Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with three counts of simple assault against a law enforcement officer, among other offenses. Defendant served a subpoena on the county sheriff requesting all disciplinary records and complaints contained within the arresting officer’s personnel file. The sheriff filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The circuit court denied the motion in part and ordered the sheriff to produce, for in camera review, portions of the officer’s personnel records from the past five years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ordering the sheriff to produce the arresting officer’s personnel records for in camera review. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of simple assault against a law enforcement officer, among other offenses. Defendant served a subpoena on the county sheriff requesting all disciplinary records and complaints contained within the personnel files of three sheriff department detectives. The sheriff moved to quash the subpoena. The circuit court denied the motion in part and ordered the sheriff to produce, for in camera review, complaints against the officers and disciplinary records and actions resulting from the incident for which Defendant was charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ordering the sheriff to produce portions of the three detectives’ personnel records for in camera review. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Dusty Groom’s handgun discharged, shooting Brody Heitmann in the head. Heitmann survived and sued Groom. Heitmann obtained a judgment against Groom and also obtained an assignment from Groom of Groom’s right to enforce coverage under an insurance policy issued to Groom’s grandmother by American Family Mutual Insurance. Heitmann subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against American Family seeking ruling that, on the date of the shooting, Groom was an insured under the policy for purposes of liability coverage. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a relative of the insured residing on the insured’s premises, and not in the household of the insured, is not a “resident relative” under the policy. View "Heitmann v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kern was injured in a rear-end collision in which the other driver was at fault. Kern filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim with Progressive Northern Insurance Company, his insurance provider. Months of settlement negotiations ended in a stalemate. Thereafter, Kern brought an action against Progressive for bad faith, alleging that Progressive’s settlement offers had been intentionally inadequate. Kern also sought unpaid UIM benefits. After a trial, the jury awarded Kern $18,650 in unpaid UIM damages and found that Progressive had not acted in bad faith. Kern appealed, alleging several errors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Kern’s alleged errors required reversal and that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to award attorney’s fees. View "Kern v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a severe storm, Richard and Lorayna Papousek discovered that ninety-three of their cattle were dead. It was determined that the cause of the cattle’s death was drowning. At the time, the Papouseks had in effect a farmowner-ranchowner policy purchased from De Smet Farm Mutual Insurance Company of South Dakota. De Smet denied the Papouseks’ claim filed under the drowning provision of the policy because none of the cattle were found submerged in water. The Papouseks filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the policy covered the cattle losses. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of De Smet. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Papouseks established coverage under the drowning provision, and De Smet did not prove an exclusion to coverage under the policy. View "Papousek v. De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison with four years suspended and credit for time served. Defendant appealed, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a new trial, and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it did not address Defendant’s motion for a change of counsel. Remanded for the circuit court to appoint new counsel and conduct a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A county Board of Adjustment granted Developer a conditional use permit for a concentrated animal feeding operation. Petitioners challenged the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction to grant the permit because the county had failed to validly enact the ordinance authorizing the Board to issue permits. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. In so doing, the court refused to consider whether the county validly enacted the ordinance, deciding that such review would be outside the scope of Petitioners’ writ challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners had standing to appeal the Board’s decision; and (2) the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the validity of the ordinances enacted by the county, as review in this case was not beyond the scope of the writ. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Brookings County Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue subjected several corporations owned by North American Truck & Trailer, Inc. (collectively, Taxpayers) to a sales-and-use-tax audit, which uncovered errors regarding Taxpayers’ reporting of use tax. Thereafter, the Department assessed Taxpayers for unpaid use taxes. Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and requested an administrative hearing. At the hearing, Taxpayers argued that the shop supplies assessed were exempt from use tax and offered exhibits in support of their position. The hearing examiner declined to consider a sales invoice offered by Taxpayers demonstrating a typical transaction that involved the cost of supplies because Taxpayers submitted it more than sixty days after the audit began, in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing examiner did not err when it (1) affirmed the Department’s refusal to consider the sales invoice; and (2) affirmed the Department’s certificate of assessment of use tax due and owing on transactions where shop supplies, purchased without payment of sales tax, were used and consumed. View "Black Hills Truck & Trailer, Inc." on Justia Law

Tri-City Associates, LP owned and operated the Northgate Shopping Center in Rapid City. It entered into a written lease agreement with Belmont, Inc. in April 2006 for unfinished commercial space. The unfinished commercial space required substantial initial construction work before the lease was to begin on August 1, 2006. The parties experienced considerable difficulties in completing the terms of the lease. Tri-City proposed to move the start date of the lease to January 15, 2007. Belmont did not respond to the requested modification. Ultimately, Tri- City did not deliver the premises to Belmont on August 1, 2006, in the condition required under the lease and did not complete its allocated initial construction work. After Belmont did not pay rent for the first few months of the lease, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice of default under the lease. A month later, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice to quit and vacate and, in April 2007, sued to evict Belmont. Belmont answered and asserted that Tri-City materially breached the lease, which Belmont asserted relieved it of its duty to pay rent. Then, in October 2007, Belmont counterclaimed for damages for Tri-City’s failure to perform under the terms of the lease. Tri-City responded to Belmont’s counterclaim that Belmont agreed to accept the premises “as is.” Tri-City also argued that Belmont failed to provide Tri-City with written notice of Tri-City’s alleged breach and did not give Tri-City an opportunity to cure as required by the notice-and-cure provision in the lease. In this second appeal, Tri-City argued that the circuit court erred when it entered a judgment in favor of Belmont, Inc. In "Tri-City I," the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to enter “findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure.” On remand, the circuit court entered supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, interpreting the notice-and-cure provision of the lease at issue to allow for substantial compliance and found that Belmont substantially complied. It also found that Tri-City had actual notice of its material breaches and an opportunity to cure. Alternatively, the court concluded that, by bringing suit against Belmont, Tri-City repudiated any intention to perform its obligation under the lease and made futile the requirement that Belmont strictly comply with the notice-and-cure provision. It then entered a judgment in favor of Belmont. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law