Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

FDJ, LLC, Richard Flugge, and LeAnn Julius (Plaintiffs) sued Ross Determan, alleging he breached a covenant not to compete after selling his accounting practice to them. Determan counterclaimed, asserting the LLC failed to make required payments under their purchase agreement. The circuit court found the LLC breached the agreement by not making payments, which voided Determan's non-compete obligation. The court awarded Determan $106,972.36 and held Plaintiffs jointly and severally liable.The circuit court determined that the LLC failed to make payments to Determan after May 2018, which constituted a material breach of the purchase agreement. This breach relieved Determan of his obligations under the non-compete clause. The court found that Determan resumed working for former clients only after the LLC stopped payments, and Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to justify withholding payments for alleged expenses.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment against the LLC but reversed the imposition of joint and several liability against Flugge and Julius individually. The court held that the purchase agreement explicitly stated the LLC was responsible for payments to Determan, and there was no basis to hold Flugge and Julius personally liable. The court also noted that Determan did not allege facts to justify disregarding the corporate entity, and the circuit court did not provide findings to support such a decision. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "FDJ, LLC v. Determan" on Justia Law

Steven and Jennifer Condron were granted a divorce in September 2019. The divorce decree included a division of assets and ordered Steven to pay Jennifer a combination of permanent and rehabilitative alimony. Steven was also required to pay $3,218 per month in child support. Three years later, Steven petitioned to modify the child support, arguing that the alimony payments should be considered in the child support calculation. The child support referee declined to include the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and refused to exclude them from Steven’s income, treating the payments as part of the property division rather than alimony. The circuit court adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. The court found that Steven’s gross annual income exceeded $1,000,000, while Jennifer had no income. The court ordered Steven to pay Jennifer $15,000 per month in alimony for four years, followed by $11,000 per month in permanent alimony. Steven later filed a petition to modify child support due to a significant reduction in his income after being terminated from his job. The child support referee found Steven’s new gross monthly income to be approximately $45,639.42 and Jennifer’s income to be $1,638. Despite these findings, the referee treated the alimony payments as part of the property division and did not adjust the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. The circuit court upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the monthly payments were indeed alimony and not part of the property division. The court noted that the payments were consistently referred to as alimony and were terminable upon significant life events, such as death or remarriage, which is characteristic of alimony. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for recalculating child support, including the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and excluding them from Steven’s income. View "Condron v. Condron" on Justia Law

Dakota Bail Bonds (DBB) posted bonds for two criminal defendants who violated their conditions of release but did not fail to appear in court. The circuit court forfeited the bonds, interpreting SDCL 23A-43-21 as requiring forfeiture for any material breach of release conditions. DBB requested the forfeiture be set aside under SDCL 23A-43-22, arguing their surety only guaranteed court appearances, not compliance with all conditions of release. The circuit court denied this request and entered orders forfeiting the bonds.The circuit court, part of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, determined that the statutory language did not distinguish between types of bonds and required forfeiture for any breach of release conditions. The court also declined to set aside the forfeiture, reasoning that justice did not warrant such action merely because the defendants complied with court appearance requirements but violated other conditions. Consequently, the court entered judgments of default against DBB.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the surety bond's language. The Supreme Court found that DBB's surety bond explicitly guaranteed only the defendants' court appearances, not compliance with all conditions of release. Since the defendants did not fail to appear in court, there was no violation of the condition guaranteed by DBB. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court should have set aside the forfeiture under SDCL 23A-43-22 and vacated the judgment of default against DBB. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the judgment of default. View "State v. Dakota Bail Bonds" on Justia Law

The City of Custer applied for a permit from the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) to discharge treated wastewater into French Creek as part of an upgrade to its wastewater treatment facility. Preserve French Creek, Inc. (Preserve), a group of local citizens, opposed this discharge. Two years after the permit was issued, a Custer County ordinance was passed by citizen initiative, declaring the discharge of treated water into French Creek a nuisance. Preserve demanded the City cease construction based on the new ordinance, but the City did not comply. Preserve then sought mandamus relief to enforce the ordinance, which the circuit court denied.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Custer County found that the ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically SDCL 21-10-2, which states that actions done under the express authority of a statute cannot be deemed a nuisance. The court concluded that the City’s actions, authorized by the DANR permit, could not be considered a nuisance. The court also rejected Preserve’s estoppel argument, stating that the City and County had no duty to enforce an ordinance that conflicted with state law.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was preempted by state law because it attempted to declare a nuisance something that state law expressly authorized. The court also found that the City and County were not estopped from asserting the ordinance’s invalidity, as their actions in placing the ordinance on the ballot and canvassing the vote were statutorily required and did not constitute an inconsistent position. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was properly denied. View "Preserve French Creek V. Custer County" on Justia Law

Beau Foote Sr. was convicted of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon and resisting arrest. In September 2017, law enforcement officers attempted to arrest Foote at a trailer home in Fort Pierre due to an outstanding warrant. During the arrest, Foote struggled with the officers, causing a taser to discharge and incapacitate one officer. Foote also attempted to use the taser on another officer, who was protected by a bullet-proof vest. Foote was combative even after being handcuffed.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Stanley County, South Dakota, held a jury trial where Foote was found guilty on all charges. Foote appealed his convictions, arguing that a taser is not a dangerous weapon and that he did not intend to cause harm. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed his convictions, citing that a taser is considered a dangerous weapon under state law.Foote then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing and denied his petition, but issued a certificate of probable cause for appeal. Foote appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that his trial counsel failed to object to the State’s expert disclosures, challenge the experts’ qualifications, and hire a defense expert.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Foote’s counsel made strategic decisions that did not constitute ineffective assistance. The court noted that the counsel’s decisions were based on reasonable trial strategy and that Foote failed to demonstrate how these decisions prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief. View "Foote v. Young" on Justia Law

