Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Revenue subjected several corporations owned by North American Truck & Trailer, Inc. (collectively, Taxpayers) to a sales-and-use-tax audit, which uncovered errors regarding Taxpayers’ reporting of use tax. Thereafter, the Department assessed Taxpayers for unpaid use taxes. Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and requested an administrative hearing. At the hearing, Taxpayers argued that the shop supplies assessed were exempt from use tax and offered exhibits in support of their position. The hearing examiner declined to consider a sales invoice offered by Taxpayers demonstrating a typical transaction that involved the cost of supplies because Taxpayers submitted it more than sixty days after the audit began, in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing examiner did not err when it (1) affirmed the Department’s refusal to consider the sales invoice; and (2) affirmed the Department’s certificate of assessment of use tax due and owing on transactions where shop supplies, purchased without payment of sales tax, were used and consumed. View "Black Hills Truck & Trailer, Inc." on Justia Law

Tri-City Associates, LP owned and operated the Northgate Shopping Center in Rapid City. It entered into a written lease agreement with Belmont, Inc. in April 2006 for unfinished commercial space. The unfinished commercial space required substantial initial construction work before the lease was to begin on August 1, 2006. The parties experienced considerable difficulties in completing the terms of the lease. Tri-City proposed to move the start date of the lease to January 15, 2007. Belmont did not respond to the requested modification. Ultimately, Tri- City did not deliver the premises to Belmont on August 1, 2006, in the condition required under the lease and did not complete its allocated initial construction work. After Belmont did not pay rent for the first few months of the lease, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice of default under the lease. A month later, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice to quit and vacate and, in April 2007, sued to evict Belmont. Belmont answered and asserted that Tri-City materially breached the lease, which Belmont asserted relieved it of its duty to pay rent. Then, in October 2007, Belmont counterclaimed for damages for Tri-City’s failure to perform under the terms of the lease. Tri-City responded to Belmont’s counterclaim that Belmont agreed to accept the premises “as is.” Tri-City also argued that Belmont failed to provide Tri-City with written notice of Tri-City’s alleged breach and did not give Tri-City an opportunity to cure as required by the notice-and-cure provision in the lease. In this second appeal, Tri-City argued that the circuit court erred when it entered a judgment in favor of Belmont, Inc. In "Tri-City I," the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to enter “findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure.” On remand, the circuit court entered supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, interpreting the notice-and-cure provision of the lease at issue to allow for substantial compliance and found that Belmont substantially complied. It also found that Tri-City had actual notice of its material breaches and an opportunity to cure. Alternatively, the court concluded that, by bringing suit against Belmont, Tri-City repudiated any intention to perform its obligation under the lease and made futile the requirement that Belmont strictly comply with the notice-and-cure provision. It then entered a judgment in favor of Belmont. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to A.B. She argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it qualified the State’s witness as an expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in light of recently-adopted Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines interpreting ICWA. She also claimed that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of proof when it terminated her parental rights, and that the State’s expert failed to specifically opine that continued custody of the child with Mother would likely cause serious emotional or physical harm to the child. Lastly, Mother claimed that the least restrictive alternative was to continue Mother’s legal relationship with the child while Father retains full legal and physical custody. From its review of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Supreme Court found that the trial court’s failure to identify the proper standard of proof was "problematic." The trial court concluded that evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that “the best interest of the minor child outweighs” termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the court did not make the requisite inquiry whether the evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother’s continued custody of A.B. would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm. The Supreme Court therefore concluded the trial court erred when it terminated Mother’s parental rights without conducting this necessary examination utilizing the proper standard of proof. The matter was remanded for the circuit court to determine-on the existing record-whether evidence existed beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional and/or physical damage would likely result were A.B. placed in the legal care or custody of Mother. View "Interest of A.B." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Cleve Janis, Jr. of third-degree rape in 2015. Janis appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it admitted undisclosed expert testimony. Janis also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct through various statements during trial and that there was improper contact between a juror and a spectator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Dakota v. Janis" on Justia Law

The Dewey County Commission (the Commission) granted an application to erect a power distribution line in a section line right-of-way bordering Margaret Upell’s property. Upell filed a notice of appeal of the Commission’s decision with the circuit court. Upell served her notice of appeal by mail on counsel for Coop and on the Dewey County State’s Attorney. But she did not serve a member of the board of county commissioners as required by SDCL 7-8-29. She appealed to the circuit court which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Upell v. Dewey Cty. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to simple assault. Appellant was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary - the maximum penalty - with no credit for time served. Appellant appealed, challenging the circuit court’s failure to give credit for time served and the constitutionality of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give credit for time served; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime of simple assault and was thus constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Remanded for correction of Appellant’s sentence to give credit for time served. View "State v. Ainsworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to Defendant’s attorney in cross-examination and closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor’s statements improperly suggested to the jury that Defendant and his defense counsel concocted a false defense to avoid a guilty verdict; but (2) a new trial was not warranted because Defendant was not prejudiced. View "State v. Pursley" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his right to appeal and his right to remain silent during the presentence investigation; and (2) Appellant’s sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. View "Stark v. Weber" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his jury trial was closed to the public in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and that defense counsel’s failure to object to the closure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court dismissed Appellant’s application without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s allegation of a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation failed to meet the “minimum threshold of plausibility.” View "Riley v. Young" on Justia Law