Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kreisers Inc., a Subchapter S corporation, hired First Dakota Title to assist it with a like-kind property exchange in order to receive tax deferred benefits under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The like-kind exchange partially failed. Kreisers subsequently sued First Dakota for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court rejected Kreiser’s negligent misrepresentation claim but determined that First Dakota was negligent in assisting Kreisers with the exchange. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in applying tort law rather than contract law to determine the duty that First Dakota owed to Kreisers; (2) did not err in concluding that Kreisers was not contributorily negligent; and (3) did not err in its calculation of damages. View "Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and was later convicted and incarcerated for felony failure to appear arising from the driving under the influence conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that counsel in his driving under the influence conviction failed to fully and correctly advise him regarding the constitutionality of the seizure of blood evidence. In support of his petition, Appellant cited Missouri v. McNeely, which the U.S. Supreme Court decided after Appellant’s arrest. In McNeely the Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigent circumstance justifying nonconsensual blood testing in all driving under the influence arrests. The habeas court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim but issued a certificate of probable cause regarding whether McNeely should be given retroactive effect in South Dakota. The Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court’s ruling, holding that the new rule announced in McNeely was not a rule which warrants retroactive application to cases on habeas review. View "Siers v. Weber" on Justia Law

After Elliott defaulted on his mortgage GMAC Mortgage sued to foreclose. The circuit court granted GMAC summary judgment on his right to foreclose, finding (1) Freddie Mac was the owner of the promissory note (Note), and GMAC was the Note’s holder and servicer; and (2) GMAC, as holder and service, had authority to enforce the Note. Elliott appealed, arguing that GMAC lacked standing at the time it initiated foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting GMAC’s motion for summary judgment because GMAC ultimately provided a properly indorsed bearer Note, mortgage, and evidence of default, thus providing evidence that GMAC had standing. View "Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Shane Liebig testified that he and Edward Kirchoff orally agreed that Kirchoff would purchase real property and later convey it to Liebig on certain terms. When Kirchoff did not convey the property to Liebig, Liebig sued for enforcement of the alleged purchase agreement and for fraud and deceit. Kirchoff counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Liebig failed to establish a contractual right to purchase the property. A jury decided the remaining claims. The jury awarded Liebig compensatory and punitive damages on his fraud-and-deceit claim and awarded Kirchoff damages on his unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds as to the material terms of the contract; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Kirchoff’s motion for summary judgment on Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim; and (3) the jury’s award of damages on the fraud-and-deceit claim exceeded the amount Liebig was entitled to claim. Remanded for a new trial on damages related to Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim. View "Leibig v. Kirchoff" on Justia Law

Ella Richard died leaving a will naming her son, Kelly Ricard, as personal representative of the estate and the sole devisee. The circuit court entered an order for complete settlement declaring the will valid. Thereafter, Renee Laas, another of Ella’s children, filed a petition to set aside informal probate and determine intestacy, alleging undue influence. The circuit court denied the petition, determining that the order for complete settlement was final and appealable and that Laas failed to appeal the order. Laas appealed the denial of her petition, arguing that the will was never formally probated and that S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-108 and 29-3-401 allow an interested person to file a petition for formal administration of a will any time within three years of the decedent’s death, even after a complete settlement of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate in this case was completely settled and closed in a formal probate proceeding, that Laas had notice of this proceeding, and therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Lass’s petition to set aside informal probate and declare intestacy. View "In re Estate of Ricard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the first-degree rape of a nine-year-old girl. Prior to trial, the State moved to partially close the courtroom during the victim’s testimony to everyone but the parties, the media, and the State’s victim-witness assistant. The trial court ordered disclosure, and defense counsel did not object. On appeal, Defendant challenged the courtroom closure, alleging, inter alia, that the closure violated his right to a public trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel, rather than a defendant personally, may waive a defendant’s right to a public trial; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error by closing the courtroom to the general public during the victim’s testimony. View "State v. Bauer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault for the death of his son. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, was sufficient to sustain a reasonable theory of guilt; and (2) did not err by allowing testimony of a witness who had conversed with Defendant in the county jail where the witness used a note to refresh his memory before he met with a law enforcement officer. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape of a minor and twelve counts of possessing, manufacturing, or distributing child pornography. During the trial the trial court closed the courtroom to members of the general public during the victim’s testimony. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly closed Defendant’s trial to the public without making sufficient findings regarding the closure. The Court remanded the case and instructed the court to enter supplemental findings regarding the closure. On remand, the trial court held a supplemental hearing and found that substantial reason existed for closing the courtroom. Defendant appealed, contending that remanding for supplemental findings was an inappropriate remedy. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the remedy ordered by the Court in Rolfe I was appropriate to cure the constitutional violation alleged; and (2) the trial court did not improperly close Defendant’s trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. View "State v. Rolfe" on Justia Law

After highway patrol troopers stopped a vehicle, in which Defendant was a passenger, for a traffic infraction, the trooper smelled marijuana on the driver and in the vehicle. Defendant then admitted to the presence of marijuana in the back of the vehicle. A trooper subsequently handcuffed Defendant, patted down his person, and found cocaine on Defendant’s person. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The circuit court suppressed the cocaine seized from Defendant’s person, concluding that the State failed to establish that the warrantless search of Defendant’s person was justified under any exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the search of Defendant’s person did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement; but (2) the cocaine evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

During their marriage, Brian Shabino and Sandra Wichman borrowed money from Sandra’s mother, Mary Ann Wichman, to use as a down payment on the purchase of their home. When Sandra and Brian divorced in 2003, the divorce decree apportioned to Brian the marital home as well as the remaining debt to Mary Ann. Brian failed to repay Mary Ann, In 2012, Mary Ann brought suit for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and enforcement of the divorce decree. The circuit court concluded that a portion of Mary Ann’s breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that Mary Ann could not enforce the terms of the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Mary Ann could not enforce the divorce decree; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Mary Ann could not recover the entirety of the debt under the statute of limitations. View "Wichman v. Shabino" on Justia Law