Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Linda Ager Coyle, the personal representative of Fred Ager's estate, filed a motion for confirmation of a specific devise related to the proceeds from the sale of storage units Fred had owned. Fred's will directed that the units be given in equal shares to his children, Linda and Jeff, with a life estate interest in half of the net rental income to his wife, Arlene Ager. Arlene filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate, which the circuit court granted. Subsequently, the court denied Linda's motion for confirmation of the specific devise.Linda appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion, and Arlene filed a notice of review seeking to challenge the court's earlier decision denying her motion to remove Linda as the personal representative. The Supreme Court of South Dakota issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to address whether the order denying the motion to confirm a specific devise was appealable. Linda argued that the order was appealable based on the precedent set in In re Estate of Geier, which held that each proceeding in an unsupervised administration is a final order. Arlene contended that the order was not final and not subject to review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a decision made prior to a final order terminating a supervised probate action is not governed by the Geier final order rule. The court emphasized that supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding under SDCL 29A-3-501, which contrasts with the multiple, independent proceedings allowed under SDCL 29A-3-107 for unsupervised administration. Since the order for supervised administration was signed before the denial of Linda's motion, the action had become a supervised administration, and the individual-proceeding rule of finality did not apply. Consequently, the court also dismissed Arlene's notice of review. View "Estate Of Ager" on Justia Law

Regina Goeden and Wayne Goeden were involved in a divorce proceeding where Wayne contested the circuit court's decisions on the validity of their premarital agreement, the valuation and division of marital property, the treatment of his veterans' disability benefits, and the grounds for divorce. Regina and Wayne had been married since 2017, and both had adult children from previous marriages. They lived together in a home owned by Wayne, and prior to their marriage, Wayne physically assaulted Regina, leading to a temporary breakup and legal charges against Wayne.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, found the premarital agreement void and unenforceable, determining that Regina did not execute it voluntarily and that it was unconscionable. The court also found that Wayne did not provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of his property and financial obligations. The court divided the marital property equally, giving Wayne credit for certain premarital assets but rejecting his claims for additional credits related to the marital home and other expenses. The court also found that Wayne violated a temporary restraining order by using marital funds for personal expenses.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the premarital agreement was unconscionable and that Wayne did not provide adequate disclosure of his assets. The court also upheld the equal division of the marital estate, finding no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's valuation and division of property. Additionally, the court agreed with the circuit court's treatment of Wayne's veterans' disability benefits, determining that they lost their exclusionary status when commingled with marital funds. Finally, the court affirmed the grant of divorce to Regina on the grounds of extreme cruelty, based on credible evidence of Wayne's emotional abuse. View "Goeden v. Goeden" on Justia Law

Jerry Simon, the decedent, owned a ranching operation known as Simon Ranch, Inc. He had a will that left all his property to his only child, DeLynn Hanson. Jerry married Lynda Simon in 2011, after executing his will. Lynda filed a petition as an omitted spouse seeking an intestate share of Jerry’s estate under SDCL 29A-2-301, arguing she was entitled to a share because she was not provided for in the will.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, denied Lynda’s petition. The court found that Jerry had provided for Lynda outside of the will with the intent that these transfers were in lieu of any testamentary provision. The court based its decision on evidence that Jerry had transferred assets, including horses and vehicles, into joint ownership with Lynda and had made statements indicating his intent to leave Simon Ranch to his daughter and grandchildren. The court granted Lynda an elective share of 21% of Jerry’s augmented estate under SDCL 29A-2-202.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Jerry intended to provide for Lynda outside of his will. The Supreme Court noted that Jerry’s statements, the amount of the transfers, and other evidence supported the conclusion that Jerry intended to omit Lynda from his will and provide for her through other means. The court upheld the denial of Lynda’s petition for an intestate share and affirmed the grant of an elective share. View "In the Matter of the Estate Of Simon" on Justia Law

SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

Acuity issued a commercial auto policy to Terra-Tek, LLC, which included John Waba and Sheila Foreman as additional named insureds. Waba was injured in an auto accident with an underinsured motorist while driving a vehicle not listed under Terra-Tek’s policy. Acuity denied Waba’s claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits, arguing that the vehicle he was driving was not covered under the policy. Acuity then sought a declaratory judgment to confirm that Waba was not entitled to UIM benefits.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Brule County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that the UIM endorsement in Terra-Tek’s policy unambiguously provided coverage to Waba for the injuries sustained in the accident, despite the vehicle not being listed as a covered auto. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Waba, determining that the policy’s language did not require Waba to be occupying a covered auto to receive UIM benefits. Acuity appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the UIM endorsement’s language did not limit coverage to injuries sustained while occupying a covered auto. The court noted that the policy’s definition of an insured for UIM coverage did not include such a limitation, unlike the liability coverage section, which explicitly required the insured to be occupying a covered auto. The court concluded that the policy provided UIM coverage to Waba for the accident, affirming the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Terra-Tek and Waba. View "Acuity V. Terra-Tek" on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law

