Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this second appeal regarding a contract dispute, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err, on remand, in concluding that the contract created a right of first refusal and that the contract was void as an unreasonable restraint against alienation. The court held (1) the circuit court did not err when it held that the parties intended to create a right of first refusal; (2) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that the contract constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation and repugnant to the interest created; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to narrow the scope of the alienation to comply with S.D. Codified Laws 43-5-1 or another reasonable limitation. View "Laska v. Barr" on Justia Law

In this second appeal regarding a contract dispute, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err, on remand, in concluding that the contract created a right of first refusal and that the contract was void as an unreasonable restraint against alienation. The court held (1) the circuit court did not err when it held that the parties intended to create a right of first refusal; (2) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that the contract constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation and repugnant to the interest created; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to narrow the scope of the alienation to comply with S.D. Codified Laws 43-5-1 or another reasonable limitation. View "Laska v. Barr" on Justia Law

At issue was the Meade County Board of County Commissioners’ order approving incorporation of a proposed municipality of Buffalo Chip City and setting an election for voters to decide whether to assent to incorporation.After denying a request to stay the election, the election was held, and a majority of voters chose to incorporate Buffalo Chip City. The Board then declared Buffalo Chip City formally incorporated. The circuit court heard Appellees’ appeal and issued a judgment declaring that the Board’s order was invalid, that the election was a nullity, and that Buffalo Chip City was void. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that S.D. Codified Laws 9-3-20 requires that any action challenging Buffalo Chip City’s incorporation be brought by the State, and because Appellees did not bring their suit on behalf of the State, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lippold v. Meade County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

At issue was the Meade County Board of County Commissioners’ order approving incorporation of a proposed municipality of Buffalo Chip City and setting an election for voters to decide whether to assent to incorporation.After denying a request to stay the election, the election was held, and a majority of voters chose to incorporate Buffalo Chip City. The Board then declared Buffalo Chip City formally incorporated. The circuit court heard Appellees’ appeal and issued a judgment declaring that the Board’s order was invalid, that the election was a nullity, and that Buffalo Chip City was void. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that S.D. Codified Laws 9-3-20 requires that any action challenging Buffalo Chip City’s incorporation be brought by the State, and because Appellees did not bring their suit on behalf of the State, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lippold v. Meade County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

At issue in this negligence case was whether the circuit court committed reversible error when it did not instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Plaintiff was at a Cabela’s store when she brushed a heavy drop-down steel receiver hitch, which fell and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Cabela’s for negligence. During the settling of jury instructions, Plaintiff requested two pattern jury instructions on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that the instructions were appropriate because the only evidence of negligence was the fact that the hitch, which was under Cabela’s control, fell. The circuit court concluded that the instructions were not warranted by the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit reversible error when it refused Plaintiff’s requested instructions because Plaintiff’s evidence left room for different presumptions or inferences negating the applicability of the doctrine. View "Steilen v. Cabela’s Wholesale, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this negligence case was whether the circuit court committed reversible error when it did not instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Plaintiff was at a Cabela’s store when she brushed a heavy drop-down steel receiver hitch, which fell and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Cabela’s for negligence. During the settling of jury instructions, Plaintiff requested two pattern jury instructions on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that the instructions were appropriate because the only evidence of negligence was the fact that the hitch, which was under Cabela’s control, fell. The circuit court concluded that the instructions were not warranted by the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit reversible error when it refused Plaintiff’s requested instructions because Plaintiff’s evidence left room for different presumptions or inferences negating the applicability of the doctrine. View "Steilen v. Cabela’s Wholesale, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order rejecting the plea agreement between Defendant and the State.After Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement the circuit court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and the factual basis to support the plea. Two weeks later, the circuit court informed the parties that it intended to reject the plea agreement. The court then entered an order rejecting the plea agreement. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court was bound by the plea agreement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the circuit court at the time of the plea did not reject the agreement and did not defer its decision to accept or reject the agreement, the circuit court was required to sentence Defendant within the bounds of the plea agreement. The court remanded the case with directions to sentence Defendant in accordance with the agreement. View "State v. Hale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order rejecting the plea agreement between Defendant and the State.After Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement the circuit court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and the factual basis to support the plea. Two weeks later, the circuit court informed the parties that it intended to reject the plea agreement. The court then entered an order rejecting the plea agreement. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court was bound by the plea agreement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the circuit court at the time of the plea did not reject the agreement and did not defer its decision to accept or reject the agreement, the circuit court was required to sentence Defendant within the bounds of the plea agreement. The court remanded the case with directions to sentence Defendant in accordance with the agreement. View "State v. Hale" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a guardian’s attorney fees should be paid from a protected person’s estate when the fees were incurred in responding to pleadings to remove the guardian and to move the protected person to an assisted living facility.Beverly Sears, the guardian in this case, moved for her attorney fees incurred in a dispute seeking to remove her as guardian and to move the protected person to a facility. The parties settled, with Sears agreeing to step down as guardian but the parties deciding that the protected person would not be moved to a facility. Sears moved for her attorney fees paid from the estate. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that without a resolution of factual matters relating to the necessity of the services in administering the guardianship or the reasonableness of the fee amount, the court was unable to meaningfully review the circuit court’s decision. View "In re Conservatorship of Bachand" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a guardian’s attorney fees should be paid from a protected person’s estate when the fees were incurred in responding to pleadings to remove the guardian and to move the protected person to an assisted living facility.Beverly Sears, the guardian in this case, moved for her attorney fees incurred in a dispute seeking to remove her as guardian and to move the protected person to a facility. The parties settled, with Sears agreeing to step down as guardian but the parties deciding that the protected person would not be moved to a facility. Sears moved for her attorney fees paid from the estate. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that without a resolution of factual matters relating to the necessity of the services in administering the guardianship or the reasonableness of the fee amount, the court was unable to meaningfully review the circuit court’s decision. View "In re Conservatorship of Bachand" on Justia Law