Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After an abuse and neglect proceeding, the circuit court entered a dispositional order terminating the parental rights of Mother to her two biological children. Mother filed a notice of appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Mother’s signature was not on the notice. Mother then filed a second notice of appeal, which the Supreme Court dismissed as untimely. After obtaining an “Amended Dispositional Order” from the circuit court, which contained revisions to the final order, Mother filed a third notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding that the circuit court’s order did not restart the timeframe for appeal, making Mother’s third appeal untimely. View "In re Interest of L.R." on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, Defendant argued that from 2012 to 2014, S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-93 prohibited the enforcement of laws such as the DUI statute, S.D. Codified Laws 32-23-1, that included “drinking, drunknness, or being found in an intoxicated condition” as an element of the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in enacting of section 34-20A-93 in 1974, the Legislature did not intend to end the enforcement of the DUI statute, and in repealing S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-95 in 2012, the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the enforcement of section 32-23-1. View "State v. Mundy-Geidd" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped after a highway patrol trooper registered Defendant’s car traveling at 112 miles per hour. Defendant, who was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana, was traveling with three small children in the vehicle. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of abuse of a minor in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-1 because he had “exposed” the children as stated by the statute. Defendant appealed, asserting that section 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute does not define the word “expose.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even though section 26-10-1 does not include a definition of the word “expose,” the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it affords the public adequate notice as to the conduct proscribed and does not allow law enforcement unfettered discretion to enforce it. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The State filed a part II information charging Defendant with third offense DUI based on a 2005 DUI conviction and a 2012 DUI conviction. Defendant challenged the validity of his 2005 DUI conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally invalid because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The circuit court found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances and struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the Court’s recent decision in State v. Chant, Defendant may not collaterally attack his 2005 conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes because he waived his right to counsel in the 2005 proceedings. View "State v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The property at issue in this case was transferred to Deadwood Stage Run, LLC (Developer) in early 2006. On December 18, 2006, the City of Deadwood created Tax Incremental District Number Eight (the District) out of the property. After the City and Developer entered into a contract for private development of the District, Lawrence County sent its 2007 assessment of the property reflecting the most recent assessment of $934,520. The Developer sought a declaratory judgment prospectively establishing the 2006 assessed valuation of the District as the appropriate tax incremental base rather than the 2007 assessed valuation, arguing that the Department of Revenue incorrectly calculated the tax incremental base for the District in the City by using the County’s November 1, 2006 annual assessment rather than the Department’s August 25, 2006 annual Certificate of Assessment, Equalization, and Levy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in calculating the tax incremental base for a tax incremental district, the Department is statutorily required to use the last aggregate assessed valuation certified by the Department prior to the date of creation of the tax incremental district. View "Deadwood Stage Run, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved three establishments (collectively, Establishments) that ran promotional programs intended to attract patrons to their casinos. In essence, if the patrons joined an establishment’s club, they received coupons or credits called “free play” that allowed them to play slot machines without using any of their personal money. The Establishments sued the South Dakota Department of Revenue and Regulation requesting a declaration that free play was not part of adjusted gross proceeds and was therefore not subject to gaming tax. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Department, ruling that free play was not a deductible event in the calculation of adjusted gross revenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant statutes and regulations do not include the value of free play for slot machines in the calculation of an establishment’s adjusted gross revenue, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that the Establishments must remit gaming tax for the value of free play. View "First Gold, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue and Regulation" on Justia Law

After Paul Lockenour was arrested, police officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Lockenour’s recreational vehicle (RV). Lockenour pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled substance. The State then brought a civil forfeiture action against Lockenour’s RV. The value of the RV was $54,000, and the approximate street value of the drugs found in Lockenour’s possession was between $1,600 and $2,000. Lockenour asserted as an affirmative defense that the forfeiture of the TV was disproportionate to his crime. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate or unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the entire circumstances surrounding the offense that led to the forfeiture, the forfeiture of Lockenour’s TV was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Lockenour’s offense. View "State v. 2011 White Forest River XLR Toy Hauler" on Justia Law

Clint Bowyer, a North Carolina resident, was a professional race car driver for NASCAR. Appellant was also a motorcycle enthusiast who often attended the motorcycle rallies in Sturgis, South Dakota. Kustom Cycles, Inc., a South Dakota corporation, agreed to customize a motorcycle for Bowyer. After Kustom Cycles delivered the motorcycle to Bowyer, it sent Bowyer a bill for the work in the amount of $30,788. Bowyer refused to pay the bill, insisting that the owner of the corporation proposed, and Bowyer performed, compensation in the form of promotions, endorsements, and special access to NASCAR events. Kustom Cycles filed a complaint against Bowyer for payment of the bill. Bowyer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bowyer’s minimal contacts with South Dakota did not meet the “minimum contacts” required to satisfy the Due Process Clause, and Kustom Cycles did not meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Bowyer. View "Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer" on Justia Law

In 2000, while working at Homestake Mining Company, Michael Martz injured his shoulder. Martz was paid workers’ compensation benefits. In 2002, while working for McLaughlin Sawmill (Hills Materials), Martz injured the same shoulder. Hills Materials began paying benefits but, several years later, denied liability for further benefits. Martz petitioned the Department of Labor, contending that both employers were liable for benefits. Homestake was granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. In regards Hills Materials, the Department rejected Martz’s argument that promissory estoppel precluded Hills Materials from denying liability and concluded that Martz failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the 2002 injury was a “major contributing cause” of his current condition. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hills Materials was not estopped from denying liability for Martz’s current condition and need for treatment; and (2) Martz failed to establish that Hills Materials was liable for benefits where he did not prove a sufficient causal relationship between his 2002 injury and his current condition and need for treatment. View "Martz v. Hills Materials" on Justia Law