Kevin Jucht and Nathan Schulz are neighboring farmers. Jucht sued Schulz, alleging that Schulz's chemical spray drifted onto Jucht's property, damaging his soybeans. Jucht reported the incident to the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) and subsequently filed a lawsuit against Schulz for negligence, strict liability, trespass, and nuisance, seeking actual and punitive damages. Schulz moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Jucht failed to provide the statutory notice required under SDCL 38-21-46.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, McCook County, granted Schulz's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Jucht's failure to provide the notice required by SDCL 38-21-46 barred him from seeking recovery for the alleged damages. Jucht appealed the decision, arguing that the lack of notice should not bar his cause of action.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that while SDCL 38-21-46 requires a person claiming damages from pesticide use to notify the applicator, failure to provide such notice does not automatically bar the claimant from bringing their claim. Instead, a claimant is barred from seeking recovery under SDCL 38-21-47 only if they fail to allow the applicator to inspect the alleged damage. The court emphasized that the purpose of the notice is to enable timely inspection by the applicator. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the nature and timing of the notice Schulz received and whether he was given the opportunity to inspect the damage. View "Jucht v. Schulz" on Justia Law

FDJ, LLC, Richard Flugge, and LeAnn Julius (Plaintiffs) sued Ross Determan, alleging he breached a covenant not to compete after selling his accounting practice to them. Determan counterclaimed, asserting the LLC failed to make required payments under their purchase agreement. The circuit court found the LLC breached the agreement by not making payments, which voided Determan's non-compete obligation. The court awarded Determan $106,972.36 and held Plaintiffs jointly and severally liable.The circuit court determined that the LLC failed to make payments to Determan after May 2018, which constituted a material breach of the purchase agreement. This breach relieved Determan of his obligations under the non-compete clause. The court found that Determan resumed working for former clients only after the LLC stopped payments, and Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to justify withholding payments for alleged expenses.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment against the LLC but reversed the imposition of joint and several liability against Flugge and Julius individually. The court held that the purchase agreement explicitly stated the LLC was responsible for payments to Determan, and there was no basis to hold Flugge and Julius personally liable. The court also noted that Determan did not allege facts to justify disregarding the corporate entity, and the circuit court did not provide findings to support such a decision. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "FDJ, LLC v. Determan" on Justia Law

Steven and Jennifer Condron were granted a divorce in September 2019. The divorce decree included a division of assets and ordered Steven to pay Jennifer a combination of permanent and rehabilitative alimony. Steven was also required to pay $3,218 per month in child support. Three years later, Steven petitioned to modify the child support, arguing that the alimony payments should be considered in the child support calculation. The child support referee declined to include the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and refused to exclude them from Steven’s income, treating the payments as part of the property division rather than alimony. The circuit court adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. The court found that Steven’s gross annual income exceeded $1,000,000, while Jennifer had no income. The court ordered Steven to pay Jennifer $15,000 per month in alimony for four years, followed by $11,000 per month in permanent alimony. Steven later filed a petition to modify child support due to a significant reduction in his income after being terminated from his job. The child support referee found Steven’s new gross monthly income to be approximately $45,639.42 and Jennifer’s income to be $1,638. Despite these findings, the referee treated the alimony payments as part of the property division and did not adjust the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. The circuit court upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the monthly payments were indeed alimony and not part of the property division. The court noted that the payments were consistently referred to as alimony and were terminable upon significant life events, such as death or remarriage, which is characteristic of alimony. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for recalculating child support, including the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and excluding them from Steven’s income. View "Condron v. Condron" on Justia Law

Dakota Bail Bonds (DBB) posted bonds for two criminal defendants who violated their conditions of release but did not fail to appear in court. The circuit court forfeited the bonds, interpreting SDCL 23A-43-21 as requiring forfeiture for any material breach of release conditions. DBB requested the forfeiture be set aside under SDCL 23A-43-22, arguing their surety only guaranteed court appearances, not compliance with all conditions of release. The circuit court denied this request and entered orders forfeiting the bonds.The circuit court, part of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, determined that the statutory language did not distinguish between types of bonds and required forfeiture for any breach of release conditions. The court also declined to set aside the forfeiture, reasoning that justice did not warrant such action merely because the defendants complied with court appearance requirements but violated other conditions. Consequently, the court entered judgments of default against DBB.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the surety bond's language. The Supreme Court found that DBB's surety bond explicitly guaranteed only the defendants' court appearances, not compliance with all conditions of release. Since the defendants did not fail to appear in court, there was no violation of the condition guaranteed by DBB. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court should have set aside the forfeiture under SDCL 23A-43-22 and vacated the judgment of default against DBB. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the judgment of default. View "State v. Dakota Bail Bonds" on Justia Law