Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dorothy McLean invested in a certificate of deposit (CD) with Black Hills Federal Credit Union (BHFCU). McLean subsequently changed the CD’s payable-on-death beneficiary from Ronald Studt, her son, to David Sholes, her second cousin. Thereafter, McLean executed a general, durable power of attorney naming Studt as her attorney-in-fact. Studt then sent an email to BHFCU requesting the beneficiary on the CD to be changed to him. After McLean died, Studt filed a declaratory judgment action against BHFCU and Sholes to determine the rightful beneficiary of the CD. During a hearing, Studt argued that the language of the power of attorney granted him broad powers to make gifts to himself. BHFCU and Sholes argued, in the contrary, that the power of attorney did not grant Studt the power to self-deal. The circuit court found that the language in the power of attorney was too broad and general and did not specifically authorize self-dealing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it found that the power of attorney did not permit Studt to engage in self-dealing. View "Studt v. Black Hills Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

Frank and Josephine Kaberna established two trusts for the equal distribution of real property to their four children: Karen, Frank, Jean, and Don. After Frank and Josephine died, each of the four children, along with their spouses, received a one-fourth undivided interest in the real property. Plaintiffs later brought the underlying partition action against Karen and her husband due to disputes among the family members. The circuit court ultimately adopted a “Modified Maas Plan” that divided the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in adopting the Modified Maas Plan. View "Kaberna v. Brown" on Justia Law

Troy Dowling, the operator of a crop-spraying business, owned a John Deere sprayer that was a scheduled item on his commercial general liability insurance policy through Berkley Regional Insurance Company. Dowling also had a commercial automobile insurance policy with Great West Casualty Company. Dowling had borrowed a different sprayer and was driving the sprayer to one of his customer’s fields when the sprayer collided with a motorcycle. James and Kimberly Seiler, who were both seriously injured in the collision, sought damages. The circuit court granted declaratory judgments for Berkley and Great West, concluding that the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Berkley and reversed and remanded the judgment for Great West, holding (1) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Berkley, Berkley had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling for any claims arising from the accident; and (2) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Great West, Great West had the duty to defend and indemnify Dowling for claims related to the accident. View "Berkley Reg’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Dowling Spray Serv." on Justia Law

Borrower, a hotel, obtained a loan from Bank in exchange for a promissory note and mortgage on the hotel. To further secure the obligation, Bank obtained separate commercial guaranties from individual Guarantors. Borrower subsequently defaulted on the note. Bank filed an amended complaint for foreclosure and receivership against Borrower. Borrower did not answer the complaint, and the circuit court entered a default judgment against Borrower and ordered that the mortgaged premises be sold at public auction. After obtaining the property, Bank filed a complaint against the Guarantors alleging that each Guarantor owed Bank over $3 million and other expenses associated with Bank having to run the hotel. The trial court granted the Guarantors summary judgment, concluding that Bank’s choice to bid the entire amount of Borrower’s obligation at the auction left no deficiency on Borrower’s obligation to Bank, and therefore, there was no indebtedness for the Guarantors to guarantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the guaranties were unenforceable because the Borrower’s obligation had been extinguished. View "First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant claimed mineral rights to the same 280 acres of U.S. Forest Service land in Lawrence County, South Dakota. Plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant failed to follow federal and state law regarding the proper location of placer mining claims but that Plaintiff followed all applicable laws and was therefore entitled to the mining claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in deciding that Defendant’s fourteen placer mineral claims on property at issue were invalid; and (2) Defendant’s invalid placer mineral claims did not preclude Plaintiff’s subsequent claims. View "Pete Lien & Sons, Inc. v. Zellmer" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Robert Mercer submitted a request to the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office under S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-37 seeking the release of the Division of Criminal Investigation’s (DCI) records related to the investigation of Richard Benda’s death. Mercer conceded that S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-1.5(5) precluded public release of the documents but requested the death investigation records because Benda was a public figure and because news reports “raised questions about the death.” The Attorney General’s Office stated that it would make the death investigation records available if certain conditions were met. Because Mercer was unable to fulfill the conditions, the Attorney General’s Office denied Mercer’s request for disclosure. The office of Hearing Examiners (OHE) upheld the Attorney General’s office’s denial of Mercer’s request. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the public’s significant and legitimate interest” did not warrant access to the death investigation records because Benda’s death investigation records were exempt from disclosure under section 1-27-1.5(5). View "Mercer v. S.D. Attorney General Office" on Justia Law

