Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three landowners in Roberts County, South Dakota, own agricultural properties encumbered by perpetual federal wetlands reserve easements, which severely restrict agricultural and other uses of the land. After the previous owner’s death, the properties were appraised at $897 per acre in 2017 but ultimately sold to the current landowners for about $128 per acre in 2019. In 2023, the county’s Director of Equalization assessed the properties using a statutory productivity-based method, resulting in values of $2,255.54 and $1,678.77 per acre, far exceeding the purchase price and prior appraisal. The landowners did not dispute the statutory method’s application but argued that the resulting assessments exceeded the properties’ actual value, violating the South Dakota Constitution.The landowners appealed the assessments through the local and county boards of equalization, both of which affirmed the Director’s valuations. They then appealed to the Office of Hearing Examiners (OHE), where an administrative law judge (ALJ) found the landowners’ witnesses—two real estate brokers—credible in their testimony that the easements significantly reduced the properties’ market value. However, the ALJ concluded she lacked authority to decide the constitutional issue and affirmed the assessments, finding the landowners had not rebutted the presumption of correct statutory procedure. The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit affirmed, holding that only a certified appraiser’s opinion could rebut the presumption of correctness and that the brokers’ opinions and the 2017 appraisal were insufficient.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. It held that neither the South Dakota Constitution nor state law requires a certified appraiser’s opinion to establish actual value for tax purposes; credible testimony from any qualified witness suffices. The Court further held that the landowners presented sufficient credible evidence that the assessments exceeded actual value. The case was remanded for a factual finding of actual value based on the existing record. View "Pallansch v. Roberts County" on Justia Law

A child, B.M., was born to Cheryl Melius and Lakota Songer, who were no longer in a relationship at the time of birth. Cheryl initially had sole custody and did not inform Lakota of the birth immediately. After B.M. was diagnosed with failure to thrive, Cheryl voluntarily placed the child with her brother, Miles, and his wife, Tori (the Meliuses), who were later granted guardianship. Lakota established paternity and sought custody, but the Meliuses initiated a third-party custody action, leading to a combined proceeding. During the litigation, the Meliuses were granted temporary custody, and Lakota was given stepped-up visitation. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was found to apply after Lakota disclosed his tribal status.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Gregory County, South Dakota, held a trial and found that while the Meliuses had a significant relationship with B.M., they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances existed to rebut Lakota’s presumptive right to custody under SDCL 25-5-30. The court awarded Lakota sole custody but granted the Meliuses ongoing visitation and ordered Lakota to use a specific daycare provider. The court also assessed attorney fees against Lakota for his late disclosure of tribal status and for contempt related to violating court orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Meliuses did not establish extraordinary circumstances to overcome Lakota’s parental rights and affirmed the denial of non-parent custody. The Supreme Court reversed the award of permanent visitation to the Meliuses, holding that such visitation cannot be granted absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances rebutting the parent’s rights. The Court also reversed the attorney fees related to the tribal status delay, finding the lower court erred in assigning responsibility to Lakota. The issue regarding the daycare provider was deemed moot. The case was remanded to determine attorney fees solely attributable to contempt. View "Melius v. Songer" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, specifically Delta-9 Tetrahydrocannabinol, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The suspected drug was sent to the state health lab for testing shortly after the charges were filed. Over the following months, the defendant’s attorney requested several delays in the trial and plea deadlines, citing the absence of a plea offer and the need for time to discuss the offer once received. Eventually, the parties reached a plea agreement, but at the change of plea hearing, the State had still not received the drug test results. The defendant then moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the nearly seven-month delay in obtaining the test results was excessive.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, granted the defendant’s oral motion to dismiss, finding that the delay in obtaining the drug test results and the State’s failure to meet court-imposed plea offer deadlines constituted unnecessary delay under SDCL 23A-44-3. The court dismissed the indictment without prejudice, basing its decision solely on the statute addressing unnecessary delay in prosecution, and not on the 180-day rule for bringing a defendant to trial.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the record did not support a finding of unnecessary delay attributable to the State, as the State had submitted the evidence for testing promptly and the prosecution had not been dormant. The Court clarified that SDCL 23A-44-3 provides discretionary authority to dismiss for unnecessary delay, but the circumstances here did not justify such a dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

