Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Julia and George Havlik were married for sixty-five years and operated a farm together. The couple eventually separated, and Julia filed for a separation and a division of their marital assets. Julia later sought spousal support. The circuit court divided the parties’ property and ordered George to pay Julia monthly spousal support “to equalize” their social security benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering George to pay monthly spousal support, as there was insufficient evidence reflecting Julia’s need for support and George’s ability to pay. View "Havlik v. Havlik" on Justia Law

In August 2011, an indictment issued charging Defendant with one count of aggravated child abuse between March 24, 2011 and March 28, 2011. Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that they must determine guilt or innocence on each incident, the one on March 24 and the one on March 28. The court refused the requested jury instruction. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict because there was no way to determine whether all twelve jurors agreed upon the commission of the same act in order to commit him of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State presented two incidents of trauma, each of which could have formed the basis of aggravated child abuse, and the instructions only informed the jury that the verdict must be unanimous; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the act supporting the conviction or to find that Defendant had committed both acts of child abuse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. White Face" on Justia Law

Terry and Cindy Leonhardt sued Terry’s father, Delbert Leonhardt, for specific performance of an oral lease and right of first refusal. The Leonhardts alleged that they had entered into an oral lease with Delbert whereby they would have the right to lease Delbert’s farmland during the lifetime of Delbert and his wife and that Delbert orally promised them a right of first refusal to purchase the farmland after he and his wife died. The Leonhardts claimed that Delbert breached the agreements when he gave Terry notice of his intent to terminate the Leonardts’ lease. On remand, the circuit court entered judgment against the Leonhardts, concluding that no credible evidence existed to support the existence of a lifetime lease or right of first refusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it ruled that the Leonhardts failed to meet their burden of proof that a lifetime lease and right of first refusal existed. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Brandon Taliaferro of seven charges. The State formally dismissed two charges, and the circuit court granted judgments of acquittal on the remaining five charges. Thereafter, Taliaferro filed a petition for expungement of all seven charges pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-27. The circuit court granted the petition of expungement as to the five acquitted charges but denied the petition as to the two dismissed charges on the grounds that the court did not have the prosecutor’s consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Taliaferro’s petition to expunge the two dismissed charges, as the plain language of section 23A-3-27 only allows for the expungement of dismissed charges when the entire criminal case has been dismissed on the record, not when only part of the case has been dismissed. View "In re Expungement of the Record Concerning Taliaferro" on Justia Law

In 1996, Defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of thirty-three years in prison for kidnapping. In 2012, Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional based on the United States Supreme Court decisions Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not receive life without parole or a de facto life sentence because he had the opportunity for release at age forty-nine, and therefore, Defendant was unable to establish that Roper, Graham, and Miller applied to him. View "State v. Springer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular battery. The sole issue at trial was whether Defendant or the deceased was driving the Corvette when it crashed into a minivan on Interstate 90. After the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, Defendant petitioned successively for habeas corpus relief in state and federal courts. In his fourth amended petition for habeas relief, Defendant asserted a freestanding claim of actual innocence and newly discovered evidence through another witness. The circuit court ruled found the witness’s testimony was newly discovered, that the testimony was credible, persuasive and compelling, and that the testimony established that the witness saw a woman driving a Corvette on Interstate 90 immediately prior to the accident. The circuit court granted Defendant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the newly discovered evidence, in light of the evidence as a whole, would create reasonable doubt of Defendant’s guilt in the mind of a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s conclusion that Defendant established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the underlying offense. View "Engesser v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). A Part II Information alleged that Defendant had two prior convictions of DUI - one in 2004 and a second in 2006. Defendant filed a motion to strike the Part II Information, arguing that his 2004 DUI conviction was unconstitutional because the court neither advised him of the waiver effect of a guilty plea nor inquired into whether the plea was voluntary. The circuit court denied the motion to strike. After a trial, the circuit court entered a final judgment of conviction for third offense DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant may only collaterally attack prior convictions used for enhancement if he or she was unrepresented by counsel when pleading guilty; and (2) because Defendant was represented by counsel during the 2004 plea proceedings, the Court did not need to consider whether his 2004 plea was valid for enhancement purposes. View "State v. Chant" on Justia Law

Defendants, two individuals, worked as automobile salesman for two different dealerships. Defendants signed materially identical noncompete agreements during the course of their employments. Defendants later started their own automobile dealership, and Plaintiffs, their former employers, sued, seeking injunctions to enforce the agreements. The circuit court ruled that it would decide the requests for injunctions after a jury determined Defendants’ defenses. The jury found for Appellees on several of their defenses, and in accordance with the jury verdict, the circuit court denied injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly utilized a binding jury to determine equitable defenses without the consent of the parties. Remanded. View "Granite Buick GMC, Inc. v. Ray" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled drug or substance. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to five years in prison with two years suspended and fined him $10,000. The two suspended years of imprisonment were conditioned on Appellant paying the fine. On appeal, Appellant argued that the $10,000 fine for possession of a controlled drug or substance was grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that the $10,000 fine was grossly disproportionate to the offense. View "State v. Webb" on Justia Law

Steven C. Lester died on August 17, 2011. Pamela Lester, the personal representative of Steven’s estate, published a Notice to Creditors advising them to file claims within four months of the notice. On a later date, Pamela mailed a notice directly to Michelle Lamphere, which provided a later deadline by which Lamphere was required to file her claim. Lamphere met that deadline, but Pamela denied the claim. Lamphere subsequently filed a petition to allow the claim. Pamela moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations provided for creditors’ claims. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Lamphere’s claim was time-barred because it was not filed within four months after the publication of the Notice to Creditors. Lamphere appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an unknown, known, or reasonably ascertainable creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it resolved a disputed question of material fact regarding Lamphere’s status as a creditor and granted judgment to Steven’s estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Lester" on Justia Law