Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Son was born to Mother and Father, Son received the surname of Father. Mother and Father subsequently divorced, and Mother was granted primary physical custody of Son. Mother later married Stepfather. Mother petitioned to change Son’s surname to a hyphenated surname combining Mother’s new last name and Father’s last name. The circuit court found that Son’s name change was in his best interests and granted Mother’s request to change Son’s surname. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting Mother’s request to change Son’s surname; and (2) there is no need to modify the best interests of the child standard to include a finding of clear and compelling evidence by the circuit court. View "In re Name Change of J.P.H." on Justia Law

In 2007, four members of the Stabler family - Stan and Rose Stabler, their child, Brad, and Brad’s wife Brenda - brought fraud actions against the First State Bank of Roscoe (FSB) and its president, John Beyers, alleging that FSB and Beyers conspired to induce the Stablers to sign notes and mortgages to pay debt that had been discharged due to bankruptcy. The circuit court rescinded one note and mortgage as to Brad and Brenda and allowed another note with a third-party bank to be enforced against them. After a trial, a jury found that FSB and Beyers fraudulently induced Stan and Rose to sign a promissory note and collateral real estate mortgage. Both sides appealed the circuit court’s judgment with respect to multiple transactions that they engaged in over the years. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in (1) setting aside the $20,000 punitive damage award to Stan and Rose; and (2) ruling that a prior mortgagee that no longer holds any interest in a collateral real estate mortgage may file an addendum for the current mortgagee, and therefore, one collateral real estate mortgage lapsed for failure of the mortgagee, Beyers, to file an addendum. View "Stabler v. First State Bank of Roscoe" on Justia Law

Police officer Robert Neisen arrested Defendant for driving under the influence. Officer Niesen first informed Defendant that he had impliedly consented to a blood draw by virtue of operating a vehicle in South Dakota, but then the officer asked Defendant if he consented to the blood draw. Defendant consented. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the blood test, arguing that his consent was not voluntary. The circuit court agreed with Defendant and suppressed the blood test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances supported a conclusion that Defendant’s consent was involuntary. View "State v. Medicine" on Justia Law

Todd and Joanne Egge placed obstructions on a platted but unimproved service road north of their property. Gary Busselman sued the Egges for damages and sought an injunction to prevent the Egges’ obstruction of the service road, contending that the service road was open to public travel because it had been dedicated and accepted by the City of Sioux Falls and Minnehaha County. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Busselman. The Egges appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to require joinder of the relevant governmental entity responsible for acceptance of the purported dedication. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for joinder of the appropriate governmental entity, holding that, under Thieman v. Bohman, the appropriate governmental entity was an indispensable party to Busselman’s action. View "Busselman v. Egge" on Justia Law

Employee was injured when he ran from a co-worker on the job site after tricking that co-worker. Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied workers’ compensation benefits, asserting that Employee’s injury did not “arise out of” or “in the course of” his employment because Employer specifically prohibited horseplay by its employees. Employee petitioned for a hearing. The Department of Labor concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” his employment because, but for his work with Employer” he would not have been at the job site where he was injured, but that the injury did not occur “in the course of” the employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for an award of benefits, holding that the Department (1) correctly concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” the employment; and (2) erred when it did not consider the effect of the mandatory lull in Employee’s work when it determined that the injury did not occur “in the course of” his employment. Because Employee’s act of horseplay was not a substantial deviation from his employment, it occurred “in the course of the employment.” View "Petrik v. JJ Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick Nickles and Kacie Nickles divorced. The circuit court ordered joint legal custody with primary physical custody awarded to Kacie, awarded monthly child support and rehabilitative alimony to Kacie, divided the parties’ property, and ordered Patrick to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Patrick appealed from these decisions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s decision on child custody, holding that the court did not err in its child custody findings or in failing to make an express determination whether Kacie rebutted a purported presumption against her having custody because of her “conviction of domestic abuse”; and (2) reversed and remanded for the entry of findings of fact on all remaining issues, holding that the circuit court’s lack of findings prevented appellate review of the circuit court’s remaining decisions. View "Nickles v. Nickles" on Justia Law

This was the third of appeal of this medical malpractice action. The third appeal concerned Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant-doctor was negligent for failing to refer Plaintiff to a doctor who specialized in repairing vesicovaginal fistulas. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion in limine precluding Plaintiff from proffering statements from Defendant’s deposition regarding her treatment of three former patients who suffered vesicovaginal fistulas. The court further reaffirmed its earlier finding that Plaintiff’s proffered evidence regarding Defendant’s treatment of the three patients was not relevant. Moreover, the circuit court reaffirmed most of the redactions previously made to Defendant’s deposition. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) when it denied admission of evidence regarding Defendant’s treatment of other patients; and (2) did not err by denying admission of expert testimony that Defendant breached the standard of care by failing to inform Plaintiff that repairing vesicovaginal fistulas was not her specialty. View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law

In spring of 2000, Plaintiffs hired Meyer Modernizing Company to install siding, soffits, and gutters on the home they were constructing. Plaintiffs moved into the home by late 2000. No later than 2002, Plaintiffs noticed water infiltration around window and door openings when it rained. Plaintiffs did not bring suit regarding their water infiltration claim until 2010. In 2013, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the assertion that Meyer concealed the absence of installed flashing. Under the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were permitted to file their cause of action within six years of its accrual. The circuit court granted Meyer’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to the beginning of the six-year limitations period, and Plaintiffs offered no reason why the period of limitation should be tolled. View "Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty-five years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s sentence, which was not grossly disproportionate to Defendant’s crime, fell within the constitutional prescriptions of the Eighth Amendment; (2) the inclusion of the federal presentence investigation report in the state presentence investigation report did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; and (3) Defendant was not improperly denied counsel during his interview with court services, as Defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present at the interview. View "State v. Garreau" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress methamphetamine evidence obtained during a “stop and frisk” because the police officer who initiated the stop lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that Defendant had committed a crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, the drug evidence was the product of an illegal search. View "State v. Walter" on Justia Law