A woman was injured while running along a city road when she stepped off the roadway to avoid traffic and her foot became lodged in a metal culvert that was partially exposed in a roadside ditch. The culvert had been installed by the city as part of improvement projects in the mid-1990s, and there were no sidewalks in the area. The woman suffered a sprained ankle and a significant laceration that required medical treatment. She alleged that the city failed to maintain the public right-of-way, leaving the culvert uncapped and exposed, and did not provide adequate inspection, maintenance, or warnings.After the incident, the city admitted responsibility for maintaining public rights-of-way and acknowledged that its maintenance practices were primarily complaint-driven, with no routine inspections or written policies for culvert maintenance. The city stated that it had not received complaints about the culvert before the accident and that, after being notified of the incident, it inspected and repaired the culvert by removing the damaged end section.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all claims, holding that the city owed no common law duty of care, that the plaintiff failed to show the culvert was damaged as required under the relevant statute (SDCL 31-32-10), and that the nuisance and gross negligence claims were barred or unsupported.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the culvert was damaged and whether the city should have discovered the damage, making summary judgment on the negligence claim improper. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the city on the nuisance and gross negligence claims, finding them barred by statutory exemptions and insufficient evidence, respectively. The court thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Mahmoudi v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

A state-operated university in South Dakota, facing increased demand for student housing, entered into a series of lease agreements with a local housing commission beginning in 2000. The commission constructed and financed two apartment buildings, leasing them to the university with an option for the university to purchase the property. The original 2000 lease included a provision for a reserve account, funded by any excess between actual debt service and lease payments, which would be disbursed to the university if it exercised its purchase option. Over the years, the parties executed new leases in 2011, 2014, and 2017, each with different terms and none referencing the reserve account provision from the 2000 lease. In 2020, the university notified the commission of its intent to purchase the property, leading to disputes over the purchase price and whether the university was entitled to a credit from a reserve account that no longer existed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Lake County, South Dakota, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the university, holding that all the leases should be read as a single, continuous contract, thereby extending the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease into subsequent agreements. The court also interpreted the purchase price provision to refer to the original construction mortgage, not any refinanced debt, and determined the university was entitled to a refund after calculating the buy-out amount. The commission’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and final judgment was entered for the university.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. It held that the leases were separate agreements, not a single continuous contract, and that the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease did not carry forward. The court further held that the buy-out price should be based on the balance of the mortgage existing at the time the purchase option was exercised, including any refinanced debt, not just the original mortgage. The circuit court’s judgment was vacated. View "S.D. Board Of Regents v. Madison Housing" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours, law enforcement officers in Spearfish, South Dakota, found a man asleep in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with its brake lights on. Upon waking him, the officers conducted field sobriety tests and arrested him for driving under the influence. After being taken into custody, he voluntarily provided blood and urine samples, which were tested by the state health lab and found to contain THC, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. The defendant’s primary defense centered on challenging the reliability of the state health lab’s testing methods, particularly their inability to distinguish between different isomers of methamphetamine, one of which is present in some over-the-counter medications.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, presided over pretrial motions and the trial. The court denied the defendant’s request for a Daubert hearing to assess the reliability of the lab’s methods, finding the chemists qualified and the methods well-established. The court also excluded the testimony of a late-disclosed expert witness and limited another expert’s testimony to her area of expertise. During trial, the defendant was permitted to present some evidence regarding isomers of methamphetamine but was restricted from arguing that the presence of l-methamphetamine, as opposed to d-methamphetamine, was legally significant. The jury convicted the defendant of unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance and being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding or limiting expert testimony, in denying a Daubert hearing, and whether these rulings denied the defendant a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in all respects, found no violation of the defendant’s right to present a defense, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with two children has been involved in ongoing litigation over custody and visitation since their separation in 2019. The mother was granted primary physical custody, while both parents shared joint legal custody. The children have consistently resisted visitation with their father, often refusing to interact with him during scheduled exchanges. The father alleged that the mother interfered with his visitation rights and alienated the children, while the mother claimed the children’s reluctance stemmed from the father’s past abuse and alcohol misuse. Over several years, the court ordered various counseling and reunification efforts, but the children continued to avoid contact with their father.After multiple motions and hearings, the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, South Dakota, ordered a new visitation arrangement in February 2024, requiring the mother to encourage the younger child to attend twice-weekly dinners with the father. Despite the mother’s documented efforts to encourage attendance, the child continued to refuse to participate in the visits. The father moved for sanctions, arguing that the mother’s encouragement was superficial and that she undermined his relationship with the child.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case after the mother appealed the circuit court’s imposition of sanctions, which included civil penalties and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court had statutory authority under SDCL 25-4A-5 to impose sanctions for willful noncompliance with visitation orders, independent of contempt proceedings. The Court found no clear error in the circuit court’s determination that the mother willfully failed to encourage visitation as required, and it affirmed the imposition of $2,000 in civil penalties and $2,000 in attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order in all respects. View "Lefors v. Lefors" on Justia Law

