Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Moody County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to allow Mustang Pass, LLC (Mustang) to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation in Moody County. Several citizens (Citizens) petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to invalidate Mustang’s CUP, asserting (1) the Moody County Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction because Moody County failed, in 2003, to property enact its zoning ordinances creating the Moody County Board of Adjustment; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable to the appeal procedure from a board of adjustment decision violates the Equal Protection Clause. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme comports with the Equal Protection Clause because a rational relationship exists between a legitimate legislative purpose and classifications the statute creates among citizens; and (2) the 2003 ordinances were validly enacted. View "Tibbs v. Bd. of Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to simple assault and aggravated assault. For aggravated assault, Defendant was sentenced to a thirteen-year penitentiary sentence, suspended on certain conditions. One of the conditions was that Defendant consent to any treatment plan deemed necessary by his Court Services Officer (CSO). Defendant’s CSO told Defendant that he must undergo a sex offender evaluation. The circuit court later revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence for failure to obtain a sex offender evaluation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it unlawfully delegated its judicial authority to a CSO to create and impose a condition of probation for a sex offender evaluation and treatment. Accordingly, the court erred when it revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Blakney" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, Mother alleged that Father sexually abused one of the parties’ two children. The circuit court granted sole physical custody of the children to Mother and granted Father supervised visitation. Mother appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting Father visitation. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s visitation order, holding that the circuit court erroneously concluded that it could not prohibit visitation and applied the incorrect burden of proof to the allegations of sexual abuse. Remanded for a determination of whether visitation with Father was in the children’s best interests.View "Pieper v. Pieper" on Justia Law

Employee was injured at work and underwent surgery. Employee’s health insurer covered the surgery’s costs at a discounted rate. After the Department of Labor found Employer liable for Employee’s condition Employer accepted Employee’s claim and reimbursed Employee for his out of pocket expenses and reimbursed Employee’s insurer for payments it made on Employee’s behalf. Employee challenged the payment, arguing that Employer was required to pay the full medical expense without the health insurance discount. The Department concluded that Employer fulfilled its obligation. The circuit court reversed and found Employer liable for the full medical expense billed before adjustments. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Department’s order, holding that the Department correctly applied the law in determining that Employer satisfied its statutory reimbursement obligation. View "Whitesell v. Rapid Soft Water & Spas, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first degree rape, sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen, and aggravated incest based on allegations that Defendant had sexually abused his nine-year-old granddaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting testimony as to the victim’s brother’s statements; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Defendant to proceed pro se at sentencing; (3) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) Defendant’s arguments that he received effective assistance of counsel at trial were not ripe for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Craig" on Justia Law

Megan Ruschenberg, Jessica Cornelius, and Heather Rensch (collectively, Appellants) were employees at two businesses that sold adult movies, clothing, and other sexual products. Keith Johnson was a majority owner of the businesses, and David Eliason was a minority owner and helped to manage both businesses. Each Appellant alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Eliason during her employment. Ruschenberg was allegedly raped by Eliason, which resulted in a pregnancy and an abortion. Appellants filed complaints against Eliason and the businesses (together, Defendants), alleging several causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of Ruschenberg’s abortion or in denying Appellants’ motion for a mistrial based on Johnson’s statements at trial. View "Ruschenberg v. Eliason" on Justia Law

An employee (Isack) was injured during the course and scope of his employment with his employer. Acuity, the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, paid workers’ compensation benefits to Isack. Isack then retained attorney John Knight for legal representation in a suit against the tortfeasor and his employer. In turn, Acuity retained an attorney to represent its statutory rights of recovery and offset in Isack’s claim. Isack and the tortfeasor’s employer reached a litigation settlement. The trial judge subsequently awarded Knight one-third of Acuity’s recovery and offset award. Acuity appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by giving Knight a thirty-three percent contingent fee from Acuity’s settlement portion because Acuity retained its own attorney to represent its interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s application of S.D. Codified Laws 62-4-39 and its allocation of the entire contingent fee to Knight was not clearly erroneous. View "Isack v. Acuity" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in Oregon in 2008, and the Oregon court granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child. Although Father was granted supervised visitation at least once a month, Father visited the child on two occasions only. Father also failed in general to pay child support. Mother later moved to South Dakota and eventually married Stepfather. Mother and Stepfather subsequently initiated proceedings for adoption of the child. The trial court waived Father's consent to the adoption, terminated his parental rights, and entered the order for adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in waiving Father's consent to the adoption and in determining that it was in the best interest of the child to grant the stepparent adoption.View "In re Adoption of Z.N.F." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography and sentenced to eight years incarceration. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. At issue on appeal was whether there was substantial evidence establishing that Defendant exercised dominion or control over a video file containing child pornography when the State presented no direct evidence that Defendant possessed the video, but rather relied on circumstantial evidence to convict Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstructing a law enforcement officer. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, Defendant contended that police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop or frisk him, and therefore, the evidence against him was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore, the subsequently discovered evidence was admissible.View "State v. Mohr" on Justia Law