Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether a defendant is “licensed or privileged to enter or remain” in an occupied structure hinges on whether the defendant is, under the totality of the circumstances, in possession or control of the premises at the time of entry. Defendant entered a home he previously shared with his ex-wife and brought with him items that could be used for restraint, a suicide note, and his last will and testament. The police arrested Defendant inside the home, and the State charged with second-degree burglary, among other offenses. Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that he had a “license or privilege to enter or remain” in the residence under S.D. Codified Laws 22-32-3; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment of conviction and allow withdrawal of Defendant’s guilty plea; and (3) did not err by accepting Defendant’s guilty plea where there was an adequate factual basis supporting Defendant’s guilty plea. View "State v. Pentecost" on Justia Law

Dakota Mill & Grain, Inc. filed suit against Gateway Building Systems, Inc. Gateway had purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy from Western National Mutual Insurance Company, which was in effect during the period at issue. Western National provided Gateway with a defense in the action but issued a reservation of rights letter. Western National subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment regarding coverage under the policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Western National, concluding that the policy between Gateway and Western National provided an initial grant of coverage in the Dakota Mill suit but that exclusions defeated coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that disputed material facts precluded summary judgment in this declaratory action. Remanded. View "Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gateway Building Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Black was hired as an agent of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2005. Approximately one decade later, DCI terminated Black’s employment after a series of incidents and disciplinary actions. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) found that DCI had just cause to terminate Black’s employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) CSC did not err in finding that DCI had just cause to terminate Black’s employment; and (2) DCI complied with the applicable rules and regulations and afforded Black due process of law. View "Black v. Division of Criminal Investigation" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and kidnapping. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime. The State moved to transfer Defendant’s case to adult court. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion to transfer. After a trial in adult court, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder (arson), first-degree felony murder, first-degree arson, felony murder (aggravated kidnapping), and second-degree aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to eighty years imprisonment for the murder conviction and a concurrent fifty-year sentence for second-degree aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in transferring Defendant to adult court; (2) the circuit court did not fail to adequately instruct the jury on Defendant’s theory of defense; and (3) Defendant’s eighty-year-sentence was not an abuse of discretion, grossly disproportionate, or a de facto life sentence in violation of the spirit of Montgomery v. Louisiana. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for eight drug-related offenses. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven of the eight counts. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred by amending the indictment the day before trial, and (2) the trial court committed plain error by not informing the parties of a jury question that arose during deliberations and then by answering that question without input from the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit plain error by amending the indictment the day prior to trial; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error by not notifying the parties of the jury’s question at the time it occurred. View "State v. Schrempp" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence after police officers approached a parked vehicle and found Defendant in the driver’s seat and smelled the odor of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the intrusion. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the officer’s investigation was justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement applied and thus denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Kleven" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years in the state penitentiary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing a nurse practitioner who helped care for the victim to give her opinion regarding the seriousness of the victim’s injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err, let alone commit plain error, in permitting the nurse practitioner to opine whether the victim suffered a serious bodily injury, and therefore, Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by jury. View "State v. Greenwood" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Defendant argued that the court erred when it found that exceptions to the warrant requirement existed and erred by failing to suppress his statements made to law enforcement prior to receiving Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) exigent circumstances existed justifying the officers’ warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment; and (2) the admission of Defendant’s statements that he made to law enforcement before he received Miranda warnings was proper. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad and Myron Stoebner entered into a contract for the sale of real property. Under the contract, the Stoebners agreed to sell Konrad nine parcels of real estate. The contract contained an arbitration clause. When the Stoebners refused to close on the sale of Parcel 7, Konrad sent the Stoebners a demand for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that the Stoebners breached the contract and ordered the Stoebners to transfer Parcel 7 to Konrad. The Stoebners moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by disregarding the contractual definition of “transfer.” The circuit court denied the Stoebners’ application and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Konrad because the arbitrator did not exceed his powers when he decided the issue submitted. View "Konrad v. Stoebner" on Justia Law

Bonnie Jean Pease executed a holographic will approximately seven months before her death. The will disinherited Pease’s mother, sister, and brother but not her brother Douglas Hubert. At issue before the circuit court was whether Pease intended to devise anything to Lisa and Lynn Schock, who were named in the will as the executors of Pease’s estate and to whom Pease gave “all [her] belongings…” contingent on them giving a share to Hubert, to a search for a home for her bird, and to fund litigation against the State. The circuit court ruled that after the Schocks set aside the requested funds, they were to distribute the entire residual estate to Hubert. The Schocks appealed, arguing that the gifting language of the will gave them a conditional gift. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will gave Pease’s property to Schocks subject to the stated convictions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law