Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1980, Joseph and C. Elaine Lingscheit transferred 240 acres in fee simple to their seven children. In 2001, the Lingscheits executed a warranty deed conveying in fee simple 240 acres to their son, Brian. The 2001 deed, however, mistakenly conveyed 80 acres that had previously been conveyed to all seven children. The Lingscheits held only a life estate interest in these 80 acres. During the probate proceedings, the children learned their parents had twice transferred the 80-acre tract of land and that their parents owned, in fee simple, a different 80-acre tract of land that was never transferred. Two siblings, Brian and Bradley, brought suit against the remaining siblings asking the circuit court to reform and revise the 2001 warranty deed, contending that the Lingscheits intended to convey to Brian the 80 acres owned by the Lingscheits in fee simple. The trial court declined to reform the 2001 deed and ruled that this deed transferred to Brian a life estate interest in 80 acres. The SupremeCourt affirmed, holding that Brian did not present clear and convincing evidence that the 2001 deed failed to express the intent of the Lingscheits. View "Hines v. Hines" on Justia Law

Jesse and Elizabeth, who were married with two children, were divorced in 2009. The divorce decree awarded primary physical custody of the children to Elizabeth and granted visitation to Jesse. After Elizabeth remarried and her husband accepted a job in California, Elizabeth filed a motion to relocate. The circuit court determined that it was in the best interests of the children to move to California and awarded Elizabeth $3,500 in attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) admitting and relying on certain evidence in making its determination; (2) determining that relocation was in the best interests of the children; and (3) awarding Elizabeth $3,500 in attorney fees.View "Brosnan v. Brosnan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part two information alleged that Defendant had two previous DUI convictions within the last ten years, including one in 2011. Defendant filed a motion to strike the 2011 conviction from the part two information, claiming that his guilty plea was invalid because he was not fully advised that he would waive his right to a jury trial, right to confrontation, and right against self-incrimination. The circuit court agreed with Defendant and ordered that the 2011 conviction be stricken from the part two information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it struck Defendant's 2011 conviction from the part two information, as the record affirmatively showed that Defendant was fully advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama during his 2011 conviction and intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights.View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Paul Nelson Farm (“Appellee”) operated an all-inclusive hunting lodge in South Dakota. The Department of Revenue and Regulation conducted an audit on Appellee and determined that Appellee owed unpaid use tax on food, beverages, and ammunition. Appellee argued that it was not required to pay use tax on those items because the food, beverages, and ammunition were not purchased for end use by Appellee but were instead purchased for resale to hunting lodge customers in Appellee’s ordinary course of business. The circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Appellee was not required to remit use tax on the food but was required to remit use tax on the beverages and ammunition. The Supreme Court held that use tax was not properly imposed on any of the goods because the items were purchased for resale to Appellee’s customers in the regular course of business, and therefore, Appellee’s control and possession of the items did not constitute “use” as defined by S.D. Codified Laws 10-46-1(17). View "Paul Nelson Farm v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

While responding to an emergency, Tim Bauman, a volunteer firefighter for the Chester Fire Department, activated his hazard lights and sped toward the fire station. While crossing an intersection, Bauman’s vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Areyman Gabriel. Both Gabriel and his passenger were injured. Gabriel sued Bauman and Chester Fire, alleging that Bauman’s conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless and that Chester Fire negligently trained Bauman and inadequately equipped Bauman’s vehicle. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it used the Supreme Court’s definition of “willful and wanton misconduct” from South Dakota’s repealed guest statute to rule as a matter of law that Bauman did not act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for Bauman; and (3) the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment to Chester Fire on Gabriel’s negligent training and equipment claims based on the immunity in S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-4.1. View "Gabriel v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and ingestion of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search of his hotel room. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the drugs seized during the initial illegal search but denied the motion with respect to evidence gathered during a subsequent call to the hotel. After a trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as the second call to police constituted an independent source of evidence against Defendant and that the evidence obtained thereby bore no causal connection to the evidence illegally seized in Defendant's hotel room. View "State v. Heney" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in 2008 while working for Employer. In 2010, Appellant received an injury she believed was a "flare-up" from the earlier injury. Appellant subsequently petitioned the Department of Labor for benefits. Because Appellant's original petition did not assert that the 2010 incident caused a recurrence of her 2008 injury, Appellant amended her petition making that assertion. Employer argued that Appellant's claim was time barred under her amended petition. Appellant respondent that the claims in her amended petition related back to her original petition, which was filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations. The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Appellant's claims in her amended petition did not relate back to her original petition and granted summary judgment to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction that the ALJ allow Appellant's amended petition to relate back to the date of her original petition, holding that to not allow Appellant to proceed on a claim that all parties agreed was a recurrence of her 2008 compensable work-related injury because Appellant failed to posture her request for relief in her original petition as a recurrence contravened the spirit of the state's worker's compensation laws.View "Waterman v. Morningside Manor" on Justia Law

Border States Paving Company, Inc. was the prime contractor on a South Dakota Department of Transportation road construction project. Weatherton Contracting Company, Inc. entered into a subcontract with Border States to supply crushed aggregate for the project. Stern Oil Company sold Weatherton fuel and petroleum products necessary for Weatherton to perform its subcontract, but Weatherton failed to pay Stern Oil for the products. Stern Oil Company brought suit against Border States and its surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, pleading causes of action against Border States for unjust enrichment and breach of an alleged third-party beneficiary payment agreement to pay the bill and against Liberty Mutual for payment on the bond. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Stern Oil on all claims. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment against Stern Oil on its claims. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm at a car, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Defendant’s 2002 conviction as other act evidence under S.D. R. Crim. P. 404(b), where the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. View "State v. Boe" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Logs Unlimited, Inc., the corporation transferred its assets to Thomas Schramel, Schramel's daughter, and another corporation. Schramel was the sole shareholder, director, and officer of both corporations. Proceeds from the transfer were used to pay some of Logs Unlimited's creditors, but Plaintiff was not among the creditors paid. Plaintiffs sued Logs Unlimited, claiming that it had fraudulently transferred its assets. The circuit court set aside the transfer, concluding that Logs Unlimited fraudulently transferred its assets to prevent satisfaction of Plaintiff's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, upon consideration of the relevant factors, the transfer was fraudulent under S.D. Codified Laws 54-8A-4(a)(1).View "Nielsen v. Logs Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law