreclosure action against the Branhans. As part of a settlement agreement, the Branhans agreed to surrender and transfer to Great Western all their rights to Glacial Lakes stock they were unable to sell by a certain date. After Great Western issued a satisfaction of judgment, Glacial Lakes announced a capital call repayment. In response, the Branhans filed a motion to determine which party was entitled to the capital call repayments. The circuit court concluded that Great Western owned the stock and was therefore entitled to the repayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Great Western was entitled to the capital call repayment because the benefit of capital call repayment transferred with the shares. View "Great Western Bank v. Branhan" on Justia Law

Employee submitted a workers' compensation claim to his Employer after suffering a reaction that some doctors attributed to work-related exposure. Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his workers' compensation claim. The Department denied Employee's claim, concluding that Employee failed to demonstrate that he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee's efforts to prove causation were thwarted by Employer's refusal to allow collection of samples of various materials in areas around the plant and its later destruction of potential samples. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to properly consider the spoliation question and Employee was entitled to a new hearing before the Department. View "Thyen v. Hubbard Feeds, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Jones was convicted of raping a twenty-three-year-old woman who testified that she was too intoxicated to have consented. The defendant appealed, asserting that although S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(4) does not explicitly include a knowledge element, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove that the defendant knew that the woman's intoxicated condition made her unable to consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature intended that a rape conviction under section 22-22-1(4) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant Mil Hirning pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance and admitted to being a habitual offender. Hirning made the plea after Hirning's trial counsel withdrew from representing him and Hirning proceeded pro se. On appeal, Hirning argued that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court reversed Hirning's convictions and sentence, (1) finding that Hirning was not warned of the dangers of self-representation, and (2) holding that the record did not indicate circumstances from which the Court could find Hirning was aware of the danger and made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Remanded. View "State v. Hirning" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments. View "Law v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dale Guthmiller was convicted of criminal pedophilia and sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other things, that the trial judge made improper comments during the trial, violating Petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial. The habeas court granted Petitioner's writ on reconsideration, (1) concluding that the trial judge's comments created a structural error negating Petitioner's requirement to establish prejudice, and (2) retracting its earlier ruling that trial counsel's failure to object was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial judge's comments did not constitute a structural error, and (2) despite defense counsel's failure to object to the judge's improper remarks, Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the jury's verdict would reasonably likely have been different absent trial counsel's errors. View "Guthmiller v. Weber" on Justia Law