Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lake County Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Lake County Drainage Board (Board), approving the application for permits filed by Steven Carmody and Edward Becker to install drain tile on their respective properties in Lake County, holding that the circuit court did not err when it affirmed the Board's decision to issue the drainage permits.James Carmody objected to both permits and appealed the Board's approval of the permits to the circuit court. The circuit court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review and affirmed the Board's approval of the drainage permits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) applied the correct standard of review and burden of proof to Carmody's appeal of the drainage permits; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed the Board's decision to issue the drainage permits. View "Carmody v. Lake County Board Of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor determining that Appellant's knee surgery and related treatment were not compensable, holding that the Department did not err when it concluded that Appellant's work-related injury, in combination with his preexisting condition, did not remain a major contributing cause of his disability, impairment, or need for treatment.Appellant injured his left knee while working for Appellee. Appellee denied liability for Appellant's total knee replacement surgery and post-operative treatment. The Department found the work-related injury neither contributed independently nor was a major contributing cause of Appellant's need for surgery. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to prove causation under either S.D. Codified Laws 62-1-1(7)(b) or S.D. Codified Laws 62-1-1(7)(c). View "Armstrong v. Longview Farms, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his hotel room pursuant to a search warrant, holding that the officer who previously detained Defendant's vehicle and gathered information eventually contained in the search warrant affidavit did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle and that all evidence obtained after the stop must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.Defendant was stopped because the officer observed a brake light emit a white light. A consent search of the vehicle did not produce evidence of unlawful drugs, but the officer later found a foil ball in the vehicle, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Thereafter, police officers seized evidence from Defendant's hotel room pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because it had two properly working brake lights. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle; and (2) once the information derived from the unlawful traffic stop was excluded from the search warrant affidavit, it lacked a substantial basis upon which probable cause could be found. View "State v. Tenold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment denying Appellant's second application for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden to show deficient performance and prejudice on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that Appellant's remaining claims were not reviewable or meritorious habeas claims.In his habeas corpus application, Appellant claimed that his original guilty pleas were not made voluntarily and intelligently, that the court upon his resentencing abused its discretion when it denied his motion to introduce evidence of the State's alleged inconsistent previous arguments, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his initial change of plea hearing and at his jury resentencing. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant cannot challenge his guilty plea or alleged inconsistent arguments on the merits under the procedural framework of a habeas action; and (2) Appellant did not meet the Strickland standard to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Piper v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the circuit court dismissing an application for a writ of prohibition, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court erred by dismissing the alternative application for writ of certiorari.Triple K Land, LLC successfully applied to the Hanson County Board of adjustment for a conditional use permit to construct a pig nursery facility. Loren Huber and Amy Nolan-Huber (the Hubers), adjacent property owners, applied for a writ of prohibition, alternatively designating the application as a verified petition setting forth the illegality of the Board's decision. During a hearing, the circuit court granted Triple K's oral motion to intervene. The court then dismissed the application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) insofar as the circuit court dismissed the claim for writ of prohibition, it did not err; (2) the Hubers complied with the requirements of S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-61, and the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter by writ of certiorari; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Triple K's motion to intervene. View "Huber v. Hanson County Planning Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the habeas court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden to prove his trial counsel was ineffective when it made the strategic decision not to employ or consult experts.Appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant later sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he did not engage any expert witnesses to evaluate certain evidence. The circuit court denied the habeas petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where defense counsel's decisions were reasonable to advance Defendant's defense theory and where Defendant could not satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement, the habeas court did not err when it denied Appellant's habeas petition. View "Reay v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for second-degree rape and simple assault, holding that the circuit court erred when it admitted a narrative report prepared by an emergency room nurse summarizing the victim's oral statements made during a sexual assault examination, but the error was harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and in admitting the sexual assault examination note. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial; and (2) the circuit court erred in admitting the victim's statements describing her assailant and what occurred and what was said after the attack, but the error was harmless because Defendant failed to demonstrate that the error, in all probability, produced some effect upon the final result of the trial. View "State v. Packard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree rape of a child under age thirteen, holding that the circuit court erred in admitting statements from an unavailable witness, but the error was harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge's order admitting, as other acts evidence, statements from an unavailable witness violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statements at issue were testimonial and of a constitutional magnitude; (2) the circuit court's decision to admit the statements violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation; but (3) the affect of the circuit court's error in admitting the statements at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Richmond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing an out-of-state subpoena proceeding as moot, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the proceedings.During a divorce proceeding in Connecticut between Donald Netter and Stephanie Netter, Stephanie served an out-of-state subpoena duces cecum on South Dakota Trust Company LLC (SDTC) seeking information from certain South Dakota trusts administered by SDTC. Stephanie later filed a motion for a protective order and scheduled a hearing with the South Dakota circuit court because the SDTC and Stephanie were unable to reach an agreement concerning the terms of a protective order for the information sought. SDTC requested additional protections. Before the hearing, Stephanie sought to withdraw the subpoena and the motion for protective order, indicating that the subpoena was no longer necessary. The circuit court allowed Stephanie to withdraw her motion for protective order and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and on mootness grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the dispute relating to the out-of-state subpoena was the sole controversy before the circuit court and because Stephanie withdrew her subpoena, there was no longer a dispute before the circuit court, and the matter was moot. View "Netter v. Netter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss Appellant's civil action challenging a Department of Corrections (DOC) administrative policy relating to the method and procedures for carrying out capital sentences, holding that provisions of S.D. Codified Laws chapter 23A-27A, rather than the DOC policy, vest members of the executive branch with the authority to carry out a capital sentence.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Appellant later brought his civil action claiming that a written policy issued by the DOC relating to the execution of a condemned inmate was invalid because it was not promulgated within the rule-making requirements of the state's Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The circuit court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Policy was not subject to the APA and that the authority of the DOC to carry out a death sentence was derived from S.D. Codified Laws 23A-27A-32, whose provisions were self-executing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DOC policy was not subject to the APA's rule-making requirements. View "Rhines v. S.D. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law