Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During his lifetime, Joseph Baumgart created a trust that had been court supervised for thirty-five years. Petitioners, income beneficiaries of the trust with one exception, filed suit against Trustees seeking to reopen previous accountings, remove Trustees, and appoint an independent third-party trustee on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, trust mismanagement, material omission, self-dealing, and other breaches of fiduciary duties. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Trustees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err when it determined that one trustee’s relationship to the party who leased trust property did not support a charge of self-dealing; (2) did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioners’ request to replace Trustees with a neutral, third party trustee; and (3) did not err when it ruled that there were no material omissions in the accountings. View "In re Trust of Baumgart" on Justia Law

Defendant and several others in a group were stopped by South Dakota State University (SDSU) police officers on suspicion of underage consumption and for violating South Dakota’s open container law. Defendant was later convicted of driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence stemming from the stop because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make the stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the SDSU police officers had an individualized, objective, and reasonable basis to believe that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, and therefore, Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the stop. View "State v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distribution of a schedule I or II substance and possession of a controlled substance. On the possession charge, the circuit court departed from presumptive probation and imposed a sentence of four years in the penitentiary, with two years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that her sentence for a term of imprisonment violated her constitutional right to a jury trial because the court departed from presumptive probation based on facts that were neither found by a jury nor submitted by Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court appropriately sentenced Defendant. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over a road located on property owned by David and Roxie Niemi in Fredlund Township. The Neimis brought suit against the Township seeking a declaratory judgment that the portion of Lewton Road that traverses their property is not a public road. After a trial, the circuit court concluded that the Niemis and their predecessors in interest had dedicated the road to the public by implication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not when in ruling that the entire length of the disputed roadway was a public road by operation of an implied common-law dedication. View "Niemi v. Fredlund Township" on Justia Law

After Fannie Mae foreclosed upon and acquired the home at issue in this case, Fannie Mae hired Hayman Residential Engineering Services, Inc. to prepare a structural engineering report on the home. Based on the report, Fannie Mae made some of the recommended repairs. Fannie Mae subsequently sold the home to buyers, who then sold the home to Roger and Dorothy Johnson. Thereafter, the Johnsons discovered that the estimated cost of making all necessary repairs to the home exceeded its value. The Johnsons filed a professional negligence claim against Hayman. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hayman, concluding that Hayman did not owe the Johnsons a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hayman did not owe a professional duty to the Johnsons because they did not suffer a foreseeable harm stemming from Hayman’s alleged negligence, and therefore, a professional negligence claim could not be established. View "Johnson v. Hayman & Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

At the time of the divorce of Mother and Father, the parties agreed that Mother would have primary physical custody of the parties’ two children. Five years later, the circuit court changed primary physical custody from Mother to Father. The next year, Mother filed a motion for a change of custody. After a trial, the circuit court held that it was in the best interests of the children for Mother to again have primary physical custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding that a substantial change in circumstances was not required to change custody; but (2) it was in the best interests of the children to change primary physical custody back to Mother based on a substantial change in circumstances. View "McCarty v. McCarty" on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Julie and Grant Rush were married in 1990 in Pennsylvania. In 2012, Grant left the marital home in Pennsylvania and moved into his mother’s home in South Dakota. That same year, Julie filed a “Uniform Support Petition” in Pennsylvania seeking child and spousal support. Five days later, Grant filed for a divorce in South Dakota. The circuit court dismissed the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction and on the grounds of the forum non conveniens doctrine, concluding that Grant was not a true South Dakota resident at the time he filed for divorce and that, under the forum non conveniens doctrine, Pennsylvania was the more appropriate and convenient forum for this divorce matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was substantial evidence in the record that Grant established actual residency in South Dakota in 2012 for purposes other than obtaining a divorce, the circuit court erred when it concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the parties in this proceeding; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Grant’s divorce action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens because Grant properly commenced the divorce action in South Dakota and no divorce action had ever been commenced in Pennsylvania. View "Rush v. Rush" on Justia Law

Mother brought an action against Father to establish Father’s child support obligation and to determine arrearages. A child support referee recommended that Father receive a credit for mortgage payments as well as for food, clothing, and school supplies Father had purchased for the children after the parties’ separation and when he was absent from the home. The circuit court adopted the recommendation in part and rejected it in part. Specifically, the court allowed a credit for clothing and school supplies but gave Father no credit for mortgage payments and food, concluding (1) Father was financially bound to make mortgage payments and received benefits from the mortgage payments; and (2) the referee clearly erred in finding that Mother’s testimony denying that Father provided food was not credible. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to accept the referee’s recommendation, holding (1) there was no significance in the fact that Father had a contractual obligation to pay the mortgage, and Mother and the children also received the benefit of the payments; and (2) the referee did not clearly err in making his credibility finding, and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. View "State ex rel. Tegegne v. Andalo" on Justia Law