Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Dennis Lindskov purchased Les Lindskov's interest in an automotive company, Dennis and Les signed a dissolution agreement that contained a non-disparagement clause. Les opened a competing business within months of the sale of his interest in the company. Dennis initiated a breach of contract and fraud and deceit action, alleging that the non-disparagement clause contained a covenant not to compete. The trial court granted Les's motions for summary judgment on both causes of action and dismissed Dennis's complaint. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court properly granted Les's motions for summary judgment where (1) because the clause did not create a covenant not to compete, Les did not breach the dissolution agreement by opening a competing business, and (2) because Les did not have a fiduciary duty to disclose his intent to compete, he did not commit fraud or deceit as a matter of law. View "Lindskov v. Lindskov" on Justia Law

After the City of the Pierre and the International Union of Operating Engineers were unable to reach an agreement for employment contracts, the City imposed the terms and conditions of one of its previously proposed contracts that had been rejected by the Union. The Union filed for conciliation and fact-finding with the state Department of Labor, arguing the City could not impose the previously rejected contract until after the Department's conciliation and fact-finding process was complete. The trial court held in favor of the City, holding that the conciliation and fact-finding process was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore the City could unilaterally impose a contract any time after impasse was declared. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City could not impose a previously rejected contract until the Department's conciliation and fact-finding was complete. Remanded. View "International Union v. City of Pierre" on Justia Law

J.L. was fourteen when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. A juvenile petition was filed against J.L., and the circuit court adjudicated J.L. as a delinquent under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(1), a statute under which the girlfriend was legally incapable of giving consent and under which J.L. would have been convicted of rape in the first degree had J.L. been an adult. On appeal, J.L. argued that the application of the statute to the facts of this case created an absurd result, one not reasonably intended by the legislature. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the statute to the facts did not suggest an unintended absurdity. View "In re J.L. " on Justia Law

After a fire damaged Oscar Batiz's residential rental property, Batiz filed a claim with his carrier, Fire Insurance Exchange. Exchange initially tendered to Batiz $33,182 representing the actual cash value of the damaged property, later raising that amount to $8,415 after both parties chose an impartial appraiser and an umpire determined the cost to repair the property was $43,921. Batiz did not cash the payment and brought a declaratory action against Exchange. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Exchange's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Batiz's action without prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that a declaratory judgment against Exchange was unwarranted because the insurance policy unambiguously provided what rights and obligations the parties had; and (2) the circuit court was correct in ruling that Batiz's assertion that the vast difference between his appraiser's and the umpire's valuations presented a justiciable issue requiring the court to determine the amount of loss was premature as Batiz had not yet repaired or replaced the damaged property. Remanded. View "Batiz v. Fire Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Arrowhead Ridge initiated a forcible entry and detainer action when its tenant, Cold Stone Creamery, defaulted on its lease. The trial court granted Arrowhead partial summary judgment, and the issues of mitigation of damages, interest, and attorneys' fees proceeded to trial. The trial court concluded that (1) Arrowhead failed to mitigate its damages due solely to an exclusivity provision in a lease with another tenant, and (2) Arrowhead could not recover its attorneys' fees under either the terms of the lease or state law. The court then denied the parties' motions for a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the undisputed evidence established that Arrowhead made substantial efforts to lease the premises to another tenant, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial; (2) the record established that Arrowhead mitigated its damages by the exercise of reasonable diligence as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial on the basis that it could recover the attorneys' fees it incurred due to Cold Stone's default. Remanded. View "Arrowhead Ridge I, L.L.C. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Jensen was charged with fourth offense driving under the influence. He filed a motion to strike one of his three prior driving under the influence convictions, arguing that because the magistrate court relied on a statement of rights form to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea during that prior hearing, that prior conviction was invalid for sentence enhancement purposes. The trial court denied Jensen's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of rights form was an adequate record of voluntariness. Jensen appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jensen did not demonstrate prejudice, his challenge to his prior driving under the influence conviction was not proper for the Court's consideration; and (2) Jensen did not demonstrate that the magistrate court's failure to personally canvass him to establish the voluntariness of his plea violated his due process rights. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Richard Orr and Sheldon Cook had a partnership agreement to conduct a cow-calf operation. The parties sold the cows and calves in the spring of 2007. Cook received $230,935 from the sale. Orr sued Cook, disputing the reimbursement amount Cook owed him from the sale and for the cost of feeding and caring for the cows during the winter of 2007. The trial court awarded Orr $41,614. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the value of the calves; (2) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the amount of reimbursement Cook owed Orr for feed and veterinarian costs; and (3) the trial court did err in refusing to award Orr prejudgment interest because it was requested in a manner allowed by statute. View "Orr v. Cook" on Justia Law

Carlin Jewett was employed as a welder by Real Tuff where Jewett often worked on his knees. In 2006, Jewett suffered a right knee injury. Jewett received arthroscopic surgery, during which the surgeon found pre-existing bilateral osteoarthritis in Jewett's knee. Jewett subsequently filed a petition with the state Department of Labor, seeking workers' compensation for a right knee replacement. Two years later, Jewett suffered a second work-related injury to his left knee. Jewett added a workers' compensation claim for diagnostic treatment of his left knee. The Department and the circuit court ruled that Jewell failed to sustain his burden of proof on the alternate theories that (1) work-related injuries to both knees were a major contributing cause of the need for medical treatment, and (2) the cumulative effect of Jewett's work-related activities was a major contributing cause of the osteoarthritis. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Department and circuit court did not err in finding (1) Jewett's first injury was not a major contributing cause of Jewett's need for a right knee replacement, and (2) Jewett did not prove that working on his knees was a major contributing cause of his osteoarthritis. View "Jewett v. Real Tuff, Inc." on Justia Law

A limited partnership, POB Associates, was formed for the purpose of owning and operating a physicians office building. The partnership had two general partners. The allocation of POB Associates' profits and losses was governed by Article I, Section 1.06(b) of the partnership agreement, and for approximately 25 years the general partners annually allocated 98% of the limited partnership's profits and losses to the limited partners in accordance with the number of units held by each. In 2008, the general partners adopted a new allocation formula based on a new interpretation of Section 1.06(b), under which 46% of POB Associates' profits and losses were allocated to the limited partners and the remaining 54% was allocated to the general partners. Several limited partners sued the general partners, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the allocation under the agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the general partners. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, finding the partnership agreement capable of more than one meaning under the disputed facts of the case. Remanded. View "Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Good Plume was found guilty of aggravated assault and of being a habitual offender and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted (1) that the sentencing judge, in referring to a pattern of drunken violence by Good Plume as "going native," evinced his personal bias against defendant and used race as a sentencing factor, thus violating defendant's federal and state due process rights; and (2) the judge abused his discretion in admitting into evidence a letter defendant wrote without considering the requirements of S.D. R. Evid. 404(b) before admitting it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendant did not meet his burden of making a specific and substantial showing that a racial or personal bias was used as an aggravating factor in his sentence, and (2) the letter was admitted not to prove defendant engaged in other wrongs, crimes, or acts but as res gestae evidence necessary to prove intent. View "State v. Good Plume" on Justia Law