Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Adam Ray, a former employee of Granite Buick GMC, Inc., and Scott Hanna, a former employee of McKie Ford Lincoln, Inc., left their respect employment and started their own automobile dealership. Granite Buick and McKie Ford sought injunctions to enforce non-compete agreements Defendants signed during the course of their employment. After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, the circuit court concluded that the non-compete agreements were valid but granted judgment in favor of Defendants on their affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly determined (1) Ray’s covenant not to compete was fraudulently induced; and (2) McKie Ford waived its right to enforce Hanna’s covenant not to compete. View "Granite Buick GMC, Inc. v. Ray" on Justia Law

High Plains sought a writ of prohibition alleging that the Fall River County Board of Commissioners exceeded its authority by rescinding Resolution No. 2014-09, which approved High Plains’ proposed petroleum contaminated soil farm. High Plains requested that the circuit court order the county to desist and refrain from counting the votes regarding resolution No. 2014-16, a similar, subsequently enacted resolution. The circuit court issued a writ setting aside the rescission of Resolution No. 2014-09 and prohibiting the ballots on the referendum election on Resolution 2014-16 from being counted, concluding that High Plains did not have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board’s action in considering the rescission of Resolution No. 2014-09 did not exceed its jurisdiction; and (2) as to the issue of whether the Board complied with S.D. Codified Laws 34A-6-103 or exceeded its powers when it rescinded Resolution No. 2014-09, High Plains had an alternative remedy through an appeal, which precluded the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition. View "High Plains Res., LLC v. Fall River County Bd. of Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit at the Sanford USD Medical Center (Hospital) after being struck in the throat and head during an altercation. Plaintiff insisted on leaving the Hospital against medical advice. After Plaintiff left the Hospital, he brutally assaulted his neighbors. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to multiple charges related to the assault but was found not guilty by reason of mental illness. Plaintiff later brought this suit against the Hospital, alleging that the Hospital negligently failed to assess his mental condition after he insisted on leaving against medical advice, which made him a danger to himself and others. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the grounds that S.D. Codified Laws 34-12C-7 applied, which provides good faith immunity to health care providers who follow a patient’s direction for his or her own health care, and that Plaintiff alleged no facts alleging bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that section 34-12C-7 applies and that there was no disputed issue of material fact that the Hospital acted in good faith. View "Klein v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Harding County for negligence after he drove into a washed-out portion of a county road and was injured. A jury returned a general verdict for the County. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the County’s admitted violation of S.D. Codified Laws 31-28-6 entitled him to judgment as a matter of law as to the County’s liability and that the court erred by allowing questions regarding assumption of the risk and contributory negligence to go to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was evidence that supported the verdict; and (2) the evidence supported the instructions given for contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. View "Stensland v. Harding County" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of aggravated theft by deception, holding that the State failed to prove all the elements of the offense. The State subsequently brought new charges against Defendant for forgery and offering false or forged instruments for filing, registering, or recording in a public office. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and res judicata barred the State’s subsequent prosecution because the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the newly-indicted charges during the first trial. Defendant further asserted that the indictment should be dismissed for improper venue. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of all charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the newly-indicted charges were separate and distinct from the charges dismissed in the first trial, the State was not precluded from retrying Defendant under double jeopardy and res judicata principles; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded that venue was proper on all charges. View "State v. Thomason" on Justia Law

Petitioners - four residents of the Westwood Valley Addition to Sioux Falls, which is a part of the Tea Area School District (TASD) - submitted a petition to the Tea Area School Board requesting that the TASD’s boundary be changed to exclude their residences, which would instead be annexed by the Sioux Falls School District. After a publicly noticed meeting at which none of Petitioners appeared, either personally or through counsel, the Board denied the petition. One petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) the Board’s denial of the petition for a minor boundary change was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Schaefer v. Tea Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

On December 31, 2009, Employee was injured during the scope of her employment at Employer. One week later, Employee suffered a massive intraventricular hemorrhage in her brain, which caused her to undergo brain surgery. Employer denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that Employee’s brain injuries were the result of a different incident on January 4, 2010. After a hearing, the Department of Labor ruled in favor of Employee, finding (1) the work-related injury was a major contributing cause of the hemorrhage and Employee’s resulting disabilities, and (2) the alleged second incident did not take place after the workplace incident as Employer claim, if it occurred at all. After the Department clarified compensable damages, the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department was not clearly erroneous in finding that the workplace injury was a major contributing cause to Employee’s injury and disability and that there was no second incident; and (2) the Department did not abuse its discretion in admitting the undisclosed testimony of an expert witness. View "Sorensen v. Harbor Bar, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the circuit court revoked probation and imposed a sentence of two years incarceration (Sentence 1). That same year, Defendant received two additional sentences, each for unauthorized ingestion of a controlled drug or substance. On one of the convictions, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years incarceration, suspended, and placed Defendant on probation (Sentence 2). On the final sentence, the court sentenced Defendant to four years incarceration (Sentence 3). The court ordered Sentence 3 to run consecutively to Sentence 1 and ordered Sentence 2 to run concurrently with Sentences 1 and 3. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s sentences improperly placed him under simultaneous supervision of the executive and judicial branches. Remanded. View "State v. Orr" on Justia Law

Montana Dakota Utilities Co. and Otter Tail Power Company (together, Applicants) applied to the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (Commission) for a permit to construct a high-voltage electrical transmission line. Applicant’s project would cross one part of Gerald Pesall’s farm. Pesall intervened and was granted party status. Pesall objected to the project, arguing that excavating and moving soil to construct the project could unearth and spread a crop parasite. The Commission granted the permit subject to conditions, including a condition to identify and mitigate the potential parasite problem. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s decision to grant a conditional permit rather than requiring reapplication; (2) the permit condition relating to the parasites did not constitute an improper delegation of the Commission’s authority to a private party; and (3) the Commission timely rendered complete findings on the permit application. View "Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utils., Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) commenced an audit of Taxpayer’s excise tax and sales tax licenses for tax period 2009 through 2012. At issue in this case was whether Taxpayer’s construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities were subject to a contractor’s excise tax under S.D. Codified Laws 10-46A-1. Taxpayer did not remit excise tax on the gross receipts it received from its construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities. As a result of the audit, the Department issued Taxpayer a certificate of assessment for $43,020, which included excise tax and interest. The circuit court reversed the Department’s certificate of assessment, ruling that Taxpayer’s services were not subject to a contractor’s excise tax under section 10-46A-1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer’s act of entering into a contract with a public entity to guarantee a satisfactorily completed public improvement project by a specific date for a specific cost was subject to excise tax under section 10-46A-1. View "Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law