Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and driving under the influence. For reasons unrelated to this appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State and Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree manslaughter and one count of vehicular battery. After the scheduled sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea because she was unable to recall committing the crimes for which she was convicted and pleaded guilty out of fear. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. View "State v. Kvasnicka" on Justia Law

Dorothy and Harlan Smizer were seriously injured when a vehicle driven by Christina Drey collided with the Smizers’ vehicle. The Smizers brought suit against Christina alleging negligence and seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted the Smizers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Christina’s negligence and granted Christina’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. The court also granted Christina’s motion for sanctions under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-11(c), concluding that the Smizers did not conduct a reasonable investigation in law or fact to support their claim for punitive damages and that the Smizers improperly sought punitive damages to attempt to leverage a settlement of their negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the Smizers had no basis in law or fact to assert their claim for punitive damages and brought their claim for an improper purpose. View "Smizer v. Drey" on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of her biological mother two days after Child’s birth. Child was placed in the temporary custody of Foster Parents, who had previously adopted Child’s sister. The parental rights of both biological parents were subsequently terminated. Thereafter, DSS consented to the adoption of Child by Foster Parents instead of Child’s maternal Aunt. Aunt requested a hearing to review DSS’s decision, arguing that she was entitled to adoption placement preference over Foster Parents. The circuit court concluded that DSS did not abuse its discretion in consenting to the adoption by Foster Parents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Aunt failed to establish that she was entitled to placement preference. View "In re Interest of E.M.H." on Justia Law

John and Kimberly Nooney purchased tickets from StubHub, Inc. for a concert. The tickets were invalid, and the Nooneys were denied access to the concert. The Nooneys sued StubHub for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The circuit court granted StubHub’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but in doing so, the circuit court considered a document that was not attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in considering the document without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the document was referenced in the complaint; but (2) erred in dismissing the complaint on the merits, as the Nooneys’ complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Nooney v. StubHub, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual contact and rape involving three minors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not cause structural error because he left the courtroom during the presentation of evidence, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the judge’s absence; and (2) the trial judge failed to fully and regularly admonish the jury at each recess and adjournment pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-24-5, but because Defendant was not prejudiced as a result of this error, his challenge to his conviction on this ground was denied. View "State v. Arguello" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his admissions that he raped a three-year-old girl, arguing that the State could not present independent corroborating evidence showing the corpus delicti of a rape.The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s admissions, reasoning that there was insufficient independent evidence corroborating Defendant’s admissions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as an alternative method of corroborating admissions alongside requiring evidence of the corpus delicti, this Court now allows evidence of the admission’s trustworthiness to corroborate the admission and establish guilt; but (2) the application of the trustworthiness rule in this case would violate Defendant’s due process right to fair warning. Remanded. View "State v. Plastow" on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. In 2007, Appellant was granted parole. After his release, Appellant committed another burglary in Minnesota and was convicted of second-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. In 2012, Appellant and was re-incarcerated in South Dakota for violating his parole. Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his penitentiary sentences were miscalculated. The habeas court denied Appellant’s application. The Supreme Court affirmed after analyzing the statutes relevant to this appeal, holding that Appellant was correctly sentenced. View "Dale v. Young" on Justia Law

Charles Korzan and his brother, Michael Korzan, were transporting hay bales in a semi-trailer when the the hay ignited and spread fire to nearby lands. Plaintiffs sued the Korzans, alleging nuisance, negligence, trespass, and punitive damages for the fires. Charles’s insurance carrier, North Star Mutual Insurance Company, filed a separate action seeking a determination as to whether it had a duty to defend and indemnify the Korzans for the fires. The circuit court granted North Star’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that no coverage existed under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was precluded under the policy. View "N. Star Mut. Ins. v. Korzan" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

David Zerfas swerved to avoid a deer carcass in his lane of travel and lost control of his vehicle. Zerfas died after his vehicle was hit by oncoming traffic. Zerfas’s wife, Stacey, sought uninsured motorist benefits with their automobile insurance company, AMCO Insurance Company, alleging that an unidentified driver left the deer carcass in the lane of travel, which caused Zerfas to lose control of his vehicle. AMCO denied Stacey’s claim on the grounds that Stacey would not legally be entitled to recover damages from the unidentified driver. Stacey subsequently brought a breach of contract action against AMCO. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of AMCO, concluding that the unidentified driver did not have a legal duty to Zerfas to remove the carcass or warn of its existence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no common law or statutory duty existed between the unidentified driver and Zerfas, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting AMCO summary judgment. View "Zerfas v. AMCO Ins. Co." on Justia Law