Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to A.B. She argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it qualified the State’s witness as an expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in light of recently-adopted Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines interpreting ICWA. She also claimed that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of proof when it terminated her parental rights, and that the State’s expert failed to specifically opine that continued custody of the child with Mother would likely cause serious emotional or physical harm to the child. Lastly, Mother claimed that the least restrictive alternative was to continue Mother’s legal relationship with the child while Father retains full legal and physical custody. From its review of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Supreme Court found that the trial court’s failure to identify the proper standard of proof was "problematic." The trial court concluded that evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that “the best interest of the minor child outweighs” termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the court did not make the requisite inquiry whether the evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother’s continued custody of A.B. would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm. The Supreme Court therefore concluded the trial court erred when it terminated Mother’s parental rights without conducting this necessary examination utilizing the proper standard of proof. The matter was remanded for the circuit court to determine-on the existing record-whether evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional and/or physical damage would likely result were A.B. placed in the legal care or custody of Mother. View "Interest of A.B." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Cleve Janis, Jr. of third-degree rape in 2015. Janis appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it admitted undisclosed expert testimony. Janis also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct through various statements during trial and that there was improper contact between a juror and a spectator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Dakota v. Janis" on Justia Law

The Dewey County Commission (the Commission) granted an application to erect a power distribution line in a section line right-of-way bordering Margaret Upell’s property. Upell filed a notice of appeal of the Commission’s decision with the circuit court. Upell served her notice of appeal by mail on counsel for Coop and on the Dewey County State’s Attorney. But she did not serve a member of the board of county commissioners as required by SDCL 7-8-29. She appealed to the circuit court which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Upell v. Dewey Cty. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to simple assault. Appellant was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary - the maximum penalty - with no credit for time served. Appellant appealed, challenging the circuit court’s failure to give credit for time served and the constitutionality of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give credit for time served; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime of simple assault and was thus constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Remanded for correction of Appellant’s sentence to give credit for time served. View "State v. Ainsworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to Defendant’s attorney in cross-examination and closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s statements improperly suggested to the jury that Defendant and his defense counsel concocted a false defense to avoid a guilty verdict; but (2) a new trial was not warranted because Defendant was not prejudiced. View "State v. Pursley" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his right to appeal and his right to remain silent during the presentence investigation; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. View "Stark v. Weber" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his jury trial was closed to the public in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and that defense counsel’s failure to object to the closure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court dismissed Appellant’s application without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s allegation of a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation failed to meet the “minimum threshold of plausibility.” View "Riley v. Young" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury on second-degree murder did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to notice of the charges against him and his right to defend against such charges where second-degree murder was not charged in the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not deny Defendant his right to confront witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of a State witness; (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to suppress Defendant’s statements made to an officer immediately after the shooting; and (4) Defendant’s sentence for aggravated assault was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. McCahren" on Justia Law

Richard and Susan Karst sued Shur Company and Wilson Trailer Company alleging defective design and improper warnings related to Shur’s electric-tarp system that Wilson Trailer included on a grain trailer it sold to Richard. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the Karsts’ failure-to-warn claims and granted summary judgment to Wilson on the Karsts’ negligent-defective-design claim. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on the Karsts’ remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) instructing the jury on strict liability; (2) granting summary judgment on the Karsts’ improper-warnings claims; and (3) refusing to admit evidence of the warnings that were provided. View "Karst v. Shur-Co." on Justia Law