Robert and Betty Scherer obtained a divorce in 2014. The main dispute in the divorce was the inclusion of three businesses in the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by including the businesses in the marital estate; (2) abused its discretion in extending the alimony award beyond Robert’s death and by granting the amount of alimony awarded in this case; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Betty the sum of two million dollars; and (4) erred by granting Betty a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty. On remand, the court must consider the property division and alimony together to determine if Betty has demonstrated a need for alimony, and the court must determine whether extreme cruelty existed. View "Scherer v. Scherer" on Justia Law

Patricia Wheeler was employed by Cinna Bakers, Westside Casino, and Get ’N’ Go and held the three separate jobs concurrently. Wheeler was injured in the course of her employment with Cinna Bakers, which rendered her unable to work at any of her jobs. Cinna Bakers and its insurance company (together, Cinna Bakers) accepted Wheeler’s injuries as compensable but disputed whether all three of Wheeler’s concurrent employments should not be aggregated to calculate her Average Weekly Wage (AWW). An administrative law judge determined that only Wheeler’s wage from Cinna Bakers could be utilized to calculate her AWW. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) South Dakota law allows for the aggregation of wages when an injury at one employment renders the worker incapable of performing that employee’s other concurrently held employments; and (2) the Court is persuaded to adopt the “growing minority rule,” which allows for aggregation of wages from all concurrently held employments, not just similar or related employments. View "Wheeler v. Cinna Bakers LLC" on Justia Law

In 1999, James Stadheim entered into a lease with Flack Signs that gave Flack Signs the right to erect advertising signs on Stadheim’s property. The lease provided for a ten-year term. In 2002, Guy Carlson acquired the property, and Lamar Advertising Co. acquired Flack Signs. Carlson began giving mortgages on the property Dacotah Bank. In 2009, Carlson, believing the lease had terminated, entered into a second lease with Lamar that provided a term of fifteen years. In 2012, Carlson defaulted on the mortgages to Dacotah Bank and entered into an agreement for non-judicial voluntary foreclosure. Jermar Properties, LLC purchased the property from Dacotah Bank. Lamar refused to remove its signs at Jermar’s request, claiming it still had a leasehold interest. Jermar brought this quiet title action against Lamar to determine whether Jermar held title to the property free of Lamar’s purported leasehold interest. The circuit court granted judgment for Jermar, finding that the 2009 lease was a novation of the 1999 lease, and therefore, Lamar did not continue to have a leasehold interest by virtue of the 1999 lease that was senior to the mortgage given to Dacotah Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it found that a novation occurred. View "Jermar Props., LLC v. Lamar Advertising Co." on Justia Law

Linda Golden owned a fifty percent mineral interest that was within a “spacing unit” in which Luff Exploration Company desired to drill for oil. Golden declined Luff’s offer to lease her mineral interest or participate with Luff in the cost of the drilling. After Luff decided to proceed with drilling, it filed a petition with the South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) seeking to “compulsory pool” the mineral interests in the spacing unit and seeking “risk compensation” from Golden. The Board issued a compulsory pooling order and found that Golden should pay 100 percent risk compensation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board failed to comply with the plain language of S.D. Codified Laws 45-9-32 by granting a pooling order that contained no provision specifying a time and manner for Golden to elect to participate in the well by paying her proportionate share of the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. View "In re Petition of Luff Exploration Co." on Justia Law