Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree rape and was sentenced to seventy years’ imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Approximately five years later, Defendant filed a petition for habeas relief arguing, among other things, that his guilty plea was unconstitutional because the sentencing court did not properly advise him of his right against self-incrimination or that a guilty plea would waive that right. The habeas court denied relief, finding that Defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the habeas court did not err in concluding that Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. View "Oleson v. Young" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted fetal homicide. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was improperly convicted of the crime of attempted fetal homicide because the jury did not have to find that he had the specific intent to cause the death of the unborn child, which is an element the State had the burden to prove; (2) Defendant’s spousal privilege and right to confrontation was violated by the circuit court’s admission of a taped conversation between him and his wife; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other act evidence under S.D. Codified Laws 19-19-404(b). View "State v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. Defendant attempted to appeal the original judgment, but his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal within the time provided by statute. Defendant was later resentenced. Defendant sought to appeal based on the amended judgment, arguing that the circuit court accepted his guilty plea to burglary without establishing a factual basis. The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed on the grounds that no appeal of right existed from the judgment sought to be appealed. Noting that the circuit court did not make certain determinations before proceeding under S.D. Codified Laws 23A-27-51, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court to make findings or hold further proceedings on whether a constitutional violation occurred, whether the relief was requested within a reasonable time, or whether an adequate record was available for review. View "State v. Pentecost" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Revenue assessed Northern Border Pipeline Company, the operator of an interstate pipeline that provides transportation services to natural gas owners who desire to ship their gas, for use tax on the value of the shippers’ gas that the shippers allowed Northern Border to burn as fuel in compressors that moved the gas through the pipeline. An administrative law judge affirmed the assessment. The circuit court reversed, holding that Northern Border’s burning of the shippers’ gas was exempt from use tax under a tax exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Northern Border did not own the gas, use tax may not be imposed under this Court’s precedents. View "N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled drug or substance with intent to distribute and committing or attempting to commit a felony with a firearm. In 2012, Appellant signed a suspended sentence supervision agreement. The next year, the Board of Pardons and Paroles revoked Appellant’s suspended sentence for failing to maintain a good disciplinary record. The circuit court affirmed the revocation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board acted within its authority by imposing the conditions of the agreement and revoking Appellant’s suspended sentence upon Appellant’s violation of the suspended sentence supervision agreement. View "Kelley v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

In 2012, Citibank, Inc. filed with the South Dakota Department of Revenue a request for a refund of bank franchise taxes paid for the tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The Department denied the tax refund claim, concluding that the refund claim was filed after the three-year statute of limitations had expired pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-19. Citibank requested an administrative hearing before the Office of Hearing Examiners (OHE). OHE dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the refund claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Citibank’s 2012 request for a refund of bank franchise taxes was time-barred by section 10-59-19 and, furthermore, equitable tolling was not available to Citibank in this case. View "Citibank, N.A. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Voorhees Cattle Co. brought a foreclosure action against Dakota Feeding Co. (DFC). In answering the complaint, DFC brought a third party complaint against B and B Equipment, Inc. (B&B) for breach of contract. B&B counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and impossibility of performance. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Voorhees on the foreclosure claim and for B&B on its counterclaims against DFC. DFC satisfied the judgment granted to Voorhees, leaving DFC and B&B as the remaining parties to this appeal. DFC appealed, arguing that evidence admitted at trial violated the attorney-client privilege and that the error prejudicially tainted the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the privileged evidence should not have been allowed, but the evidence did not prove, nor go to the heart of B&B’s claims; and (2) as a result, the erroneous admission of the privileged communications was not unfairly prejudicial to DFC as against B&B. View "Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co." on Justia Law