Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Konrad and Myron Stoebner entered into a contract for the sale of real property. Under the contract, the Stoebners agreed to sell Konrad nine parcels of real estate. The contract contained an arbitration clause. When the Stoebners refused to close on the sale of Parcel 7, Konrad sent the Stoebners a demand for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that the Stoebners breached the contract and ordered the Stoebners to transfer Parcel 7 to Konrad. The Stoebners moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by disregarding the contractual definition of “transfer.” The circuit court denied the Stoebners’ application and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Konrad because the arbitrator did not exceed his powers when he decided the issue submitted. View "Konrad v. Stoebner" on Justia Law

Bonnie Jean Pease executed a holographic will approximately seven months before her death. The will disinherited Pease’s mother, sister, and brother but not her brother Douglas Hubert. At issue before the circuit court was whether Pease intended to devise anything to Lisa and Lynn Schock, who were named in the will as the executors of Pease’s estate and to whom Pease gave “all [her] belongings…” contingent on them giving a share to Hubert, to a search for a home for her bird, and to fund litigation against the State. The circuit court ruled that after the Schocks set aside the requested funds, they were to distribute the entire residual estate to Hubert. The Schocks appealed, arguing that the gifting language of the will gave them a conditional gift. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will gave Pease’s property to Schocks subject to the stated convictions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Defendants - a medical doctor, his medical clinic, two hospitals, and other individual defendants (collectively, Defendants) - alleging various causes of action, including negligence, negligent credentialing, fraud, and deceit. Plaintiffs sought production of documents from Defendants, but Defendants declined to produce all of them, asserting that some of the materials sought were peer review materials protected under S.D. Codified Laws 36-4-26.1. Plaintiffs moved to compel production, asking the circuit court to determine that section 36-4-26.1 was unconstitutional. The circuit court ordered Defendants to produce, without in camera review, documents protected by peer review, determining that the statute was constitutional only if it applied a “crime-fraud exception” and that the exception had been met in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred (1) by creating a crime-fraud exception to section 36-4-26.1, and (2) by ordering Defendants to produce materials in the possession of medical peer review committees. View "Novotny v. Sossan" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and admitted that he was a habitual offender. Appellant did not directly appeal his conviction. Nearly seven years after his conviction became final, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and a Miranda violation. After a hearing, the habeas court concluded that Appellant’s habeas petition was untimely and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the habeas court did not err in applying S.D. Codified Laws 21-27-3.3 to Appellant’s action because Appellant commenced the action after the effective date of the statute; but (2) in applying section 21-27-3.3, the habeas court had the authority to delay commencement of the two-year limitations period until the effective date of the statute, and because Appellant filed the action within the two years, the habeas court erroneously granted summary judgment against Appellant for violating the statute of limitations in section 21-27-3.3. View "Hughbanks v. Dooley" on Justia Law

In 2005, Mother executed a power of attorney that appointed her son (Son) as her attorney-in-fact. Mother held a life estate in several properties to which her daughters (Daughters) held remainder interests. Prior to Mother’s death in 2013, Son had been leasing from Mother the land in which Daughters held remainder interests. In 2014, Daughters initiated this suit alleging that Son had breached his farmland lease by failing to pay rent on the property in which they received their remainder interests. The Estate also brought suit alleging that Son breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mother. Prior to trial, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude extrinsic evidence of Mother’s intent with regards to the power of attorney. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Daughters on the breach of contract claim and in favor of the Estate on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it prevented Son from introducing relevant evidence related to, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding Mother’s arrangement of leasing her land to her family without charging rent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Hein v. Zoss" on Justia Law

A landowner’s successor in interest, a landowner’s straw man, and judgment lien creditors engaged in competing attempts to redeem in two mortgage foreclosures. The successor in interest successfully redeemed from a judgment lien creditor in the first foreclosure, but a senior mortgagee started a second foreclosure. A second judgment lien creditor redeemed in the second foreclosure, and the second foreclosure court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest waived the right to an owner’s final right of redemption. On appeal from the second foreclosure court’s waiver ruling, the landowner and successor in interest lost the land to the second judgment lien creditor. In the first foreclosure court, the successor in interest and landowner made equitable claims for the recovery of redemption money paid and still in the custody of the sheriff. The circuit court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest had no equitable claim to the money and awarded the money on deposit to the judgment lien creditor from who the redemption had been made. The landowner and successor in interest appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Farmpro Services, Inc. v. Finneman" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the circuit court’s resolution of a protracted post-decree dispute over the division of the parties’ property, a restaurant. The court resolved the property division dispute by awarding Husband the business and converting Husband’s cash-equalization obligation in the property division to alimony to be paid to Wife. The court also found Husband in contempt and denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in modifying the original judgment and decree by converting the property equalization payment to an alimony payment; and (2) the circuit court erred in finding Husband in contempt because the court entered no findings of fact on any elements of contempt. View "Pike v. Pike" on Justia Law

Maurice Ricard and his wife, Ella “Bernadette” Ricard, had five girls and one boy. Maurice had a will creating the Maurice M. Ricard Family Trust. The Trust provided that real property owned by Maurice would be held by the Trust for the use and benefit of Bernadette during her lifetime and that, upon the death of Bernadette, the Trust would terminate and the girls would receive the assets. Maurice died in 2002, after which the sisters sold their respective interests in the Trust to their brother. In 2010, after Bernadette died, the Trust terminated. The sisters subsequently sought to rescind their agreements and repurchase their respective interests. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreements were enforceable, and the sisters should not be allowed to rescind their agreements. View "In re Ricard Family Trust" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Sully County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to Ring-Neck Energy & Feed, LLC for an ethanol plant. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court alleging that the Board’s decision granting the CUP was illegal. Ring-Neck Energy intervened and moved to quash the writ and dismiss the petition as untimely. The circuit court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the petition was untimely under S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-61. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners failed timely to appeal the Board’s decision to grant a CUP to Ring-Neck Energy. View "Hyde v. Sully County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

In 2007, Brant Lake enacted an ordinance regulating the use of public and private sewers and requiring connection to the public sewer. In 2014, Brant Lake notified Steven and Gloria Thornberry that, pursuant to the ordinance, they must install suitable toilet and sanitation facilities in their dwelling and connect those facilities to the main public sewer line within sixty days. When the Thornberrys had no taken any steps to connect to the main sewer system over a year later, Brant Lake brought this action seeking to enjoin the Thornberrys from using or occupying their property until they connected their dwelling to Brant Lake’s sewer line. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thornberrys, concluding that the ordinance did not apply to the Thornberrys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Brant Lake’s ordinances, as written, did not require the Thornberrys to connect to its public sewer system. View "Brant Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Thornberry" on Justia Law