Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman sought a protection order against her former partner, with whom she shares two minor children, alleging that his actions caused her and the children to fear imminent physical harm. The petition described several incidents, including one where the former partner allegedly pointed a laser through a window at her and one of the children, and another where he handled a firearm after consuming alcohol. The woman also testified to past physical and emotional abuse directed at both her and the children. The former partner denied threatening them with a firearm or laser, asserting that any lasers involved were harmless pointers for the children.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County, South Dakota, held a hearing and found the woman’s testimony credible. The court determined that the former partner’s conduct, particularly the laser incident, constituted domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm. The court issued a five-year protection order prohibiting all contact between the former partner and the woman and their children. When the former partner later moved to modify the order to allow contact with the children, the court denied the request, despite both parties expressing willingness for supervised visitation and acknowledging that the facility typically used for such visits would not participate due to the nature of the allegations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding domestic abuse and did not abuse its discretion in issuing a five-year protection order covering the woman and the children. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion by prohibiting all contact between the father and his children for five years without considering the children’s best interests or the parties’ wishes for supervised visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the protection order in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to provide for appropriate contact and visitation. View "Wagner v. Tovar" on Justia Law

Rodney Alexander and Steve Hobart entered into an agreement granting Alexander a right of first refusal to purchase Steve’s cattle and to have Steve’s national forest livestock grazing permit transferred to him. An addendum later clarified that the agreement extended to Steve’s son, Nick. Years later, Nick sold the cattle and transferred the permit to a third party without notifying Alexander, who then sued for breach of contract and fraud. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the contract was void due to impossibility of performance or because it was for an unlawful object, and that the right of first refusal was an unreasonable restraint on property alienation.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted the motion, ruling the contract void for impossibility of performance. Alexander appealed, asserting the court erred in its conclusion. Nick, through notice of review, sought to challenge the court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It found that the contract did not require the Hobarts to transfer the permit directly, but rather that the purchase was contingent on the USFS transferring the permit to Alexander. The court concluded that the contract was not void for impossibility of performance. Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, considering the purpose, price, and duration of the agreement, and the mutual consent of the parties.The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Alexander v. Estate Of Hobart" on Justia Law

Kevin Rowe filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Dione Rowe, alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. Dione, with the help of her daughters, sent a letter to the Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) making disparaging allegations against Kevin, who leased Tribal-owned land from the TLE. The letter requested the TLE to cancel Kevin’s leases and lease the land to her daughters instead. The TLE rescinded Kevin’s leases at their next board meeting, leading Kevin to file the lawsuit.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Tripp County, South Dakota, denied Dione’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that her letter was an absolutely privileged communication under SDCL 20-11-5(2). The court concluded that the TLE meeting was a quasi-judicial proceeding but held that the privilege did not apply because the TLE did not follow its own procedures, including providing notice to Kevin.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(2) applies to claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. The court found that the TLE board meeting was an official proceeding authorized by law and that Dione’s letter had a logical relation to the TLE’s proceedings. The court also determined that the lack of notice to Kevin did not negate the privilege. Additionally, the court concluded that Dione did not waive the privilege by failing to plead it in her answer, as the issue was tried by implied consent during the summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of Dione. View "Rowe v. Rowe" on Justia Law

Jody Pham injured her neck and right shoulder while working at Smithfield Foods, a self-insured employer. Smithfield accepted the injury as a compensable workers’ compensation claim and paid benefits for over two years. In 2018, Smithfield stopped paying medical benefits, believing Pham’s employment was no longer a major contributing cause of her need for additional treatment. Pham filed a petition for a hearing with the Department of Labor and Regulation, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Pham failed to establish causation. Pham appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the ALJ’s decision, reasoning that Smithfield had the burden to show a change in circumstances to justify suspending benefits. Smithfield appealed.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court concluded that SDCL 62-7-33, which the circuit court relied on, did not apply because Smithfield’s pre-petition payments were voluntary and not based on a final order or settlement agreement. The court also found that Pham’s argument that Smithfield had the burden to prove non-compensability was incorrect. The court emphasized that Pham bore the burden to establish compensability since the issue had not been previously litigated or adjudicated.Regarding the expert testimony, the court noted that the ALJ found Dr. Jensen’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Ripperda’s. The court held that the ALJ’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that the circuit court erred in reweighing the evidence. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and reinstated the ALJ’s decision, concluding that Pham failed to meet her burden of proving that her work-related injury was a major contributing cause of her need for additional treatment. View "Pham v. Smithfield Foods" on Justia Law

The Nelson Estate claimed an interest in a coin shop and alleged conversion of its property. Dr. Earl Nelson had provided funds for the business, resulting in a 50% ownership interest, which was confirmed by William Tinkcom. After Dr. Nelson's death in 2013, Tinkcom continued to operate the business and assured Nelson's heirs of their 50% interest. Tinkcom died in 2022, and the business was sold to Eddie Welch without including the Nelson Estate in the final agreement. The Nelson Estate sued the Tinkcom Estate, Welch, and Mere Coin Company, LLC, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, including conversion of valuable coins and collectibles.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the statute of limitations barred all claims. The Nelson Estate argued that the statute of limitations had not expired and that equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment should prevent the statute of limitations defense.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's determination that the first six business interest claims accrued upon Dr. Nelson's death in 2013. However, the court reversed the dismissal of these claims because the circuit court did not address the Nelson Estate's defenses of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment. The court also reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, as these claims arose from the 2022 sale of the business. Lastly, the court reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim, noting that the record did not establish when the conversion occurred or when the Nelson Estate became aware of it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Tinkcom" on Justia Law