Charles Joseph Burkard sued Tami Jo Burkard for divorce in 2012, and they agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their two children, with Charles paying $1,000 per month in child support. In 2022, their daughter began living full-time with Tami, prompting Tami to seek a modification of child support. The child support referee calculated Charles's new obligation using a hybrid formula, resulting in a monthly payment of $1,465.58. Tami objected, arguing for a different calculation method.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, held a hearing and admitted new testimony from a child support referee, Tom Keller, over Tami's objections. The court ultimately adopted the referee's hybrid formula for calculating child support, despite Tami's argument that it did not align with statutory guidelines and inflated Charles's obligation.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It found that the circuit court erred in admitting Keller's testimony, as it violated SDCL 25-7A-22, which confines evidence to the record established before the referee. However, this error was deemed non-prejudicial because the circuit court's decision was based on the referee's initial report and recommendation.The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the referee's child support calculation, as it was within a reasonable range of potential awards. However, due to discrepancies in the parties' stated income and health insurance amounts, the case was remanded for further calculations. The main holding affirmed the child support amount but required recalculations to address income discrepancies. View "Burkard v. Burkard" on Justia Law

In October 2014, while guiding a hunting party on their property, the Olsens' son observed a crop duster spraying herbicide, which allegedly damaged the Olsens' ponderosa pine trees. The Olsens claimed the herbicide caused significant damage and death to the trees. They filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who argued that expert testimony was required to prove causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, leading to the Olsens' appeal.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Spink County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that without expert testimony, a jury would be left to speculate about the cause of the damage to the trees. The court noted that the fields of chemistry, botany, and agronomy were beyond the understanding of a typical layperson. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the Olsens' complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the need for expert testimony to establish causation for the damage to the trees. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the claims of trespass, statutory nuisance, and common law nuisance, noting that these claims do not require proof of damages to survive summary judgment. The court remanded these claims for further proceedings, allowing the Olsens to potentially recover nominal damages. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel and civil conspiracy due to the lack of evidence on causation for damages. View "Estate of Olsen v. Agtegra Cooperative" on Justia Law

Michael O’Neal was charged with fifteen counts of possession of child pornography following an investigation that included the warrantless seizure of his cell phone and a subsequent search of the phone pursuant to a warrant. O’Neal moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his phone, arguing that the seizure was unconstitutional. The circuit court agreed that the seizure was unconstitutional but denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court also denied O’Neal’s motion to dismiss the charges due to preindictment delay and his motion to preclude the introduction of certain images. O’Neal was convicted on all counts after a jury trial and appealed the rulings.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, initially reviewed the case. The court held a suppression hearing and determined that the seizure of O’Neal’s phone was unconstitutional but found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure. The court also denied O’Neal’s motion to dismiss the charges due to preindictment delay, finding no substantial prejudice, and allowed the introduction of additional images as evidence.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s rulings. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause based on the detailed and credible information provided by O’Neal’s fiancé. The court also found that the evidence obtained from the phone was admissible under the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines, despite the initial unlawful seizure. The court determined that O’Neal failed to show actual and substantial prejudice from the preindictment delay and that the additional images were properly admitted as they were relevant to proving O’Neal’s knowledge and intent. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and that O’Neal’s right to jury unanimity was not violated. View "State v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Kaleb Ironheart was charged with first-degree robbery and aggravated assault after stealing a bottle of liquor from a grocery store. The store manager, Francis Gergen, noticed Ironheart acting suspiciously, saw him grab a bottle of whiskey, and then watched as Ironheart ran out of the store without paying. Gergen chased Ironheart, who then pulled out a knife and threatened Gergen before escaping in a car. Ironheart was later identified and charged.Ironheart was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota. He moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support either charge. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury found Ironheart guilty on both counts. Ironheart appealed the robbery conviction, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court noted that under South Dakota law, robbery is defined as the intentional taking of personal property from another person's possession or immediate presence, against their will, accomplished by means of force or fear of force. The court found that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Ironheart used his knife with force or fear of force to retain possession of the liquor or to prevent Gergen’s resistance to the taking. The court also found that the jury could have concluded that the force or fear of force was not used solely as a means of escape. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding Ironheart's robbery conviction. View "State v. Ironheart" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Julie and Gary Liebel, who married in 2010 and divorced in 2022. Prior to their marriage, they had signed a premarital agreement stating that each party's assets would remain separate and under their sole control, even after the marriage. The agreement also stated that neither party would acquire any interest in the other's property due to the marriage. The couple divorced on the grounds of adultery, and the circuit court applied the premarital agreement in dividing their assets. Julie appealed, arguing that the court erred in applying the agreement to the property division in the divorce and abused its discretion in classifying and distributing the parties’ property.The circuit court had found the premarital agreement to be valid and enforceable in the context of divorce. It also found that the agreement unambiguously governed the division of property in the event of divorce. The court treated the marital home, which was held jointly, as marital property, but most of the remaining property was treated as nonmarital. Gary received the bulk of the nonmarital property valued at $713,705. Upon division of the net marital assets, Julie was awarded marital property valued at $35,482, while Gary received marital property valued at $134,535. The court ordered Gary to make a cash equalization payment to Julie in the amount of $49,526, less $2,062.80 in attorney fees awarded to Gary for defending a protection order that the court determined Julie filed maliciously.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the premarital agreement unambiguously provided that neither spouse may claim an interest in the separate property of the other, whether it was acquired before or during the marriage. This could only be understood to mean that the other spouse would not obtain any interest in separately owned property under any circumstances, including divorce, unless mutually agreed to by creating a joint tenancy in any property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's division of property. View "Liebel v. Liebel" on Justia Law