Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering dissolution and the sale of Dragpipe Saloon, LLC's assets, holding that the drastic remedy of judicial dissolution was not supported by the evidence in this case.In their efforts to sell their membership interests two members of Dragpipe requested judicial dissolution and an order authorizing the sale of Dragpipe's assets. The circuit court granted the request for dissolution, concluding that judicial dissolution was authorized under S.D. Codified Laws 47-34A-801(a)(4)(i) and (iii) because Dragpipe's economic purpose was unreasonably frustrated and because it was not reasonably practicable to carry on its business under the provisions of the operating agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the operating agreement and in its application of sections 47-34A-801(a)(4)(i) and (iii); and (2) the economic purpose was not likely to be unreasonably frustrated by Dragpipe's continued operation, and the LLC was operating within the purposes stated in the operating agreement. View "Dysart v. Dragpipe Saloon, LLC" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion to exclude testimony from Plaintiff's medical providers regarding the extent and permanency of his injuries and that the jury's verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice.Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in allowing Plaintiff's treating providers to testify about the permanency of his injuries, and the court's decision to allow the undisclosed opinions by Plaintiff's regular medical provider about the impact of Plaintiff's injuries did not create prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal; and (2) the evidence presented to the jury supported its verdict and failed to support Appellants' claim that the jury acted with passion or prejudice. View "Weber v. Rains" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus relief from his kidnapping convictions, holding that Defendant's habeas claims were "clearly procedurally defaulted."Defendant's criminal judgment was final more than two years before the effective date of S.D. Codified Laws 21-27-3.3, the statute of limitations enacted in 2012, cutting off Defendant's ability to commence his habeas action. While the decision in Hughbanks v. Dooley, 887 N.W.2d 319 (S.D. 2016), gave Defendant until July 1, 2014 to commence his action Defendant did not commence it until January 2015. Defendant argued before the Supreme Court that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he was appointed counsel who could recognize the "factual predicate[s]" for his habeas claims. The Supreme Court held (1) the timeframe from which section 21-27-3.3(4) begins to run is when the facts, rather than the legal basis, giving rise to potential claims are either known or could have been discovered with due diligence; and (2) Defendant knew the evidentiary facts supporting his claims at the time his judgment was entered in 2007, and therefore, his habeas claims remained "clearly procedurally defaulted" under the statute. View "Asmussen v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the magistrate court that Defendant's motion to suppress should be granted in accordance with an earlier order of the circuit court, holding that Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, and therefore, Defendant's motion to suppress should have been denied.Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence as a result of his encounter with a police officer, arguing that he was not detained based on reasonable suspicion, and therefore, the stop of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and Article VI of the state constitution. The magistrate court denied the motion to suppress and entered a judgment of conviction. The circuit court reversed and ordered that Defendant's motion to suppress should be granted. The magistrate court then entered its order acting in accordance with the circuit court's order and granted Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal; and (2) the officer developed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before seizing Defendant, and therefore the evidence from the stop should not have been suppressed. View "State v. Sharpfish" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order dismissing this action brought by Bingham Farms Trust objecting to a special assessment lien levied upon its property by the City of Belle Fourche and affirmed the court's denial of the City's request for attorney fees, holding that the court had jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of the lien against Bingham.The circuit court declined to consider the merits of the parties' arguments regarding enforceability of the lien and instead granted the City's motion to dismiss on the grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court had the jurisdiction to hear and determine Bingham's argument that the lien was not enforceable against it, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the City's request for attorney fees. View "Bingham Farms Trust v. City Of Belle Fourche" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company's motion for a new trial after a jury returned a general verdict in favor of Giyo Miranda and denying State Farm's request for subrogation recovery against Miranda, holding that State Farm was not prejudiced by the court's instructions to the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine.Giyo Miranda was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle driven by Loyd Nielson after Miranda lost control of his vehicle. State Farm, Nielson's insurer, pursued subrogation recovery against Miranda, but the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Miranda. State Farm filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State Farm failed to establish any prejudice from the circuit court's instructions and that the court was unable to exercise meaningful appellate review on the merits of State Farm's claims. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Miranda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. (SEPR), Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky on Darlette Ridley's personal injury complaint, holding that SEPR, Zacher and Podhradksy did not breach their duty of reasonable care toward Ridley.Ridley was attacked and injured by a pit bull type dog while walking in a state campground. The dog belonged to SEPR and was in the care of Zacher and Podhradsky at their campsite. Ridley sued SEPR, Zacher and Podhradsky for her injuries. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that there was no evidence showing a lack of reasonable care on the defendants' part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no indication that it was foreseeable that the dog would have attacked Ridley, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendants breached their standard duty of care toward Ridley. View "Ridley v. Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for theft by exploitation in an amount exceeding $5,000, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error.Specifically, the Court held that the circuit court (1) did not violate Defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment by finding Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (2) did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) did not err in ordering Defendant to pay $31,743.82 in restitution; and (4) did not impose a sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Hauge" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action against Plaintiff's former attorneys the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting one attorney's motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and granted summary judgment in favor of all the former attorneys, holding that while the court erred when it dismissed one attorney for lack of personal jurisdiction it correctly granted summary judgment to that attorney and the other defendants.Plaintiff, a physician, filed this action against three attorneys he retained to prosecute a legal malpractice claim against his former divorce attorney. The court granted one attorney's motion to dismiss, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction due to insufficient minimum contacts in South Dakota. The court then granted summary judgment for all the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it determined it did not have personal jurisdiction over one attorney because that attorney's conduct and connection with South Dakota were such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into a South Dakota court; but (2) because Plaintiff failed to establish a submissible case of legal malpractice against the defendants the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment. View "Zhang v. Rasmus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles affirming the South Dakota Department of Correction's (Department) calculations of Appellant's parole eligibility for his two sentences under the parole grid in S.D. Codified Laws 24-15A-32, holding that the Department correctly calculated Appellant's parole eligibility.Appellant was sentenced to penitentiary terms for aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. Before the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the Department misapplied the parole grid by using one or more of his prior non-violent felony convictions to increase his time until parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department properly applied the parole grid. View "Reck v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law