Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clint Bolton was charged with alternative counts of simple assault, a class 1 misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended complaint charging disorderly conduct, a class 2 misdemeanor. Class 2 misdemeanors carry a maximum sentence of thirty days in jail or a $500 fine or both. The State also agreed to recommend a thirty-day jail sentence with all thirty days suspended. Bolton agreed to the plea agreement, and counsel entered a no contest plea to disorderly conduct on Bolton’s behalf. The magistrate court accepted the plea and imposed a thirty-day jail sentence. The court then suspended execution of that sentence on the condition that Bolton obey all laws and remain on good behavior for six months. Bolton’s attorney immediately objected to the sentence, arguing the court could not condition a suspended execution of sentence for a period longer than thirty days, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for class 2 misdemeanors. The issue before the South Dakota Supreme Court was whether sentencing courts have the power to suspend execution of sentence on the condition of good behavior for periods longer than the authorized maximum term of imprisonment. The Court concluded sentencing courts indeed have such power because it has been delegated to them by the Constitution and the Legislature has not restricted it. View "South Dakota v. Bolton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision awarding attorney’s fees assessed against opposing counsel for costs Defendant incurred in bringing a successful motion to disqualify opposing counsel for an alleged violation of the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court reasoned that sanctions were appropriate because the motion to disqualify was “other litigation” resulting from counsel’s alleged ethical violation. In reversing, the circuit court held (1) counsel’s alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct did not result in “other litigation” comprehended by either Jacobsen v. Leisinger, 746 N.W.2d 739, or the precedent on which it relied; and (2) the procedural requirements for S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-11(c) (Rule 11) sanctions were not met. View "Berggren v. Schonebaum" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court excluding Appellants’ expert’s undisclosed rebuttal testimony and refusing Appellants’ jury instruction.Appellants, as guardians ad litem for N.W.O., sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant improperly treated N.W.O. with the drug Reglan. During trial, Appellants attempted to present undisclosed rebuttal testimony from an expert witness and requested a nonapportionment-of-damages jury instruction. The circuit court denied the requested jury instruction and excluded the undisclosed expert witness from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in excluding Appellants’ undisclosed expert’s rebuttal testimony and in refusing Appellants’ requested jury instruction. View "O’Day v. Nanton" on Justia Law

S.D. Codified Laws 58-11-9.4, which requires underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in motor vehicle liability policies of insurance, does not limit UIM coverage to primary insurance policies and contemplates additional UIM coverage. Therefore, umbrella policies that include UIM coverage are subject to the same public policy prohibition invalidating an exception from coverage for accidents involving government owned vehicles.Plaintiffs purchased a motor vehicle liability policy from one insurer and a personal liability umbrella policy from a separate but related insurer. Both policies provided UIM coverage but both excluded coverage for accounts caused by government vehicles. When one of the plaintiffs was injured in an accident involving a government vehicle, Plaintiffs filed this declaratory action to determine the enforceability of the government vehicle exclusion in both policies. The circuit court determined that the exclusion was not enforceable in the motor vehicle liability policy but was enforceable in the umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in upholding the government vehicle exclusion in the umbrella policy. View "Streff v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting Father joint custody of the parties’ child and a shared parenting child support cross-credit.At the time of their divorce, Mother and Father stipulated that Mother would have primary physical custody of the parties’ child. Five years later, Father filed a motion for change of child custody, support, and visitation, seeking a shared-parenting custody arrangement and application of a shared parenting child support cross-credit under S.D. Codified Laws 25-7-6.27. The circuit court allowed Father the cross-credit and ordered joint physical custody. In so doing, the court reduced Father’s child support payment to Mother from $442 per month to $25 per month. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court’s findings of fact did not support its conclusions of law, namely, that applying the cross-credit was appropriate in this case under the circumstances set forth in section 25-7-6.27. View "Sigler v. Sigler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment affirming a certificate of assessment issued by the Department of Revenue requiring Valley Power Systems, Inc. to pay alternate contractor’s excise tax, use tax, interest, and a penalty.Valley Power contracted with Black Hills Power, Inc. (BHP) to install new exhaust manifolds on five mobile power units that were used by a utility company to provide supplemental power at one of its power plants, but Valley Power did not pay any tax with respect to the transaction. Instead BHP paid use tax on the transaction. After an audit of both companies, the Department refunded BHP’s use tax and issued a certificate of assessment requiring Valley Power to pay $54,404. An administrative hearing examiner and the circuit court affirmed the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department did not err in concluding that Valley Power was required to pay excise and use tax. View "Valley Power Systems v. S.D. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial.In State v. Bausch, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions for sexual contact and remanded the case with direction that the circuit court vacate the convictions and resentence Defendant on his four rape convictions. On remand, the circuit court vacated Defendant’s sexual contact convictions and resentenced Defendant on the four rape convictions. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court carried out this court’s remand directive when it vacated Defendant’s sexual contact convictions and resentenced Defendant on the four rape convictions. View "State v. Bausch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Pennington County Board of Commissioners reversing the decision of the Pennington County Planning Director approving a construction permit for Croell Redi-Mix Inc. to continue using and expand an existing mining operation. On appeal, the Board argued that the issuance of the permit violated Pennington County’s zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred by reversing the Board’s decision because (1) the Board properly entertained the appeal from the Director’s decision, and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise; (2) the Board properly declined to issue a construction permit for the purpose of doing that which is prohibited under section 507(B) of the Pennington County Zoning Ordinance, and therefore, the circuit court erred by reversing the Board’s decision; and (3) the circuit court’s conclusion that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying the construction permit was premised on an erroneous interpretation of the controlling ordinances. View "Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Pennington County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court, through formal condemnation proceedings, approving the petition of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. and Otter Tail Power Co. (collectively, Utilities) seeking easements to construct a powerline across four parcels belonging to Parkshill Farms, LLC, Reuben Parks, Vera Parks, and Ordean Parks. The court held (1) the easements were taken for a public use; (2) the Utilities’ necessity determination was not an abuse of discretion; but (3) the circuit court did not adequately instruct the jury on the appropriate measure of compensation due for the easements. The court remanded for a new trial on compensation. View "Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Parkshill Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court denying Lawrence County’s motion to join the United States as an indispensable party to this action filed by various Landowners requesting that the County maintain a road providing access to their homes. The County denied the Landowners’ request. Petitioner appealed the County’s action, and the County moved to join the United States as an indispensable party. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the United States Forest Service was not an indispensable party to the action because the County failed to follow the proper procedure to grant an easement in the road to the Forest Service. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court committed clear error in ruling on the easement without first determining whether the United States was a party that should have been joined if feasible. View "Oyen v. Lawrence County Commission" on Justia Law