Golden View Ready-Mix, LLC (Golden View) supplied concrete to Grangaard Construction, Inc. (Grangaard) for a bridge project. Golden View alleged that Grangaard failed to pay for the concrete, breached the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and committed fraud. A jury found in favor of Golden View on the breach of contract and good faith claims, awarding damages and punitive damages, but found no liability for fraud. Grangaard appealed the punitive damages award and the decision to submit the fraud issue to the jury.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, McCook County, South Dakota, presided over the case. Grangaard moved for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim, arguing there was no independent tort duty outside the contract. The court denied this motion, allowing the fraud claim to proceed. During the trial, the court permitted the jury to consider punitive damages based on the breach of the implied obligation of good faith, despite Grangaard's objections.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court determined that punitive damages are only recoverable for breaches of obligations not arising from a contract, as per SDCL 21-3-2. The court found that the implied obligation of good faith arises from the contract itself and does not constitute an independent tort that could support punitive damages. Consequently, the court vacated the punitive damages award. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects, concluding that the error regarding punitive damages did not affect the jury's decision on the breach of contract and good faith claims. View "Goldenview Ready-Mix, LLC v. Grangaard Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Joshua Lapin, acting pro se, filed a complaint against Zeetogroup, LLC and “John Doe Sender” alleging 46 violations of SDCL 37-24-47, which prohibits misleading, falsified, or unauthorized spam emails. Lapin claimed he received these emails between June 15 and July 25, 2021, at his email address, which he argued was a “South Dakota electronic mail address.” The circuit court dismissed Lapin’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Lapin was not a “resident of this state” during the time he received the emails and, therefore, could not prove his email address was a “South Dakota electronic mail address” as required by SDCL 37-24-47. Lapin appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, denied Lapin’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted Zeetogroup’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that Lapin was not a resident of South Dakota when he received the emails because he was traveling internationally as a “digital nomad” and was not physically present in the state. The court also held that SDCL 37-24-41(14) does not impose a durational residency requirement and that Lapin could sue over emails received after he became a physical resident of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the term “resident” in SDCL 37-24-41(14)(c) requires actual residency, not just legal residency or domicile. The court concluded that Lapin’s 30-day stay in an Airbnb in South Dakota and his subsequent travels did not establish him as a resident of South Dakota during the time he received the emails. Therefore, Lapin was not entitled to the protections of SDCL 37-24-47. View "Lapin v. Zeetogroup" on Justia Law

Jessica Paulsen experienced severe bleeding after giving birth on December 13, 2021, at Avera McKennan Hospital. Dr. Amber Saloum performed a hysterectomy and another surgery on December 14, 2021, to stop the bleeding. Paulsen later claimed she did not consent to the hysterectomy and filed a lawsuit against Avera McKennan, Dr. Saloum, and unnamed parties on December 15, 2023. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Paulsen's claims were barred by the two-year repose period under SDCL 15-2-14.1.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Paulsen's lawsuit was filed outside the two-year repose period. Paulsen appealed the decision, arguing that the repose period should be calculated as 730 days and that she should have been allowed additional discovery to potentially establish a continuing tort.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a "year" is defined as a "calendar year" under SDCL 2-14-2(36), meaning the repose period ends at the exact moment the start date reoccurs on the calendar. Therefore, the two-year repose period began on December 15, 2021, and ended on December 14, 2023. Since Paulsen filed her lawsuit on December 15, 2023, it was one day too late.The court also found that Paulsen's request for additional discovery was speculative and did not demonstrate how further discovery would reveal facts essential to opposing the summary judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Paulsen v. Mckennan" on Justia Law

J.W., a 14-year-old, and two other juveniles were involved in an incident where one of the boys exploded a large firework inside a vacant trailer home, causing significant fire and smoke damage. J.W. initially lied to the police about who caused the fire to protect the other juveniles. He later admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition alleging accessory to a crime. The circuit court ordered J.W. and another juvenile to pay restitution of approximately $15,000 for the damage.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County adjudicated J.W. as a delinquent child and placed him on probation. The court held a restitution hearing and ordered J.W. to pay restitution, finding that the legislative amendments to the juvenile statutes did not require a causal connection between the damages and J.W.'s criminal act. The court determined that the restitution served a rehabilitative purpose and found no credible evidence that the restitution order would cause J.W. serious hardship.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the legislative amendments to the juvenile restitution statutes now require a causal connection between the juvenile's criminal act and the victim's damages, similar to adult restitution cases. The court found that J.W.'s act of lying to the police occurred after the damage was done and was not causally connected to the fire damage. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the circuit court's restitution order, concluding that J.W. was not liable for restitution as the damage did not occur as a result of his criminal act. View "Interest Of J.W." on Justia Law

Calvin Berwald, operating Sokota Dairy, filed a lawsuit against Stan’s, Inc., a local feed mill, alleging breach of contract and breach of implied warranties. Berwald claimed that Stan’s prematurely canceled a soybean meal purchase agreement and sold him contaminated calf starter, resulting in the death of over 200 calves. Stan’s argued that the contract was canceled due to Berwald’s late payments and that the calf deaths were due to poor facilities and feeding practices.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Jerauld County granted summary judgment in favor of Stan’s on the breach of contract claim, citing accord and satisfaction. The court found that Berwald’s acceptance and deposit of a check from Stan’s, which was intended to settle the dispute, discharged the claim. A jury trial on the breach of warranty claims resulted in a verdict that Stan’s breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but awarded no damages to Berwald. The jury found against Berwald on the claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and barratry.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that Stan’s satisfied the requirements for accord and satisfaction under SDCL 57A-3-311. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the good faith tender of the check, the existence of a bona fide dispute, and Berwald’s acceptance of the payment. The court also upheld the denial of Berwald’s motion for a new trial, finding no newly discovered evidence that would likely produce a different result and no prejudicial juror misconduct. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Berwald V. Stan's, Inc." on Justia Law