Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Linda Golden owned a fifty percent mineral interest that was within a “spacing unit” in which Luff Exploration Company desired to drill for oil. Golden declined Luff’s offer to lease her mineral interest or participate with Luff in the cost of the drilling. After Luff decided to proceed with drilling, it filed a petition with the South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) seeking to “compulsory pool” the mineral interests in the spacing unit and seeking “risk compensation” from Golden. The Board issued a compulsory pooling order and found that Golden should pay 100 percent risk compensation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board failed to comply with the plain language of S.D. Codified Laws 45-9-32 by granting a pooling order that contained no provision specifying a time and manner for Golden to elect to participate in the well by paying her proportionate share of the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. View "In re Petition of Luff Exploration Co." on Justia Law

Dorothea Anderson and John Anderson were married in 1996 and separated in 2012. The parties subsequently obtained a divorce. The circuit court divided the marital assets, including land and cash that John had inherited from his mother during the marriage, and awarded Dorothea child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) including inherited and gifted land as a marital asset and divided it as such between the parties; (2) not including in the marital estate cash taken by Dorothea at the time of separation; (3) failing to make an adjustment to the property division for cash inherited from John’s mother; and (4) establishing a child support obligation for John. View "Anderson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiff suffered a compensable, work-related injury to his neck and back while employed by Ridco, Inc. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, which insured Ridco for purposes of workers’ compensation, paid temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff subsequently sought additional workers’ compensation benefits, which the administrative law judge granted. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against Twin City and Ridco, alleging bad faith handling of his workers’ compensation claim. During the discovery stage, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Twin City to produce wholly unredacted claim files, personnel files, and privilege logs. The circuit court ordered Twin City to produce the disputed documents in in unredacted form, concluding that Twin City impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Twin City implied the attorney-client privilege without conducting an in camera inspection of the documents. Remanded for findings as to whether Twin City injected its reliance upon the advice of counsel into the bad faith litigations, thereby making the disputed communications relevant to the case such that would constitute an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. View "Andrews v. Ridco, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the circuit court entered an order for child support wherein Father would pay Mother child support. In 2010, the circuit court lowered Father’s child support obligation. In May 2012, Mother petitioned the circuit court for a modification of child support. A child support referee ordered Father to pay Mother an additional $1,008 in child support per month since October 2009. The circuit court reversed the referee’s decision, concluding that the child support obligation could not be retroactively modified prior to May 2012 pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 25-7-7.3, which prohibits retroactive modification of past due child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Father’s past due payments were not retroactively modifiable prior to May 2012. View "Wiseman v. Wiseman" on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) provided Medicaid benefits to Darlene Hollman while she was in a nursing home. Hollman had an interest in real estate at the time, but DSS did not record a lien on the property for the benefits it had provided until after Hollman died. Hollman’s children challenged the validity of the lien. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of DSS, concluding that an enforceable medical assistance lien was created on the property at the time the nursing home assistance was provided and that Hollman’s interest in the property transferred at death to the children subject to the lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DSS’s medical assistance lien did not attach to Hollman’s interest in the property before her death, and Hollman’s interest passed to her children immediately upon her death; (2) because the lien had not been recorded at the time of Hollman’s death, Hollman had no interest upon which the lien could attach; and (3) therefore, Hollman’s interest passed to her children free of DSS’s lien. View "Hollman v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually abused at some point during the late 1950s through the early 1970s by priests, brothers, nuns, and others when they were attending St. Francis Mission School on the Rosebud Indian Reservation. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Wisconsin Province of the Society of Jesus and the Rosebud Educational Society/St. Francis Mission (“the Societies”), which operated the school. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Societies, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the 2010 amendment to S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-25 setting an age limit for claimants to bring suit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact showing that the Societies committed intentional criminal acts against Plaintiffs, and therefore S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-25 did not extend the time to commence these actions involving alleged childhood sexual abuse; (2) the majority of Plaintiffs failed to establish fraudulent concealment on behalf of the Societies that would toll the statute of limitations; but (3) as to two Plaintiffs, a trier of fact must determine whether the elements for fraudulent concealment had been established sufficiently to toll the statute of limitations. View "Eagleman v. Wisconsin Province of the Society of Jesus" on Justia Law

The Estate of Karla McLaren brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Wesley Sufficool in connection with a surgery performed on McLaren. Judgment was entered for the Estate. The Estate subsequently sought disbursement for video depositions of Dr. Sufficool, Karla’s treating physician, and Dr. Sufficool’s expert. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the Estate the transcript costs for the depositions but not for the videographer or video costs. The Estate appealed, arguing that the video depositions were necessary for impeachment purposes at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s ambiguous oral comments on the issue of the necessity of the video depositions were insufficient to permit meaningful review of the issue on appeal. Remanded for further factual determinations. View "McClaren v. Sufficool" on Justia Law

Nicholas Hybertson hired Jeff Muhlenkort to spray Hybertson’s filed with an herbicide. Several days after Muhlenkort applied the fertilizer to the Hybertson field, corn on a field owned by Murray and Georgine Lindblom began dying. The Lindbloms brought a claim for damages against Muhlenkort, Hybertson, and Sun Aviation, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) for damages based on negligence and trespass theories. The circuit court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Lindbloms appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court should have given deference to a South Dakota Department of Agriculture investigator’s determination that Muhlenkort violated a safety statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court was not required to give deference to the Department’s pre-hearing determination that Muhlenkort violated S.D. Codified Laws 38-21-44(2); and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the circuit court’s determination that Muhlenkort did not act negligently in applying the herbicide. View "Lindblom v. Sun Aviation, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (Count 1), possession of a controlled substance (Count 2), possession of marijuana (Count 3), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 4). The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to Count 1. However, because the dismissed Count 1 was listed in the final jury verdict form, the jury found Defendant guilty of that charge. The jury also convicted Defendant of Count 2 and Count 4 and acquitted him of Count 3. The court imposed a penitentiary sentence for Count 2 after finding grounds to depart from a presumptive sentence of probation under S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-11. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded for entry of an amended judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted two text messages suggesting that the sender wanted to obtain cocaine from Defendant; (2) the incorrect verdict form did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights or the outcome of the trial; and (3) the court did not err by finding aggravating circumstances justified a departure from the probationary sentence mandated by 22-6-11, but the dispositional order must be amended to include the aggravating circumstances considered. View "State v. Whitfield" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an automobile accident during the course of his employment with Employer. Employer and its Insurer paid workers’ compensation benefits. Employee subsequently settled a claim against the other driver involved in the accident. From that settlement, Employee reimbursed Insurer for the workers’ compensation benefits already paid out at the time of the settlement. The remaining amount of the settlement was determined to be “like damages” for which Employer and Insurer would receive an offset against future medical expenses related to the work injury. Thereafter, Employee submitted bills for ongoing care related to the work injury to his insurers, which paid the bills. Employee then filed a petition requesting workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied benefits, asserting that the amounts paid by other insurers could not be used to reduce the offset against future medical expenses. An administrative law judge and the circuit court concluded that medical expenses paid by Employee’s insurance were properly used to reduce the offset. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee’s insurance paid medical bills resulting from his compensable injury, those payments were properly considered to reduce the offset because Employee would otherwise be entitled to receive compensation for those expenses. View "Milbrandt v. Bibb’s, Inc." on Justia Law