Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Decedent opened a savings account. In 2007, Decedent included her son (Son) and daughter as additional account owners. Decedent died in 2012. The next year, Son withdrew $17,554 from the account and placed the funds in a certificate of deposit in his name. In doing so, Son relied on S.D. Codified Laws 29A-6-104, which provides that the proceeds of a joint account automatically pass to the surviving account holder. Decedent’s Estate brought suit against Son requesting a judgment for $17,554, asserting that Son converted the funds for his personal use. Son responded that, as joint owner of the account, he could not convert the funds for his own use. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Estate, concluding that the Estate met its burden of proof that Decedent did not intend to establish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and therefore, the Estate rebutted the presumption under section 29A-6-104 that the proceeds automatically pass to the surviving account holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it determined that Decedent did not intend to create a joint account with right of survivorship in 2007. View "Estate of Card v. Card" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, possession of two ounces or less of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of methamphetamine presented to the jury, as (i) Defendant did not preserve his arguments regarding the validity of his arrest and the subsequent search of his person, and (ii) the search of Defendant’s vehicle was constitutional; and (2) the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine. View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and driving under the influence. For reasons unrelated to this appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State and Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree manslaughter and one count of vehicular battery. After the scheduled sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea because she was unable to recall committing the crimes for which she was convicted and pleaded guilty out of fear. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. View "State v. Kvasnicka" on Justia Law

Dorothy and Harlan Smizer were seriously injured when a vehicle driven by Christina Drey collided with the Smizers’ vehicle. The Smizers brought suit against Christina alleging negligence and seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted the Smizers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Christina’s negligence and granted Christina’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. The court also granted Christina’s motion for sanctions under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-11(c), concluding that the Smizers did not conduct a reasonable investigation in law or fact to support their claim for punitive damages and that the Smizers improperly sought punitive damages to attempt to leverage a settlement of their negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the Smizers had no basis in law or fact to assert their claim for punitive damages and brought their claim for an improper purpose. View "Smizer v. Drey" on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of her biological mother two days after Child’s birth. Child was placed in the temporary custody of Foster Parents, who had previously adopted Child’s sister. The parental rights of both biological parents were subsequently terminated. Thereafter, DSS consented to the adoption of Child by Foster Parents instead of Child’s maternal Aunt. Aunt requested a hearing to review DSS’s decision, arguing that she was entitled to adoption placement preference over Foster Parents. The circuit court concluded that DSS did not abuse its discretion in consenting to the adoption by Foster Parents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Aunt failed to establish that she was entitled to placement preference. View "In re Interest of E.M.H." on Justia Law

John and Kimberly Nooney purchased tickets from StubHub, Inc. for a concert. The tickets were invalid, and the Nooneys were denied access to the concert. The Nooneys sued StubHub for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The circuit court granted StubHub’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but in doing so, the circuit court considered a document that was not attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in considering the document without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the document was referenced in the complaint; but (2) erred in dismissing the complaint on the merits, as the Nooneys’ complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Nooney v. StubHub, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual contact and rape involving three minors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not cause structural error because he left the courtroom during the presentation of evidence, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the judge’s absence; and (2) the trial judge failed to fully and regularly admonish the jury at each recess and adjournment pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-24-5, but because Defendant was not prejudiced as a result of this error, his challenge to his conviction on this ground was denied. View "State v. Arguello" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his admissions that he raped a three-year-old girl, arguing that the State could not present independent corroborating evidence showing the corpus delicti of a rape.The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s admissions, reasoning that there was insufficient independent evidence corroborating Defendant’s admissions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as an alternative method of corroborating admissions alongside requiring evidence of the corpus delicti, this Court now allows evidence of the admission’s trustworthiness to corroborate the admission and establish guilt; but (2) the application of the trustworthiness rule in this case would violate Defendant’s due process right to fair warning. Remanded. View "State v. Plastow" on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. In 2007, Appellant was granted parole. After his release, Appellant committed another burglary in Minnesota and was convicted of second-degree burglary and possession of burglary tools. In 2012, Appellant and was re-incarcerated in South Dakota for violating his parole. Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his penitentiary sentences were miscalculated. The habeas court denied Appellant’s application. The Supreme Court affirmed after analyzing the statutes relevant to this appeal, holding that Appellant was correctly sentenced. View "Dale v. Young" on Justia Law

Charles Korzan and his brother, Michael Korzan, were transporting hay bales in a semi-trailer when the the hay ignited and spread fire to nearby lands. Plaintiffs sued the Korzans, alleging nuisance, negligence, trespass, and punitive damages for the fires. Charles’s insurance carrier, North Star Mutual Insurance Company, filed a separate action seeking a determination as to whether it had a duty to defend and indemnify the Korzans for the fires. The circuit court granted North Star’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that no coverage existed under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was precluded under the policy. View "N. Star Mut. Ins. v. Korzan" on Justia Law