Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dusty Groom’s handgun discharged, shooting Brody Heitmann in the head. Heitmann survived and sued Groom. Heitmann obtained a judgment against Groom and also obtained an assignment from Groom of Groom’s right to enforce coverage under an insurance policy issued to Groom’s grandmother by American Family Mutual Insurance. Heitmann subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against American Family seeking ruling that, on the date of the shooting, Groom was an insured under the policy for purposes of liability coverage. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a relative of the insured residing on the insured’s premises, and not in the household of the insured, is not a “resident relative” under the policy. View "Heitmann v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kern was injured in a rear-end collision in which the other driver was at fault. Kern filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim with Progressive Northern Insurance Company, his insurance provider. Months of settlement negotiations ended in a stalemate. Thereafter, Kern brought an action against Progressive for bad faith, alleging that Progressive’s settlement offers had been intentionally inadequate. Kern also sought unpaid UIM benefits. After a trial, the jury awarded Kern $18,650 in unpaid UIM damages and found that Progressive had not acted in bad faith. Kern appealed, alleging several errors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Kern’s alleged errors required reversal and that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to award attorney’s fees. View "Kern v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a severe storm, Richard and Lorayna Papousek discovered that ninety-three of their cattle were dead. It was determined that the cause of the cattle’s death was drowning. At the time, the Papouseks had in effect a farmowner-ranchowner policy purchased from De Smet Farm Mutual Insurance Company of South Dakota. De Smet denied the Papouseks’ claim filed under the drowning provision of the policy because none of the cattle were found submerged in water. The Papouseks filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the policy covered the cattle losses. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of De Smet. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Papouseks established coverage under the drowning provision, and De Smet did not prove an exclusion to coverage under the policy. View "Papousek v. De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison with four years suspended and credit for time served. Defendant appealed, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a new trial, and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it did not address Defendant’s motion for a change of counsel. Remanded for the circuit court to appoint new counsel and conduct a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A county Board of Adjustment granted Developer a conditional use permit for a concentrated animal feeding operation. Petitioners challenged the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction to grant the permit because the county had failed to validly enact the ordinance authorizing the Board to issue permits. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. In so doing, the court refused to consider whether the county validly enacted the ordinance, deciding that such review would be outside the scope of Petitioners’ writ challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners had standing to appeal the Board’s decision; and (2) the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the validity of the ordinances enacted by the county, as review in this case was not beyond the scope of the writ. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Brookings County Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue subjected several corporations owned by North American Truck & Trailer, Inc. (collectively, Taxpayers) to a sales-and-use-tax audit, which uncovered errors regarding Taxpayers’ reporting of use tax. Thereafter, the Department assessed Taxpayers for unpaid use taxes. Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and requested an administrative hearing. At the hearing, Taxpayers argued that the shop supplies assessed were exempt from use tax and offered exhibits in support of their position. The hearing examiner declined to consider a sales invoice offered by Taxpayers demonstrating a typical transaction that involved the cost of supplies because Taxpayers submitted it more than sixty days after the audit began, in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing examiner did not err when it (1) affirmed the Department’s refusal to consider the sales invoice; and (2) affirmed the Department’s certificate of assessment of use tax due and owing on transactions where shop supplies, purchased without payment of sales tax, were used and consumed. View "Black Hills Truck & Trailer, Inc." on Justia Law

Tri-City Associates, LP owned and operated the Northgate Shopping Center in Rapid City. It entered into a written lease agreement with Belmont, Inc. in April 2006 for unfinished commercial space. The unfinished commercial space required substantial initial construction work before the lease was to begin on August 1, 2006. The parties experienced considerable difficulties in completing the terms of the lease. Tri-City proposed to move the start date of the lease to January 15, 2007. Belmont did not respond to the requested modification. Ultimately, Tri- City did not deliver the premises to Belmont on August 1, 2006, in the condition required under the lease and did not complete its allocated initial construction work. After Belmont did not pay rent for the first few months of the lease, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice of default under the lease. A month later, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice to quit and vacate and, in April 2007, sued to evict Belmont. Belmont answered and asserted that Tri-City materially breached the lease, which Belmont asserted relieved it of its duty to pay rent. Then, in October 2007, Belmont counterclaimed for damages for Tri-City’s failure to perform under the terms of the lease. Tri-City responded to Belmont’s counterclaim that Belmont agreed to accept the premises “as is.” Tri-City also argued that Belmont failed to provide Tri-City with written notice of Tri-City’s alleged breach and did not give Tri-City an opportunity to cure as required by the notice-and-cure provision in the lease. In this second appeal, Tri-City argued that the circuit court erred when it entered a judgment in favor of Belmont, Inc. In "Tri-City I," the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to enter “findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure.” On remand, the circuit court entered supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, interpreting the notice-and-cure provision of the lease at issue to allow for substantial compliance and found that Belmont substantially complied. It also found that Tri-City had actual notice of its material breaches and an opportunity to cure. Alternatively, the court concluded that, by bringing suit against Belmont, Tri-City repudiated any intention to perform its obligation under the lease and made futile the requirement that Belmont strictly comply with the notice-and-cure provision. It then entered a judgment in favor of Belmont. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to A.B. She argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it qualified the State’s witness as an expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in light of recently-adopted Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines interpreting ICWA. She also claimed that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of proof when it terminated her parental rights, and that the State’s expert failed to specifically opine that continued custody of the child with Mother would likely cause serious emotional or physical harm to the child. Lastly, Mother claimed that the least restrictive alternative was to continue Mother’s legal relationship with the child while Father retains full legal and physical custody. From its review of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Supreme Court found that the trial court’s failure to identify the proper standard of proof was "problematic." The trial court concluded that evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that “the best interest of the minor child outweighs” termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the court did not make the requisite inquiry whether the evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother’s continued custody of A.B. would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm. The Supreme Court therefore concluded the trial court erred when it terminated Mother’s parental rights without conducting this necessary examination utilizing the proper standard of proof. The matter was remanded for the circuit court to determine-on the existing record-whether evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional and/or physical damage would likely result were A.B. placed in the legal care or custody of Mother. View "Interest of A.B." on Justia Law