A Canadian corporation specializing in industrial heaters sought a new supplier and entered negotiations with a South Dakota manufacturer to custom-build 30 heaters. The parties initially agreed to the purchase and sale of 21 units, with a 20% down payment, and later extended the agreement to include the remaining nine units, for a total of 30 heaters at a set price per unit. The manufacturer began production and delivery as payments were made. However, after partial delivery and payment, the buyer stopped making payments, citing performance issues with the heaters and ultimately notified the manufacturer of its intent to terminate the relationship. Despite complaints about the heaters, the buyer did not reject or return any units but continued to accept and sell them until the manufacturer withheld further shipments due to nonpayment.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Day County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, finding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of a contract for 30 heaters and that the buyer breached the agreement by failing to pay and by terminating the contract. The court also found that the manufacturer had taken reasonable steps to mitigate damages and that the buyer had not properly rejected the goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The Supreme Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a contract for the sale of 30 heaters. However, the Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged defects in the heaters substantially impaired the value of the whole contract, which could excuse the buyer’s nonperformance under the UCC. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of contract formation, reversed the grant of summary judgment on the breach issue, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson Industries v. Thermal Intelligence" on Justia Law

A woman sought a protection order against her former partner, with whom she shares two minor children, alleging that his actions caused her and the children to fear imminent physical harm. The petition described several incidents, including one where the former partner allegedly pointed a laser through a window at her and one of the children, and another where he handled a firearm after consuming alcohol. The woman also testified to past physical and emotional abuse directed at both her and the children. The former partner denied threatening them with a firearm or laser, asserting that any lasers involved were harmless pointers for the children.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County, South Dakota, held a hearing and found the woman’s testimony credible. The court determined that the former partner’s conduct, particularly the laser incident, constituted domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm. The court issued a five-year protection order prohibiting all contact between the former partner and the woman and their children. When the former partner later moved to modify the order to allow contact with the children, the court denied the request, despite both parties expressing willingness for supervised visitation and acknowledging that the facility typically used for such visits would not participate due to the nature of the allegations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding domestic abuse and did not abuse its discretion in issuing a five-year protection order covering the woman and the children. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion by prohibiting all contact between the father and his children for five years without considering the children’s best interests or the parties’ wishes for supervised visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the protection order in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to provide for appropriate contact and visitation. View "Wagner v. Tovar" on Justia Law

Rodney Alexander and Steve Hobart entered into an agreement granting Alexander a right of first refusal to purchase Steve’s cattle and to have Steve’s national forest livestock grazing permit transferred to him. An addendum later clarified that the agreement extended to Steve’s son, Nick. Years later, Nick sold the cattle and transferred the permit to a third party without notifying Alexander, who then sued for breach of contract and fraud. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the contract was void due to impossibility of performance or because it was for an unlawful object, and that the right of first refusal was an unreasonable restraint on property alienation.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted the motion, ruling the contract void for impossibility of performance. Alexander appealed, asserting the court erred in its conclusion. Nick, through notice of review, sought to challenge the court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It found that the contract did not require the Hobarts to transfer the permit directly, but rather that the purchase was contingent on the USFS transferring the permit to Alexander. The court concluded that the contract was not void for impossibility of performance. Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, considering the purpose, price, and duration of the agreement, and the mutual consent of the parties.The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Alexander v. Estate Of Hobart" on Justia Law